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Summary
Introduction
There are academic and policy debates about whether financial incentives in 
welfare (that is, benefits and tax credit) systems affect demographic behaviour. 
For some they are seen as leading to less marriage, and more cohabitation, 
non-marital births and single parents. This report reviews the evidence on the 
influence of financial incentives in the welfare system on union formation and 
dissolution and on childbearing. The review also highlights the implications of 
reported findings for the United Kingdom (UK). 
Many countries, including the UK, have witnessed substantial changes to family 
lives and structures since the Second World War. In general, there has been less 
marriage with those marrying tending to do so later in life, more cohabitation, 
more same sex relationships, more divorce, childbearing has been delayed to later 
in life and there are more births outside of marriage. As a consequence, there has 
been a rapid increase in single parenthood.
The UK literature, which is very limited in quantity, tends to focus on the impact 
of the introduction of Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) on family structure. 
Most of the literature is from the United States (US), where the focus is on the 
welfare effects of two means-tested programmes, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and its replacement, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), as well as Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
Much of the literature is informed by economic theory, which sees the decision 
to marry, cohabit or have children as being influenced by financial incentives 
and disincentives. Benefits, tax credits and employment programmes can be 
conceived as influencing demographic behaviour indirectly through their effect on 
employment and family income. In addition, there are other (intervening) factors 
that affect family structure, such as, social norms and attitudes, race, educational 
attainment, self-esteem, age and so on. As a consequence, it can be difficult to 
predict whether the welfare system has a positive or a negative effect on family 
structure. For instance, work incentives in benefits and tax credits may lead to an 
increase in union formation as gaining work improves a woman’s self-confidence, 
2self-esteem or widens her social network which then includes more potential 
partners. However, it may mean she has less time to search for a partner or to 
socialise and so leads to decline in marriage/cohabitation. Similarly, higher female 
earnings (from the welfare system and/or employment) may mean that she is more 
attractive as a potential partner or that she has acquired the financial independence 
to live on her own. The factors underpinning demographic behaviour are complex 
and the underlying mechanisms are not fully understood.
There are three broad methodological approaches used by analysts:
•	 non-experimental;
•	 experimental,	and	
•	 quasi-experimental.	
In terms of the volume of evidence there are considerably more published analyses 
using non-experimental methods. Over time, researchers using non-experimental 
approaches have increased their degree of control over unobserved factors in 
their analyses, especially for factors operating at State and individual levels. With 
increasing levels of control for unobserved variables, the size of any welfare effect 
on	demographic	behaviour	 tends	 to	diminish;	 indeed,	what	 could	be	 reported	
as statistically significant impacts can become insignificant. Social experiments 
help to address the problem of unobserved factors, but there are problems with 
being able to generalise beyond the locality where the demonstration project 
was conducted, and there are concerns about possible contamination of control 
groups in some studies. The main quasi-experimental method used is difference-in-
difference, which involves comparing demographic outcomes for a group affected 
by a policy or programme with one unaffected by the intervention both before 
and after the introduction of the reform. 
Welfare systems and partnering
Some commentators express the concern that there may be a ‘marriage penalty’ 
(as opposed to a ‘marriage bonus’) in the benefit and tax credit system. A union/
marriage bonus (penalty) occurs when a couple receive more (less) in benefit/tax 
credit payments than they would if they were single. For union/marriage bonuses 
or penalties to exist there are two pre-conditions: the unit of assessment is the 
family (rather than the individual) and different marginal tax rates apply at different 
income levels. A benefit/tax system cannot be simultaneously neutral towards 
marriage, be progressive and treat families with the same income equally.
The evidence that welfare systems affect union formation is mixed. Where there 
is an effect it tends to be small or modest in size (typically, two to five percentage 
points). Moreover, the impacts appear to vary considerably by sub-group and 
possibly take some time before they emerge. US and Canadian studies also 
highlight that findings vary by local context. 
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In the UK, lone parents claiming Family Credit (FC) were more likely to enter 
marriage or cohabitation than non-recipients. This implies that FC did not act as 
a disincentive to forming unions notwithstanding that dual-earner families could 
lose entitlement to the benefit. However, following the introduction of WFTC, 
single parents were less likely (by 2.4 percentage points) to form a union than 
single childless women. This impact was more pronounced for women with 
younger children (two to three percentage points). This difference in UK findings 
might	be	because	WFTC	was	more	generous	than	FC;	it	reduced	the	opportunity	
cost of being a single parent.
The US literature shows that AFDC could have a negative, positive or no effect 
on marriage and cohabitation. Moreover, the effects varied by race and level of 
control for unobserved factors for those using non-experimental approaches in 
their analyses. For example, one study shows that for non-black, never-married 
mothers a $100 increase in monthly benefit reduced the probability of marriage 
by 19.5 per cent, but for black, never-married mothers the probability of marriage 
increased by 19.8 per cent. 
US results for the impact of welfare reforms (AFDC waivers and TANF) are also 
mixed.1 In terms of non-experimental approaches, for example, one study finds 
that AFDC waivers and TANF States reduced marriage rates, but another that 
AFDC waivers increased marriage but TANF had no significant effects. Similarly, 
social experiments are inconsistent on whether there is relationship between 
welfare policies and marriage rates for single parents. However, a meta-analysis 
reveals that, in general, programmes have tended not to have an effect for single 
parents on rates of marriage or cohabitation. 
There is some indication that welfare systems can have a longer term impact on 
some people’s demographic behaviour. For example, one study shows that for 
two-parent families their rates of marriage/cohabitation were higher (by seven 
percentage	points)	29	 to	41	months	after	 joining	an	employment	programme;	
another study shows that after seven years long-term benefit recipients on an 
employment programme were less likely to have divorced than non-participants – 
although no significant effect was found for more recent recipients. 
In general, the effect of EITC on partnering has been small and statistically 
insignificant.
US and Canadian research also shows that local context can have an important 
bearing on impact estimates. For instance, the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project 
(SSP), which was an earnings supplement paid to single parents in receipt of benefits 
when they entered full-time employment, was evaluated using experiments in 
two culturally and geographically distinct provinces: British Columbia and New 
Brunswick. It decreased the probability of being ever married or cohabitating 
in	British	Columbia	by	2.5	percentage	points	 (a	16	per	cent	fall);	but	 increased	
the probability of being ever married or cohabitating in New Brunswick by 
4.3 percentage points (a 22 per cent rise). 
1 The waivers covered introducing family caps, extending income disregards, 
amending time limits and expanding eligibility for two-parent families.
4The review also includes two pension studies: First, a Canadian study finds that 
the removal of marriage penalties for surviving spouses in the Canadian pension 
system showed that remarriage rates for females aged under 65 and for males 
aged 45 to 59 increased significantly. However, there are queries about the quality 
of the data used. Secondly, an analysis of the impact of social security (payroll) taxes 
for defined-benefit, Pay As You Go (PAYG) pension schemes on family formation 
across the Organisation for Ecomonica Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
finds that social security payroll taxes slightly reduce net marriage rates. However, 
this analysis includes several simplifying assumptions which limit its applicability.
Tentatively, this review finds that whilst there are some studies showing a 
welfare effect on marriage/cohabitation typically for sub-groups, there is, overall, 
no consistent evidence for a large and significant impact on union formation. 
Indeed, there is no set of studies that encompass analyses of an extensive range of 
sub-groups, explores longer term effects, has high external validity, and uses 
robust data. 
Welfare systems and union dissolution
A smaller number of studies assess whether financial incentives in welfare systems 
are sufficient to lead to increased levels of divorce and separation. A problem with 
this literature is that it does not always distinguish between the dissolution of 
marriages and cohabitation, yet different factors may be in operation.
Only one UK study was identified, which uses a quasi-experimental approach to 
explore whether WFTC had an impact on mothers’ decisions to dissolve unions. 
Overall, it found no impact. However, a sub-group, mothers with male partners on 
low earnings (that is, working less than 16 hours per week), had higher divorce/
separation rates (2.4 percentage points) than married women without children. 
Moreover, for this sub-group the divorce/separation rate was slightly higher where 
the mother had a higher level of education or where there were young children 
present.
US studies, together with an Australian study, provide mixed international evidence 
on whether there is a welfare effect on union dissolution. They do, however, serve 
to highlight the role of other factors in dissolutions. For example, husbands with 
poor economic positions, couples dissatisfied with their marriage, males feeling 
depressed or anxious are all associated with higher rates of divorce/separation.
Two US studies suggest that AFDC had little or no effect on union dissolutions, 
but another shows that states with AFDC waivers had lower rates of divorce 
(5.5 per cent) compared to those states without waivers. So welfare reform, as 
policy makers intended, could lead to a fall in the number of new divorces.
To	the	extent	that	there	is	an	effect	it	appears	to	be	larger	for	certain	sub-groups;	
the UK and Australian studies suggest that the effect is greater in families with 
lower earnings. However, the small number of studies, the mixed findings, 
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doubts about the robustness of some of the studies and that they do not always 
distinguish between dissolving marriages and cohabitations mean that there is no 
overwhelming evidence that welfare systems have had a major impact on union 
dissolution.
Welfare systems, childbearing and single parents
The review found relatively few studies on fertility and moves into single parenthood 
at the European level. González (2005 and 2007) finds a positive and significant 
association between welfare benefits and the incidence of single motherhood. 
However, as González’ (2007) analysis becomes more sophisticated the size of the 
impact of benefits on single motherhood and single headship becomes smaller 
and eventually statistically insignificant.
Of the three UK studies of WFTC reform, two find no significant impacts and the 
third an increase in birth rate for couples. 
Findings from US literature on the impact of AFDC on female headship show only 
small or no effects. Hoynes (1997) finds ‘no evidence that AFDC has a significant 
effect on female headship decisions’. Lichter et al. (1997) find that many of the 
variables they analyse only have a relatively small effect on female headship, and 
argue that cultural changes underpin the observed increase in female headship. 
More recent studies that take into account unobserved variables at the level 
of the individual find that the welfare effect is not only small but statistically 
insignificant.
Early US studies suggest a positive welfare effect on the fertility of unmarried 
women. But these effects largely disappear once controls for unobserved state 
characteristics are introduced into analysts’ models. Subsequent studies suggest 
minimal or no effect of welfare on fertility – with the exception of family cap 
policies.	The	family	cap	is	a	mixed	picture	–	most	studies	find	little	or	no	effect;	a	
small number of studies report either a small positive effect, or counter-intuitively 
a small negative effect. 
Implications for the UK welfare system
Identifying the policy implications of the reviewed literature for the UK is difficult. 
The underlying theory can be ambiguous about the direction of any welfare effect. 
Factors other than the welfare system have a key role in influencing demographic 
behaviour. Empirical studies provide mixed findings. Moreover, differences in 
policies and national contexts mean that findings from overseas about the 
direction, magnitude and significance of welfare effects cannot simply be applied 
to the UK.
Nevertheless, there are policy options in the literature to address union/marriage 
penalties and reduce (non-marital) childbearing. 
6The former include: 
•	 changing	the	unit	of	assessment	from	the	family/household	to	the	individual;
•	 introducing	a	transferable	allowance	for	couples,	and	
•	 targeting	families	with	children	by,	for	 instance,	 increasing	the	basic	credit	 in	
WTC for couples with children. 
Notwithstanding these policy options there may be reasons for retaining union/
marriage penalties, for example, couples – in contrast to single adults – benefit 
from household economies of scale, usually higher incomes, and from the time 
that a second adult can devote to a family. The latter policy options include in the 
short-term, improving sex education in schools, contraceptive take-up, and access 
to early abortion. In the longer term, they include increasing opportunities for 
employment and further education for client groups (both females and males).
The complexity of welfare systems’ interactions with demographic behaviour, the 
role of other factors, and the absence of cost-effectiveness studies on using welfare 
systems to influence family policy inevitably raises the question of whether other 
policy instruments, such as family counselling services, would be more efficient 
and effective at ‘nudging’ family structure in any desired direction. The review did 
not examine this other policy literature, but the mixed and small to modest impact 
that only some studies show for a welfare effect on family structure suggests 
limited scope for influencing demographic behaviour through the benefit and tax 
credit systems.
There are also potential tradeoffs in policy objectives. Welfare systems designed to 
promote certain family arrangements may have to do so at the expense of other 
policy goals, such as being progressive, treating families with the same total income 
equally, maximising work incentives and achieving simplicity in administrative 
systems and for customers.
Conclusions
The actual impact that financial incentives have on family structure is contested. 
Analysts across countries and over time report mixed findings. 
The evidence base for the UK is small. However, the international literature does 
provide some guidance on how to conduct analyses in this area. There is a need for 
UK research that is more up-to-date in terms of policies/programmes covered, that 
has the potential to provide estimates of longer-term impacts and has sufficiently 
large sample sizes to allow extensive sub-group analyses.
Whilst there are studies finding significant impacts, these tend to be small and 
are countered by studies finding no relationship or the opposite effect. To the 
extent that some studies provide evidence of a welfare effect on family structure, 
its magnitude is often smaller than classical economic theory might predict. On 
balance the reviewed literature shows that there is no consistent and robust 
evidence to support claims that the welfare system has a significant impact upon 
family structure.
Summary
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
‘All social policies create incentives, and most create at least some that are 
undesirable in the eyes of policymakers.’ 
(Ellwood (2000b:1063))
Many social and fiscal policies incorporate financial incentives and disincentives 
that could affect family structure. Some commentators argue that financial 
incentives in welfare systems affect demographic behaviour (see, for instance, 
Draper (2008) and Morgan (2007)). However, whether financial incentives in the 
welfare system actually affect behaviour is contested (Blundell and Walker, 2001). 
This report reviews the evidence on the influence of financial incentives in the 
welfare system on demographic behaviours such as partnering, separating and 
childbearing. The review also highlights the implications of reported findings for 
the United Kingdom (UK). 
Most of the evidence reviewed is from the United States (US), which reflects 
longstanding academic and public debates about whether the tax and transfer 
system impacts upon family structure (Moffitt, 1998a:1). There is a popular 
notion that ‘…welfare provides an incentive for women to not marry or remarry, 
to have children out of wedlock, and to live independently rather than at home 
with parents…’ (Moffitt, 1998a:1). Morgan (2007:121) outlines how this might 
happen:
‘…today’s benefits system can be seen as underwriting a decision to have 
children looked after by a lone parent when the earning potential of the 
father is relatively weak. Potentially, the benefits system has three effects. 
First, it can encourage lone parenthood rather than couple formation 
because of the bias in tax and benefits systems against couples – particularly 
single-earner couples. Second, it can encourage childbearing as opposed to 
a decision not to have children. Third, the benefits system can, itself, bring 
about labour market conditions that are less conducive to couples taking a 
decision to marry.’
8If the welfare system discourages marriage or increases non-marital births there 
is a concern that this might adversely affect child outcomes given evidence (for 
example, for educational attainment, teen parenthood, poverty and health) that 
children appear to benefit from living in two-parent families (provided they have 
a ‘low-conflict relationship’)	(Roberts,	2008:1;	see	also	Ermisch	and	Francesconi	
(2001),	Rodgers	and	Pryor	(1998),	and	McLanahan	and	Sandefur	(1994));	although	
poor outcomes for children may be more due to income poverty than family 
structure (see, for instance, Joshi et al., 1999 and Geronimus, 1997).2
In general, this review finds that the effect that welfare systems have on family 
structure	is	mixed;	some	studies	report	a	positive	effect,	others	a	negative	effect	
and some no significant effect. Where there is a welfare effect, it tends to be 
relatively	small	sized;	and	less	than	might	be	expected	on	the	basis	of	‘classical’	
economic theory. Moreover, the method used to analyse the impact of benefits 
and tax credits on demographic behaviour has a bearing on the magnitude and 
significance of any effect. Hence how the studies were conducted is an important 
part of this review.
The remainder of this chapter outlines the review’s objectives, see Section 1.2, how 
it was conducted, see Section 1.3, provides background information on UK and 
US demographics and welfare systems, see Section 1.4, and outlines theoretical, 
see Section 1.5 and analytical, see Section 1.6, issues relevant to the review.
1.2 Review’s objectives and scope
The review is focused on people’s behavioural responses to financial incentives 
in welfare systems. The review evaluates evidence on the influence of financial 
incentives in the tax credit and benefit systems on: 
•	 partnering	(marriage	and	cohabitation);	
•	 separation	(divorce	and	separation),	and	
•	 childbearing.
It outlines the mechanisms that may influence demographic behaviour. In addition, 
the review considers the methodological challenges underpinning the studies, gaps 
in the evidence base and the extent to which international evidence is applicable 
to the UK.
The scope of the review has had to be limited because there is an extensive 
literature, especially from the US, on welfare systems and family structure. Thus 
the review is focused on studies:
•	 published	after	1997;	and
•	 conducted	in	English-speaking	countries	that	have	tax	credits	or	benefits	which	
are similar in design to those in the UK.
2 There is also evidence that teen children of single parents living in three-
generation households in the US have outcomes that are as good as those 
living in two-parent families (see Bitler et al., 2006:3).
Introduction
9Excluded from the review are:
•	 any	 influence	 the	wider	 tax	 system	might	 have	 on	 family	 structure	 (see,	 for	
instance,	Buffeteau	and	Échevin	(2008));
•	 the	identification	and	evaluation	of	work	incentives;
•	 the	outcomes	for	children	of	financial	incentives	in	the	welfare	system	(see,	for	
example,	Sherman	(2001));
•	welfare	programmes	where	 there	 is	no	direct	 transfer	of	 cash,	 such	as	 Food	
Stamps and Medicaid which are specific US programmes that have no real UK 
equivalent;
•	 the	 literature	on	child	support	and	maintenance	payments	 (see,	 for	 instance,	
Aizer and McLanahan (2005), Plotnick et al. (2006), and Walker and Zhu 
(2006)).
1.3 Conduct of the review
This review involves the synthesis of a relatively wide range of published sources. 
The search strategy was purposive involving ‘informed’, extensive sweeps rather 
than systematic searches (Gough, 2007). Searches were conducted using academic 
online databases using combinations of keyword descriptors based on the research 
objectives, such as ‘family formation’, ‘marriage penalty’ and ‘marriage bonus’. 
The names of certain key authors were also used as search terms, not only to 
identify other sources by them but also citations of their work by other writers. In 
addition, a few experts in the field were contacted and asked to identify further 
studies and researchers.
1.4 Background: UK and US family structures and  
 welfare systems 
As most of the studies reviewed in subsequent chapters come from the UK and 
US, this section outlines recent demographic changes affecting families in the UK 
and US, as well as selected components of their welfare systems.
1.4.1 Demographic changes affecting UK families
In many countries, including the UK and US, there have been substantial changes 
to family lives and structures since the Second World War (Williams, 2005:18). 
In general, there has been less marriage with those marrying tending to doing 
so later in life, more cohabitation, more same sex partnerships, more divorce, 
childbearing has been delayed to later in life and there are more births outside of 
marriage (McConnell and Wilson, 2007:12). A small but increasing proportion of 
the population also form ‘reconstituted families’ as families dissolve and reform. 
These trends reflect a complex interplay of cultural, economic, legal, political, 
religious and social factors. 
Introduction
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Families – overview
Although the motif for the discussion below is the changing nature of the family, 
there is a high degree of continuity in familial relationships. Most children live 
in two-parent families and most marriages do not end in divorce. Although 
cohabitations typically have a short duration (see ahead), between 2001 and 2003 
most family relationships (94 per cent of couples and 83 per cent of single parents) 
remained unchanged (Barnes et al., 2005:26-27). 
Nevertheless, families in the UK have been changing since the 1980s. The overall 
number	of	families	in	the	UK	is	growing;	in	2006	there	were	17.1	million	families	
which was over two million more than in 1971 (McConnell and Wilson, 2007:2). 
Whilst the majority, 71 per cent (over 12 million), of the families in 2006 were 
married couple families, over the previous ten years the proportion of married 
couples has fallen by over four per cent. This decline has been accompanied by 
an increase of over 60 per cent in cohabitating couples (to 2.3 million) and an 
increase of eight per cent (to 2.6 million) in single parent families. 
Most dependent children live with two parents, but this proportion has been 
falling. In the UK, in 2006, there were 7.4 million families with dependent children 
(McConnell and Wilson, 2007:5). Most of these children (65 per cent) lived in 
married couple families, whilst around a quarter (24 per cent) lived in single 
parent families and just under an eighth (12 per cent) lived in cohabitating couple 
families.
In general, cohabitating couple families are younger than married couple families 
(McConnell and Wilson, 2007:6). This reflects that cohabitation can be a precursor 
to marriage and that younger generations are increasingly tolerant of cohabitation. 
Similarly, heads of families with dependent children tend to be younger (in their 
30s or early 40s) than those with no children or with non-dependent children. 
Marriage
There has been a decline in marriage rates in most European countries, including 
the UK. Marriage rates have declined in the UK since the 1970s (McConnell and 
Wilson, 2007:13).3 For instance, the number of single women who got married in 
1971 per 1,000 of the single population aged 16 or over was 97 and by 2004 it 
was 30.8. In 2006, England and Wales had the lowest number of marriages since 
1895. 
In recent years, people are entering their first marriages later in life. In England and 
Wales, the median ages of first marriages increased from 24 for males and 21.6 
for females in 1961 to 30.4 for males and 28.3 for females in 2004 (McConnell 
and Wilson, 2007:12). This reflects delays in first marriages and more remarriages 
(Wilson and Smallwood, 2008:19). The trend is associated with an increase in 
cohabitation, and most marriages (70 per cent) are preceded by a period of 
3 In England and Wales between 2000 and 2004 the marriage rate increased, 
but since 2005 the rate has continued its longer term downward trend.
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cohabitation (Williams, 2005:14). Thus the ‘shift to cohabitation’ is the ‘main 
engine’ for current trends in marriage (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000:159).
Male	 and	 female	 rates	 of	 remarriage	 following	 divorce	 have	 also	 fallen;	 for	
example, in 1971 the number of divorced men marrying per 1,000 divorced 
people aged 16 or over was 227.3, but by 2004 it was 45.7 (McConnell and 
Wilson, 2007:13). However, whilst the number of divorces has been increasing, the 
number of remarriages in England and Wales has, since the early 1970s, remained 
‘fairly’ constant. Moreover, divorcees as a proportion of those marrying has been 
increasing, between 1963 and 2003 it increased by 20 percentage points to over 
a quarter (Wilson and Smallwood, 2008:18).
Cohabitation
As already mentioned previously, in recent years the number of couples cohabitating, 
either as a precursor or as a substitute to (re)marriage, has been increasing. Thus 
the proportion of women aged 18 to 49 in cohabiting unions trebled between 
1976 (nine per cent) and 2004 (28 per cent) (McConnell and Wilson, 2007:15). In 
2005, 39 per cent of single people aged 25 to 34 were cohabiting. McConnell and 
Wilson (2007:15) observe that the rate of cohabitation for the most recent age 
cohort (those born 1956-60) is more stable. Consequently, the rate of increase in 
cohabitation may slow. 
In most Western European countries, including the UK, cohabiting unions tend to be 
short-lived, either dissolving or converting into marriage (Ermisch and Francesconi, 
2000:157-158;	Kiernan,	1999:32).	In	the	UK	during	the	1990s,	almost	a	half	(45	
per cent) of cohabiting unions ended within two years by either converting into 
marriage or dissolving (Ermisch, 2002:1-2). In 2004, 16 per cent of adults aged 
16 to 59 said that they had experienced at least one cohabitating union that 
did not lead to marriage (McConnell and Wilson, 2007:15). Unions with children 
were less likely to convert to marriage and were more likely to dissolve than 
those for childless women (Ermisch, 2002:2), although mothers tend to remain in 
cohabitations for longer than non-mothers (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000:168). 
Thus, cohabitating women giving birth to a child were at a relatively high risk 
of becoming a single parent. Those cohabiting unions at greater risk of having 
a baby were those facing poorer financial circumstances, notably those where 
the male was not in employment and the woman’s father had had semiskilled 
or unskilled manual job (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000:169). Unions that did 
convert to marriage tended to be those where the male had higher earnings and 
so	contributed	more	income	to	the	couple	(Ermisch,	2002:2;	see	also	Ermisch	and	
Francesconi, 2000:168).
People leaving cohabitation tend to repartner sooner than those divorcing, mainly 
because they tend to be younger (Ermisch, 2002:3-4). The median duration for 
repartnering after dissolution of a cohabiting union was 2.3 years (compared to 
five years following the dissolution of a marriage) with most (70 per cent) of 
those leaving the cohabitation repartnering within five years. Those with children 
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leaving	 a	 union	 tend	 to	 take	 longer	 to	 repartner;	 for	 instance,	 the	 proportion	
repartnering with children within five years was 15 percentage points lower than 
for those without children. 
Union dissolution
The divorce rate in England and Wales has increased in recent years. It increased 
from 12.9 per 1,000 married population in 1998 to 14 per 1,000 married population 
in 2004, but fell slightly to 13.1 in 2005. Historically, increases in divorce follow 
legal reforms, such as the Divorce Reform Act 1969 and the Matrimonial and 
Family Proceedings Act 1984, which allowed couples to divorce after one year of 
marriage. Since the early 1970s there has been a rapid rise in the rate of divorce 
after	one	to	two	years	of	marriage;	the	rate	peaks	at	three	to	four	years	of	marriage	
and then declines over time (Ermisch, 2002:4-5). Nonetheless, the annual divorce 
rate has stabilised at about six per cent for those born after 1951 (McConnell and 
Wilson, 2007:13). 
Unions may dissolve for a variety of reasons, and the causal mechanisms are 
complex with how, for instance, economic factors interact with ‘marital quality’ and 
well-being unclear (see Bradbury and Norris, 2005:426-427). However, Blekesaune 
(2008), using longitudinal data from the British Household Survey Panel, shows 
that in the UK male or female unemployment increases the risk of partnership 
dissolution (of both married and cohabitating couples). Male unemployment is 
associated with a 33 per cent larger risk of partnership dissolution and female 
unemployment with an 83 per cent larger risk of dissolution compared to 
partnerships	with	no	unemployment	 in	 the	previous	 year	 (Blekesaune,	2008:8;	
see also Böheim and Ermisch, 1999). Moreover, the increased risk due to male 
unemployment is associated with low levels of financial satisfaction amongst 
partnered women and this also helps to explain why unemployment leads to 
increased union dissolution. Thus low family income would appear to destabilise 
partnerships for women. The increased risk of female unemployment terminating 
a union was associated with mature, rather than recent, partnerships. (Indicating 
some support for an ‘independence effect’ (see ahead) for women in relationships 
that have lasted some years.) Blekesaune (2008) did not include receipt of benefits 
in her models, but presumably many of the unemployed couples would have been 
in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). Nonetheless, the research suggests that 
the presence of unemployment, rather than the welfare system per se, is a key 
factor in union dissolution.
Other research suggests that age at marriage is also an important factor in 
marital instability, with couples marrying at a younger age more likely to separate 
(see	 Bradbury	 and	 Norris,	 2005:426;	 Ermisch	 and	 Francesconi,	 2000:168;	 and	
Böheim and Ermisch, 1999). This is possibly because they have spent a shorter 
period of time looking for a ‘good’ match. In addition, for couples with dependent 
children, union dissolution (married and cohabiting) is less likely if the couple 
enjoys an unexpected improvement in their financial circumstances (Böheim and 
Ermisch, 1999). 
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Single parents
There has been a rapid increase in single parent households. The proportion of 
dependent children living in single parent families has increased from 18 per 
cent in 1981 to 23 per cent in 2001 (Bakeo and Clarke, 2004:7). The growth in 
single parents in the 1970s and early 1980s was due to increases in divorce and 
separation. Since the mid-1980s, the increase is mainly due to the increase in 
non-marital births. In the 2000s the flow from couple families into single 
parenthood was three per cent per annum (Clarke and McKay, 2008:59-60), 
whilst the rate at which single parents form new unions (with children) was nine 
per cent per annum. There are also ethnic differences in single parenthood, with 
high rates amongst African-Caribbean women and lower rates amongst Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi households (Williams, 2005:22). 
Fertility
Since the mid-1960s, and until recently, there has been a rapid fall in the fertility 
rate. The total fertility rate fell rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, but increased 
from 1.63 in 2001 to 1.84 in 2006. The decline in fertility reflects that more 
women have remained childless, more women have been having children later in 
their lives and fewer women are having larger sized families (Dixon and Margo, 
2006:72-73). Women may be delaying having children in order to maximise their 
life-long earnings – a ‘mid-skilled’ women forgoes, on average, £564,000 (at 2005 
prices) in lifetime earnings if she has a baby at 24 compared to a childless women 
(Dixon and Margo, 2006:76). Not surprisingly, increases in women’s earnings are 
associated with postponing childbirth. As a proportion of forgone earnings this 
‘fertility penalty’ is larger for women with lower skills (and hence low-income 
potential). 
In the UK, the number and proportion of non-marital births has been increasing 
since 1975. In 1999, 39 per cent of births in Great Britain were outside marriage 
(Ermisch, 2000:3) but by 2006 it was 43.7 per cent.4 There has been an increase in 
childbearing in first cohabitations (Ermisch, 2000:5). Unemployment is associated 
with higher non-marital childbearing (Ermisch, 2000). A one percentage point 
increase in unemployment increases, on average, the annual probability of 
a woman having a non-marital birth by 0.4 percentage points (a ten per cent 
increase). In addition, the risk of non-marital childbearing is lower for women with 
more educational qualifications (Ermisch, 2000:15). 
This increase in non-marital live births suggests that the previously strong 
association between marriage and fertility has weakened (Buffeteau and Échevin, 
2008:2-3). More generally, it signifies a weakening of the link between marriage 
and parenting.
4 Table 2.2, Population Trends (2008:49).
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1.4.2 UK welfare system
The UK research reviewed here mainly involves two components of the welfare 
system: Income Support (IS) and tax credits. Accordingly, other elements of the UK 
benefit and transfer system are not discussed here.
Income Support
IS is an income-based benefit available to people on low-incomes, mainly lone 
parents, people who are sick or disabled and carers. To be eligible recipients must 
not work more than 16 hours per week. The amount of benefit includes a personal 
allowance that varies by age and household composition. IS included child premia 
which in 2003, were transferred to the Child Tax Credit (CTC).
Critically, for analysts that investigate the impact of policy changes on family 
structure, when Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in 1999 (see 
ahead), IS payments to families with children were increased. 
Tax credits
The UK studies reviewed in this report tend to focus on WFTC, which replaced 
Family Credit (FC) (a means-tested in-work benefit) in October 1999.5 WFTC was 
designed to enhance the work incentives of parents in low-income households. 
To be eligible for WFTC (or FC) a family had to have at least one dependent 
child, at least one adult who worked 16 hours or more per week and a ‘low’ or 
‘middle’ household income. Incomes below a threshold received the maximum 
credit which was gradually withdrawn (the taper) as income rose up to the level 
at which eligibility ceased. In comparison to FC, WFTC was more generous due to 
an	increased	credit	for	children	aged	up	to	11	years;	a	higher	income	threshold;	a	
lower	taper	rate;	excluding	child	maintenance	from	its	definition	of	income;	and	a	
more generous childcare credit. 
WFTC, and the associated Disabled Person’s Tax Credit and Children’s Tax Credit, 
were replaced by Working Tax Credit (WTC) and CTC in April 2003.6 For families 
with	children	WTC	essentially	replicates	the	non-child	elements	of	WFTC;	however,	
it is also payable to singles and couples without dependent children. The credit 
comprises a basic element, a lone parent/couple element, a childcare element 
(if applicable) and additional elements for working 30 or more hours per week, 
having an impairment or being aged 50 years or over. Although WTC and CTC are 
separate programmes they are subject to the same means-test, which is applied to 
a couple’s joint annual income.
5 FC was introduced in 1988 and replaced Family Income Supplement (which 
was introduced in 1971) (see Strickland, 1998).
6 The Children’s Tax Credit was introduced in April 2001 and provided families 
with extra income tax relief. Effectively, it was replaced by CTC.
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CTC separated out and merged the child premia in WFTC and IS/JSA.7 It is means-
tested, but payable irrespective of the employment status of the recipient. It 
consists of a family element (a higher rate is paid if there is a child aged under 
one year), premia for each dependent child and, where appropriate, an element 
for disabled children. The CTC is paid to the adult with the main responsibility for 
caring for the dependent child(ren).
For the purposes of WTC and CTC couples are defined as men and women who 
are married or cohabitating (that is, living together as if they are married), or two 
people of the same sex in a civil partnership, or living together as if they are in a 
civil partnership. Tax credits in the UK take account of the joint income of couples. 
There is no difference in the treatment of couples or single adults for families with 
children. For WTC, an additional element is payable to working childless couples 
(as against working childless single people), and the eligibility requirements in 
terms of hours worked are slightly different for couples as against single people. 
However, apart from the support for childcare in tax credits, households with 
children with the same income and the same number of children will still receive 
the same amount of tax credits. 
In addition, when CTC and WTC were introduced, the 30 hour element was 
changed so that couples could combine their usual working hours to qualify 
for this element of the credit. This might have had some impact on any couple 
penalty/bonus after 2003 as where couples were both working less than 30 hours 
individually, but 30 or more hours jointly would benefit. 
1.4.3 Demographic changes affecting US families
Marriage and cohabitation in the US
Most Americans (about 90 per cent) marry at some point in their lives (Roberts, 
2007:2), but there is a wide variation by race – flows into marriage are lower 
in States with higher proportion of African Americans (Bitler et al., 2004:224). 
However, since the end of the Second World War rates of marriage have been 
declining in the US. In 1970, the marriage rate per 1,000 unmarried adult women 
was 76.5 but by 2004 it had fallen to 39.9 (Burstein, 2007:388). The corollary is 
an increase in non-marital cohabitation. By the mid-1990s most marriages were 
preceded by cohabitation (Burstein, 2007:388). 
The decline in the rate of marriage varies by sub-group and is higher for African 
Americans and for those with lower educational qualifications. Amongst 
never-married women living in poverty, rates of marriage are low and declining 
(Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa, 2006:11). Moreover, women with more education 
are	 tending	 to	 marry	 later	 in	 life	 (Burstein,	 2007:388;	 Ellwood	 and	 Jencks,	
2004:13).
7 Existing families on IS/JSA have been gradually migrated onto CTC, although 
the process is not yet complete – in April 2008 around 365 thousand families 
still received CTC-equivalent support via IS/JSA, compared with 1.018 million 
out of work families receiving CTC.
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Most American marriages and remarriages follow a period of cohabitation (Smock 
et al., 2005:680). Research shows that in the US cohabitation is associated with 
age, race, educational background, religiosity and family background (Moffitt et 
al., 2003:267). 
As in the UK, cohabiting unions in the US have shorter durations and higher exit 
rates compared to marital unions (Moffitt et al., 1998:260). Compared to the 
general population, rates of cohabitation amongst benefit recipients are higher 
(Moffitt et al., 1998:262). 
Cohabiting couples with children in the US have lower household incomes than 
married couples with children (Acs and Maag, 2005:2). This difference reflects the 
lower age and educational attainment of the mothers and the lower employment 
status of fathers in cohabiting couples compared to married couples. Their lower 
incomes mean that cohabitating couples were more likely to participate in the 
welfare system than their married counterparts.
Divorce
In the US rates of divorce have increased since the Second World War. The rate of 
divorce per 1,000 married women was 9.2 in 1960, rose to 22.6 in 1980 but has 
fallen	since	then;	it	was	17.7	in	2004	(Burstein,	2007:388).	The	introduction	of	
no-fault divorce in the US is partly responsible for facilitating the increase in the 
number of divorces (Morgan, 2007:128-129). Divorce and separation rates vary 
by race and level of education. Rates of divorce and separation are highest for 
African Americans and women with less than 12 years of schooling, and lowest 
for non-Hispanic whites and college educated women.
Divorced men in the US are more likely to remarry than divorced women, and 
divorced women with children are less likely to remarry than those without children 
(Bergstrom, 1996:1917).
Single mothers
The number of unmarried women having children, including teenage pregnancies, 
has increased in the US. The proportion of children aged under 18 living in single 
parent families was about ten per cent in 1965 and this rose to 29 per cent in 
1997 but fell back to 27 per cent in 2001 (Ellwood and Jencks, 2004:10). Indeed, 
between 1997 and 1999 the share of children living in single parent families fell 
by 2.1 percentage points (Acs and Nelson, 2004:274). The drivers for this have 
changed over time. In the 1960s and 1970s the rise was due to the increase in 
divorce rates, whilst in the 1980s and 1990s it was due to non-marital births. The 
more recent decline in single parenthood may be due to welfare reform and a 
tight labour market. This trend is also accompanied by an increase in the share of 
children living in cohabitating families. 
The increase in female-headed households with children has been more dramatic 
for African American women than for white women – for the former the increase 
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has been from about 30 per cent in 1970 to over 50 per cent in 1993, compared 
to an increase from eight per cent in 1968 to 17 per cent in 1993 for white women 
(Bergstrom, 1996:1917). The reasons for this difference are poorly understood 
(Ellwood and Jencks, 2004:10). 
However, there is evidence that rates of single parenthood are lower for women 
with lower levels of educational attainment (and hence earnings potential) (Ellwood 
and	Jencks,	2004:10-11;	Hoynes,	1997a:104).	
Fertility
Births outside of marriage were relatively rare in the US until the 1960s (Ellwood 
and Jencks, 2004:9), but they have increased from 11 per cent in 1970 to 
34 per cent in 2002 (Martin et al., 2003 cited by Ryan et al., 2006:104). In addition, 
second or higher order non-marital births have risen with half of all non-marital 
births in 1998 to women who already had at least one child (Terry-Humen et al., 
2001 cited by Ryan et al., 2006). 
Rates of non-marital births are higher amongst African Americans and increasingly 
for Latino communities, and are higher for those with less education (Ellwood and 
Jencks, 2004:11-13). Thus:
‘…highly educated women are postponing both marriage and childbearing, 
while less educated women are postponing marriage but not childbearing. 
The result has been a rapid rise in the fraction of less educated women who 
have had children but have not married.’
(Ellwood and Jencks (2004:13))
This increase in non-marital childbirth is mainly due to the fall in the marriage rate, 
and not because women are more likely to have children – that is, most of the 
increase in non-marital births has occurred in cohabitating unions (Ellwood and 
Jencks, 2004:9). 
1.4.4 US welfare system
The US literature reviewed in subsequent chapters is focused on three components 
of the welfare system: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), its 
replacement Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the tax credit, 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). These three programmes are discussed ahead.
ADFC
AFDC or AFDC-Basic was introduced in 1935 by the Social Security Act and provided 
cash benefits to low-income families with dependent children. ‘Dependent 
children’ were defined as those without the support or care of a biological parent 
due to death, disability or absence from the home. In practice, this meant AFDC 
covered mainly single mother families – indeed, since the 1980s the majority of 
recipients were unmarried single mothers (Moffitt, 2003:313). The definition of 
a dependent child also implied that AFDC could be claimed by a parent who 
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remarried or was cohabitating with someone who was not the natural parent – 
that is, AFDC was payable as long as any partner was not the biological parent 
of the woman’s children. In addition, the incomes of step-parents (up until 1981) 
and cohabiters were effectively excluded from the assessment of benefit (Moffitt, 
2003:294). Since a Supreme Court ruling in 1968, AFDC could not be denied to 
cohabiting	mothers;	although	the	male’s	relationship	to	the	child	and	his	degree	
of economic support must be considered. However, states had some discretion in 
setting the rules and so cohabitation within AFDC could still be difficult to achieve 
in certain states. 
In 1961 the Federal Government gave states the option of introducing the AFDC-
Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) programme, which included two parent families 
where the primary earner was unable to find employment of over 100 hours per 
month. AFDC-UP was believed to encourage marriage, because a low-income 
couple might be financially better off if they married and claimed AFDC-UP rather 
than if they cohabitated and the woman received AFDC-Basic. It operated in 
approximately a half of States before 1990 and subsequently (as required by the 
Family Support Act 1988) in all states. The income and employment eligibility 
conditions	for	AFDC-UP	were	more	stringent	than	for	AFDC-Basic;	for	instance,	
the unemployed parent had to have a history of employment and both parents’ 
income was counted.
Over	time,	the	AFDC	caseload	has	varied;	it	increased	dramatically	in	the	1970s	
and gradually declined until 1982 when it stabilised before increasing rapidly again 
during the early 1990s and then declined (Moffitt, 2003:307-9). Nonetheless, 
there was a general decline in the real value of AFDC benefits from the late 60s to 
the early 1990s when there was a modest increase in value (Hoynes, 1997a:100-
102;	Moffitt,	1998b:60	and	2003:307).	For	instance,	real	spending	on	AFDC	fell	
from $21.7m in 1984 to $20.4m in 1996 (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000:1036). 
Yet	over	the	same	period	the	caseload	increased	from	10.9m	to	12.6m;	a	15	per	
cent increase. 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1981 allowed states to waiver Federal 
AFDC rules and experiment with different forms of provision. Between 1993 
and 1995 approximately a half of states implemented some sort of waiver 
programme (Bitler et al., 2004:216). Two policy areas directly relevant to this 
review are demonstration projects with ‘family caps’ and AFDC-UP (Maynard 
et al., 1998:139-140). In 1992, New Jersey was the first state to experiment with not 
increasing AFDC benefits when recipients had additional children after ten months 
of claiming benefit (the ‘family cap’). Family caps became a feature of several 
AFDC waiver and TANF programmes (Maynard et al., 1998:141-146). Waivers for 
AFDC-UP could relax the eligibility criteria on two-parent families, such as the rule 
that the principle wage earner had to work for less than 100 hours per month 
(Maynard et al., 1998:146-150). In general, however, State waiver programmes did 
not concentrate on family formation, but on getting recipients into employment 
(Fein et al., 2002:1).
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All AFDC recipients (and, later on, TANF participants) were eligible for Food Stamps 
and Medicaid (Moffitt, 2003:295). The Food Stamp programme involves awarding 
food coupons to low-income households that are redeemable for food items, 
and Medicaid provides subsidised medical care to low-income families. For those 
people that are eligible, Food Stamps are paid irrespective of family structure.8 In 
calculating the amount of AFDC benefit, Food Stamp benefits as well as EITC (see 
ahead) and housing subsidies were, generally, excluded.9
Critically for the US research reported here AFDC benefits were set at state level, 
and	 there	was	 a	 high	 variation	 between	 states;	 there	was	 a	 sixfold	 difference	
between	 the	most	 and	 least	 generous	 (Hoynes,	 1997a:90;	Moffitt,	 2003:293).	
This variation has been used in studies to consider the impact of AFDC on family 
structures. 
TANF
TANF, which was introduced by the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA), replaced AFDC and AFDC-UP in 1996. Concerns that AFDC might 
have encouraged single mother families were reflected in the objectives of TANF, 
which included preventing and reducing non-marital births and teen pregnancies 
and births, and promoting the formation and maintenance of two-parent families 
as	well	 as	 encouraging	moves	 into	 employment	 (Burstein,	 2007:412;	Maynard	
et al., 1998:134). Implicit in TANF is the assumption that financial incentives can 
be used to influence attitudes towards family structure and so change actual 
behaviour (Mauldon et al., 2002:6). Indeed, underpinning the programme is 
a belief that marriage is an exit route from welfare and poverty (Bitler et al., 
2004:213). Although states could impose family caps and extend support to 
two-parent families as well as require that teenage single mothers in receipt 
of TANF live with their parents and stay in school (see ahead), there were few 
provisions in the legislation directly linked to its family-related objectives (Moffitt, 
2003:307) and few states have taken substantial steps to change demographic 
behaviour (Fein et al., 2002:1).
The programme has four key features. First, it is a workfare programme – parents’ 
receipt of benefit is linked to undertaking activities to gain paid work.10 Secondly, 
TANF established lifetime time limits (up to five years) for the receipt of Federal 
8 Eligibility for Food Stamps is based on the ‘assistance unit’ and a cohabitating 
couple that shares and prepares food together would, like a married couple, 
be eligible for benefits (Acs and Maag, 2005:5).
9 How EITC interacts with AFDC and TANF has changed over time, at times 
it has been counted as income, but at other times it has been disregarded 
(see Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000:1032). However, since January 1991 it 
has mainly been disregarded in means-tested programmes. Nonetheless, the 
Food Stamp programme counted AFDC benefits as income.
10 Post-1981 workfare-type demonstration projects were also a feature of some 
states with AFDC waivers.
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funds by families (although 20 per cent of the state caseload was exempt from this 
provision). Thirdly, aspects of the design of the programme and its financing, via 
block grants, were devolved to state level. As with AFDC, states were free to set 
their	own	benefit	levels;	however,	benefits	could	be	in	cash	and/or	in-kind	services	
(such as childcare) (Moffitt, 2003:311). As a consequence there are substantial 
differences in welfare programmes across the US (Schoeni and Blank, 2000:8) 
and the magnitude of any TANF effect on family structure will vary. Fourthly, as 
States could serve two-parent families based on their income, TANF removed the 
AFDC disincentives ‘against either living with or marrying the children’s father, or 
against marrying rather than living with another man.’ (Burstein, 2007:412). The 
expansion of benefits to two-parent families under TANF (and previously some 
state waiver reforms) is ‘…the only aspect of welfare reform that directly affects 
the incentive to marry.’ (Bitler et al., 2004:216). However, for the women to be 
eligible for benefits the husbands’ earnings must be low and this might make the 
men unattractive as potential spouses. Thus the extension of benefits to two-parent 
families might not have provided an incentive for women to marry. Although for 
women who were already married, it might have removed an incentive to divorce 
and become single in order to be eligible for benefit, something that might have 
been the case under the previous system. 
Eligibility for TANF, like AFDC, does not depend upon marital status, but on family 
living arrangements. In general, adults unrelated to the TANF unit are assumed not 
to contribute to it financially, even if they are cohabiting. Related partners, that is, 
married couples and cohabitating biological fathers, are assumed to contribute to 
the household. In general, this can generate some complex outcomes (Alm et al., 
1999:196):
•	 a	 single	mother	marrying	 the	 father	of	her	 children	who	was	not	previously	
living with her and who was in low paid work may lose some or all of her 
benefit,	because	of	her	husband’s	earnings;
•	 a	 single	mother	marrying	 the	 father	of	her	 children	who	was	not	previously	
living with her and who was unemployed may retain some or all of her benefit, 
because	two-parent	families	may	be	eligible	for	TANF;
•	 a	 single	 mother	 who	 marries	 someone	 unrelated	 to	 her	 children	 who	 is	 in	
employment may lose some or all of her benefit regardless of the previous living 
arrangements,	because	of	her	husband’s	earnings;
•	 a	single	mother	marrying	the	father	of	her	children	who	was	previously	living	
with her will not lose any TANF because his earnings would already have been 
taken into account in the TANF calculation.
The focus of welfare reform in the US was to increase work incentives and the 
changes have been accompanied by an increase in employment by women (Bitler 
et al., 2004:216). In real terms, expenditure on TANF has fallen as caseloads have 
reduced (Moffitt, 2003:307-8).
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The Deficit Reduction Act 2005, signed by President Bush in February 2006, 
reauthorised TANF and also provided funding for marriage and relationship 
education programmes to promote ‘healthy marriages’. 
EITC
EITC, which was introduced in 1975, is an in-work refundable tax credit paid to 
low-income households.11 In terms of caseload and expenditure EITC expanded 
rapidly, especially during the mid-1980s and 1990s.12 In real terms, the value of EITC 
increased more than ten-fold between 1984 and 1996 (Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2000:1027). Currently, EITC is the largest cash assistance programme in the US 
(Acs	and	Maag,	2005:2;	Ellwood,	2000a:189).	It	is	a	large	part	of	the	‘package’	
that (along with a decline in benefits) has increased work incentives for single 
parents (Ellwood, 2000a:190-193). 
The majority of the credits are received by single parents (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 
2000:1030), although it is also available to married taxpayers. Since January 
1991, the credit has been larger for taxpayers with two or more children than for 
those with one child (Hotz and Scholz 2003:146-151). In 1994, a small credit was 
introduced for childless low-income taxpayers aged between 24 and 65. 
To complement the Federal EITC, states can operate their own schemes. The 
states’ EITCs are calculated as a percentage of the Federal EITC and the credit is 
refundable in most but not all states. EITC is administered through the Federal 
(and in some cases the state) tax system and is usually paid once a year in the form 
of a tax refund or adjustment to tax liabilities. 
Eligibility is based on the earnings of the ‘tax filing unit’, and martial status 
determines who is included in the tax unit. Whilst married couples must file a joint 
return, unmarried individuals can file either head of household returns (if they 
have qualifying children) or single returns (if they have no qualifying children). The 
credit is based on annual family income, not wages. 
A non-refundable Federal child tax credit was also introduced in 1998 (Ellwood, 
2000b:1064).
1.5 Theoretical perspectives and empirical observations
Much of the research reviewed here is informed by economic theory that sees 
the decision to marry, cohabit or have children as being influenced by financial 
incentives and disincentives. However, evidence suggests that other factors are 
influential. For example, Ono (2001, cited in Harknett and Gennetian, 2003:456) 
argues that the gendered nature of work affects how a woman’s economic 
11 Refundable means that if the household’s credit is greater than its tax liability 
the difference is paid to the tax filer by the Treasury.
12 Ventry (2000) provides a political history of the growth of EITC.
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circumstances influence marriage decisions, whilst Wu and Balakrishan (1992) 
(cited in Harknett and Gennetian, 2003:456) show that attitudes towards marriage 
have a mediating role on structural variables, such as employment.
This section begins by outlining a heuristic framework for considering the possible 
links between welfare systems and family structure. It then outlines some of the 
theoretical debates on the factors influencing demographic behaviour and draws 
upon supporting empirical sources as appropriate. 
1.5.1 Understanding welfare systems and family structure
A wide range of factors influence demographic decision-making. Conceptually, 
the welfare system can be depicted as affecting family structure through its impact 
on employment and family income (see Figure 1.1) (Fein et al., 2002). To the 
extent that the welfare system affects family income then it influences the direct 
financial costs and benefits that people consider when making partnership and 
childbearing decisions. So, for instance, for single women entering employment the 
welfare system may increase union formation by eliminating the marriage penalty 
(or disincentive) previously associated with being on benefits. On the other hand, 
entering employment may reduce marriage because it enhances women’s financial 
independence. (These possible mechanisms are discussed further ahead.) In some 
instances the benefit may directly target demographic behaviour, for instance, in 
the US, TANF payments can be capped when recipients have additional children 
(known as the ‘family cap’). 
In addition, there may be other non-financial factors arising from the welfare 
system’s effect on employment that affect demographic behaviour. For example, 
union formation may increase because gaining work improves a woman’s 
self-confidence, self-esteem or widens her social network which then includes 
more potential partners. However, it may also mean she has less time to search 
for a partner or to socialise or even for childbearing, so marriage or cohabitation 
is less likely to occur. (These factors, may, of course, also affect men.) 
Whether and how employment and family income affect demographic behaviour 
will be mediated by individual and cultural factors – and as such they help explain, 
or clarify the nature of, the relationship between the variables. There are also 
moderating individual factors that will affect the direction and strength of the 
relationship between the variables. 
Exploring the relationships between these numerous variables is further complicated 
by decisions on marital status, childbearing and employment being inter-linked (or 
joint) rather than independent events. Failure to take the interaction between 
these processes into account will lead to biased estimates in empirical models 
(Aassve et al., 2006:781-782). 
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1.5.2 Marriage and welfare systems
Becker’s household production theory of marital formation and dissolution (for 
instance, Becker (1981)) is very influential in the studies reviewed here. His theory 
posits that women will choose marriage when its economic benefits exceed the 
economic benefits of being outside of marriage – that is, people marry to increase 
their material well-being (that is, to maximise their utility). The relative economic 
opportunities available both inside and outside of marriage are seen to influence 
the decision to marry. Marriage is seen as beneficial where there is specialisation 
between partners – one engages in paid work and the other in home production. 
Gains in efficiency – through one being employed and earning and the other 
engaged in household production – allow both to have more leisure time and 
a higher standard of living when married than when single. Specialisation leads 
to the prediction that higher-wage women will marry lower-wage men, and 
vice versa (Burstein, 2007:390). In this way, efficiency is maximised because the 
relative abilities of each partner, their comparative advantages, differ the most. 
However, if the wages for males and females converge and/or partners secure 
similar non-monetary gains from employment or childrearing then the benefits 
from specialisation and so the gains from marriage decline (Ellwood and Jencks, 
2004:14). 
However, the notion that material gains only accrue from specialisation has been 
challenged. Lam (1988 cited in Burstein, 2007:390) argues that sharing ‘public 
goods’ (for instance, housing and the benefits of having children) is another source 
of material gain within marriage. Contrary to Becker’s theory these gains may lead 
to women and men with similar wages marrying. Oppenheimer (1997 cited in 
Burstein, 2007:391) argues that specialisation is a risky strategy due to possible 
job loss or desertion. She maintains that couples can maximise their material 
gains if they both work (full-time) and buy-in household services. Weiss (1997 
cited in Burstein, 2007:391) highlights other sources of material gain in marriage: 
economies of scale from a larger household and that whilst one partner works 
the other can undertake education and training (that is, invest in human capital). 
Indeed, economies of scale, in terms of resources and time, provide a ‘powerful 
incentive’ (Ribar, 2003:6) for individuals to join together in a single household and 
share resources. 
Traditional economic theory implies that for women there is a choice between 
being married and being single and the decision is influenced by the woman’s 
wages, the wages of potential partners, and benefits and tax credits as well as 
other observable and unobservable factors (Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1999:4). 
However, the effect of earnings on the decision to marry or cohabit is ambiguous. 
Females with higher earnings or good employment records are more likely to marry 
or cohabit because they are attractive as potential partners, but equally they are less 
likely to marry or cohabit because they have the financial independence to do so 
(the ‘independence effect’). The former implies that marriage is a ‘normal good’ – 
as opposed to an ‘inferior good’ where consumption falls as income increases – 
and the correlation between wages and prevalence of single motherhood is 
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negative. The latter implies that with rising female labour participation rates 
and higher real wages the economic or ‘opportunity cost’ of remaining single 
(or getting divorced) has fallen. 
Studies that have sought to investigate the association between women’s 
employment and marriage have had mixed results, finding both positive and 
negative	effects	(Burstein,	2007:405;	Harknett	and	Gennetian,	2003:457).	More	
recent studies suggest that women – like men – are more likely to marry the more 
they earn (Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa, 2006:12-13). Yet studies have tended 
not to consider the distinction between deciding not to marry and marrying later 
on in life (Burstein, 2007:405-406). The independence hypothesis does not help 
to explain why women with higher incomes might choose to marry later on, say, 
after they have established their careers.
A related idea is the ‘marriage market’ – as expressed by the ratio of men to 
women. Geographically, the number of marriageable men and women may be 
constrained and out of balance. The reason why some low-income single women 
do not marry has been attributed to the lack of marriageable men within a locality 
(Burstein, 2007:396). Here marriageable men may be seen as those with steady 
earnings from employment – a view associated with the sociologist William Julius 
Wilson. In some communities in the US the availability of marriageable men may 
be reduced by unemployment, imprisonment or premature death (due to gang 
violence) (Roberts, 2007:4) or long-term severe socio-economic disadvantages 
(Geronimus, 1997:415). However, simply dividing people into marriageable and 
unmarriageable may be too crude a distinction, especially as what someone looks 
for in a potential partner may change over time and some individuals may restrict 
their preferences for non-economic reasons, such as not considering people from 
a different ethnic community. In addition, falls in marriage rates have also been 
observed for ‘marriageable men’, such as those with higher levels of education 
(Del	Bono,	2004:3;	see	also	Lichter	et al., 1997:115). Indeed, high-earning African 
American males, who due to their incomes could be regarded as ‘marriageable’, 
have lower marriage rates than white Americans. 
Moreover, in a marriage market where there is a scarcity of marriageable men, the 
marriageable men may use their relative scarcity to avoid marriage. Not surprisingly 
some studies find that the marriage market is not significant in accounting for 
marriage or cohabitation (see Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b:15).
Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence from the US that increasing men’s 
employment	 does	 increase	 rates	 of	marriage	 (Burstein,	 2007:389;	 Bitler	et al., 
2004:215). The related theory is that falls in levels of male unskilled employment 
and wage levels have created imbalances in marriage markets, especially amongst 
African Americans. However, Edin (2002) claims that whilst this view is persuasive, 
the fall in US marriages is greater than the theory would imply (see also Gennetian 
and Knox, 2003:9). Moreover, if in the US the fall in marriage rates amongst African 
American single mothers is due to increased unemployment amongst African 
American males, then welfare programmes that increase female employment 
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and earnings may not have large effects on marriage rates, indeed they might 
accelerate the decline in marriages (Gennetian and Knox, 2003:10).
The impact that the welfare system has on marriage is theoretically ambiguous. 
Some writers have used Becker’s theory to suggest that increases in benefits and 
tax credits will decrease the chances of marriage. Tax credits and benefits are 
seen to influence behaviour because of the loss of income (the marriage penalty) a 
woman would incur being married compared to being single. Similarly, the emphasis 
on obtaining paid work in welfare systems might mean that greater financial 
independence for women leads to less marriage (the ‘independence effect’ (see 
previously)). However, the increasing emphasis in welfare systems on conditionality 
and work requirements might mean that remaining on benefit is less attractive 
and leads to more marriage. In the US, there is some evidence that women are 
less likely to enter marriage unless they have sufficient bargaining power in the 
form of their own income or self-sufficiency (Gennetian and Millar, 2004:279). 
This implies that increases in employment/earnings will promote marriage. Indeed, 
men may prefer to marry women who are financially independent. So, in practice, 
it is difficult to predict how increases or decreases in benefits and tax credits will 
affect marriage (and cohabitation). Moreover, the theory is unable to give clear 
predictions	of	the	magnitude	of	the	effect	of	the	welfare	system	on	marriage;	it	
might be large or small. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the economic factors influencing union formation 
and dissolution through the welfare system operate differently for low-income and 
high income groups (Burstein, 2007:389). This is because: benefits might have a 
larger impact upon individuals with lower incomes compared to the effect that tax 
credits	have	on	people	with	‘higher’	incomes;	employment	programmes	usually	
increase the employment prospects and so the earnings of lower income males 
rather	than	those	of	better-off	males	(who	tend	to	be	in	full	employment);	and	for	
low-income women the benefits of employment in order to improve union stability 
(reduced financial pressures) may not exceed the costs (less leisure time) because 
their work is often poorly paid. Thus, indicators of (potential) income, such as 
educational attainment, may be used in empirical studies to explore associations 
between tax and transfer payments and family structure to see if economic 
mechanisms vary between disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged groups.
There is empirical research that shows that decisions to marry (or divorce) are 
not simply affected by the tax and transfer systems. Other factors that appear to 
influence such decisions include:
•	 Characteristics	 that	 affect	 the	 suitability	 of	 a	 person	 as	 a	 potential	 spouse	
(Carasso and Steuerle, 2005:161), including drug and alcohol abuse, mental 
health conditions (such as depression), fear of divorce and experience of 
domestic violence (Roberts, 2007:4-5). Men and women with low-incomes 
may have less access to services that help them to address these issues than 
people with higher incomes and so, it is argued, they avoid people with these 
characteristics.
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•	 A	related	point	is	the	degree	of	trust	that	can	be	placed	in	a	potential	partner.	
Changes in gender roles mean that women may be less willing to tolerate ‘bad’ 
behaviour by men (Ellwood and Jencks, 2004:20). For women this can be with 
respect to a male’s to sexual faithfulness, money management skills and the 
nature	of	his	interactions	with	her	children	(Edin,	2002;	Carasso	and	Steuerle,	
2005:161). For some the level of risk might mean avoiding marriage and for 
others delaying marriage in order to observe and assess a potential spouse’s 
behaviour.
•	 A	potential	spouse’s	suitability	as	a	parent	 (Carasso	and	Steuerle,	2005:161).	
For single mothers this may in turn be influenced by the number and age(s) of 
her child(ren). In the US separated women with no children are more likely to 
remarry than women with three or more children (Bumpass et al., 1990 cited in 
Gennetian and Knox, 2003:11). This might be because some men are unwilling 
to take on the additional responsibilities associated with marrying a woman with 
children, especially if he is not the biological father. Or he may be concerned 
about the effect of the marriage on any children he already has and he may have 
ongoing financial commitments to these children (Roberts, 2008:4). Unmarried 
mothers may also be worried about the effect that a marriage may have on her 
existing children, especially if she expects they will respond negatively (Roberts, 
2008:3-4).
•	 The	 family	 context,	 in	 terms	 of	 parental	 education	 and	 the	 family’s	 religion	
(Plotnick, 2004:7).
•	 For	 single	 people	 there	 is	 a	 possible	 cost	 of	 marriage	 in	 terms	 of	 forgoing	
possible gains from any investment in human capital (Plotnick, 2004:8). Thus 
higher levels of education can lead to delayed union formation (Aassve et al., 
2006:795).
•	 The	desire	 for	 a	 fulfilling	 relationship	 (Carasso	 and	Steuerle,	 2005:161),	 and	
young people’s expectations and desires about marriage (Plotnick, 2004). More 
recent cohorts are more likely to endorse gender equality and increasingly 
women expect to have an equal say in family decisions (Ellwood and Jencks, 
2004:20-21). The level of autonomy or control desired by single women may 
convince them that they do not wish to become dependent upon men and that 
they	want	to	live	alone	(Edin,	2002;	Gennetian	and	Knox,	2003:8).	Or	it	may	
mean that women postpone marriage until their children are in school when 
they could then enter employment and through making a financial contribution 
to the household be entitled to have a say in family decision-making. In any 
event in the UK younger cohorts have a lower rate of union formation (marriage 
and cohabitation) than older cohorts (Aassve et al., 2006:795).
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•	 Having	financial	stability	in	order	to	minimise	the	stress	that	would	otherwise	
characterise low-income households (Edin, 2002). Low-income mothers have to 
worry about money because they have so little, and erratic financial contributions 
from males can mean that couples separate or do not marry. In the US low-
income mothers can impose a ‘pay and stay’ rule – if male partners are out of 
work and not making a financial contribution to the household they can lose 
their right to co-reside.
•	Wider	socio-cultural	norms	about	the	need	for	substantial	assets	and	income	
prior to marriage (Burstein, 2007:396).
•	 Individuals	in	the	UK	with	a	limiting	long-term	health	condition	have	been	less	
likely to establish a first or subsequent relationship than those without a health 
condition (Clarke and McKay, 2008).
•	 Race	and	ethnicity	(see	previously).
•	 Educational	 attainment	 which	 in	 turn	 will	 affect	 potential	 earnings	 
(see previously).
There are other approaches to family formation and dissolution in the economics 
literature (see Bergstrom, 1996). For instance, cooperative and non-cooperative 
bargaining models, which build upon game theory, acknowledge that the members 
of	 a	 ‘family	 unit’	may	 have	 different	 objectives	 (Bergstrom,	 1996:1924-	 1930;	
Ribar, 2003:6). Thus how married and unmarried parents respond to financial 
incentives in the welfare system may differ. 
1.5.3 Cohabitation and welfare systems
Many of the economic factors promoting marriage also favour cohabitation. 
Indeed, for low-income groups the benefits of marriage over cohabitation may 
be small, as the latter can provide some of the benefits of marriage such as 
companionship and economies of scale in household production. Cohabitation 
can be conceptualised as a substitute for marriage or as a complement to 
marriage (see Moffitt et al., 1998:260). If it complements marriage, cohabitation 
can be seen as a precursor to marriage. Partners can use this trial period to gather 
information on the suitability and quality of the union. Cohabitation may also be 
attractive for single mothers as it provides a degree of flexibility during periods 
of financial instability and uncertainty (Edin and Lein, 1997) cited in Harknett 
and Gennetian, 2003:458). However, cohabitation is not necessarily a perfect 
substitute	for	marriage	(Gassman-Pines	and	Yoshikawa,	2006:12;	Moffitt	et al., 
1998:260):
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•	 It	 is	not	a	good	predictor	of	a	successful	marriage;	 in	many	countries	former	
cohabiters have higher rates of divorce than non-cohabiters (Svarer, 2004).13 
Indeed, some cohabiters claim they have no intention of marrying their 
partner. 
•	What	is	distinctive	about	marriage	is	a	commitment	that	is	backed	with	some	
legal rights and its contractual nature may reduce risks and encourage investment 
in human capital (Burstein, 2007:391).
•	 Some	 people	 give	 reasons	 for	 cohabitating,	 for	 example,	 sharing	 household	
expenses, that imply the arrangement is not a trial for marriage.
•	 Cohabiting	 unions	 may	 be	 less	 stable	 than	 married	 unions	 (see	 ahead	 and	
Section 1.4).
According to economic theory, to the extent that benefits are reduced by taking 
into account the additional income of a partner then there is a disincentive to 
cohabit. However, some argue that single parents may have an incentive to cohabit 
rather than marry if it is possible to conceal the additional income from a partner 
from the authorities.
Financial considerations can be an important consideration for cohabiters when 
deciding whether to marry (Smock et al., 2005). Specifically, male earnings, 
occupation and educational level are positively associated with transitions from 
cohabitation into marriage. In the UK union formation is influenced by male 
economic opportunities. Male unemployment is negatively associated with union 
formation – high levels of unemployment restrict women’s partnership options. The 
influence of women’s earnings and employment is more ambiguous. Qualitative 
research (conducted in the US) suggests that the main economic issues that can 
affect the transition from cohabitation to marriage are (Smock et al., 2005:687-
692): 
•	 ‘having enough money’ – marriage requires a certain level of financial stability, 
cohabitating	couples	are	unlikely	to	marry	if	they	are	struggling	financially;
•	 being	 able	 to	 pay	 for	 a	 ‘real’	 wedding	 –	 the	 cost	 of	 a	wedding	 can	 be	 an	
impediment	to	marriage;
•	 having	achieved	a	set	of	financial	goals	before	the	marriage,	for	example,	buying	
a	house	or	a	car	and	completing	education;
•	whether	the	male	partner	earns	enough	to	be	an	economic	provider;	and
•	 lacking	money	can	lead	to	stress	and	relationship	conflict	which	in	turn	adversely	
affect the quality of relationships.
13 This is not a universal finding – Denmark is an exception, where cohabiters 
have a lower risk of marital dissolution, possibly because there is little social 
stigma associated with cohabitation couples are able to use it as a ‘trial’ for 
marriage (Svarer, 2004:533).
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A cohort analysis of British single parents over the period 1991 to 2001 shows 
that the 1991 lone parents who were married or cohabitating by 2001 tended to 
be (Marsh and Vegeris, 2004:35-37):
•	 younger	(and	age	had	the	largest	effect	controlling	for	other	factors);
•	 those	in	1991	who	had	been	never	partnered	or	who	had	been	married	were	
more likely to be married by 2001 than those who left a cohabitating relationship 
in	1991;
•	 those	with	a	new	child	since	1991;	and
•	 those	working	16	hours	or	more	a	week	in	2001.
Moreover, the factor that influenced whether they married rather than cohabited 
was whether the 1991 single parent had a new child. Getting a new partner 
(and paid work) was often associated with being on an ‘upward and improving 
path’ (Marsh and Vegeris, 2004). Many became dual-earner families, although for 
younger single parents entering a new union could be accompanied by having a 
baby and a temporary exit from employment.
Union formation (marriage and cohabitation) in the UK can be influenced by the 
birth of a child, specifically birth order: 
‘…experiencing a first birth has a strong positive effect on forming a union, 
and this is so for both genders. However, having a second birth outside a 
union actually lowers the rate of union formation. The positive effect of 
the first birth event is consistent with economic theory, in that individuals 
consider a cohabiting union or a marriage to be more beneficial once 
they have acquired marital-specific capital. However, there might also be 
normative forces at play, in the sense that individuals might feel a pressure 
to ‘legitimize’ the child. The negative sign of the second birth event indicates 
that those who do not form a union after the first birth are at a disadvantage 
in the marriage market when they have the second child. There might also be 
a selection effect here: individuals who are willing to have one child outside 
a union might be more willing to repeat the experience. The subsequent 
birth events have no significant effect on union formation.’
(Aassve et al. (2006:796))
1.5.4 Union dissolution and welfare systems
The Beckerian model of marriage is also influential within the literature on 
separation and divorce. It posits that people divorce/separate when the benefits 
minus costs of becoming single exceed those of remaining married/cohabitating. 
Some argue that welfare benefits contribute to divorce – fathers are seen as 
prepared to leave their spouses (and children) knowing that the State will provide 
adequate financial support (Zimmerman, 1991:139). Indeed, it is claimed that 
women might agree to this arrangement since it provides them with enhanced 
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economic security and stability. However, research shows that there is a wide range 
of other factors that influence divorce/separation (and union) decisions including 
(Dickert-Conlin,	1999;	Harknett	and	Gennetian,	2003):
•	 The	 earnings	 potential	 of	 the	 spouses	 (Ono,	 1998):	 There	 is	 some	 evidence	
that women’s employment and earnings increase marital stability, although 
other studies show a decrease (Burstein, 2007:407). Indeed, the outcome is 
theoretically ambiguous, see Ono, 1998: 
– ‘the stability effect’ posits that if the spouse has a high earnings potential this 
will make the person more attractive as a partner and/or by reducing financial 
hardships lessens the likelihood of relationship conflict and so reduces the 
risk of separation. Unions where the male is in full-time employment and/or 
has high earnings are more stable because the couple have a higher standard 
of living (Burstein, 2007:404) – known as the husband’s income hypothesis 
(Ono, 1998). Similarly, increases in women’s earnings may reduce levels of 
financial	distress	and	so	reduce	the	risk	of	dissolution;	but	
– ‘the independence effect’ suggests that a person with high earnings is less 
in need of a partner and hence if already in a partnership separation is more 
likely. Typically, this independence effect is seen as applying to women – a 
wife’s resources are positively related to marital dissolution. Any increase in 
the wife’s resources must, however, be sufficient for her to live separately 
from her husband (Ono, 1998:686). Alternatively, employment can increase 
the stress on partners and impose time constraints, which in turn increase the 
likelihood of union dissolution. 
•	 Presence	 of	 children	 may	 reduce	 the	 likelihood	 of	 separation	 because	 they	
represent an emotional and time investment in a marriage. However, in 
households with young children and mothers with specific impairments (for 
instance, depression) there is a higher risk of union dissolution (Clarke and 
McKay, 2008). Moreover, two-parent families with a disabled child aged one to 
two years are at greater risk of becoming single parent households.
•	 The	 duration	 of	 the	 marriage:	 Those	 married	 for	 longer	 are	 less	 likely	 to	
separate.
•	 Age	at	marriage:	Women	who	marry	early	are	more	likely	to	separate	from	their	
husbands. 
•	 In	the	UK	younger	cohorts	are	more	likely	to	dissolve	a	union	than	other	cohorts	
(Aassve et al., 2006:795).
•	 The	presence	and	stability	of	an	impairment:	Households	where	adults	have	no	
impairment or where the experience of the impairment was stable are less likely 
to dissolve their union (Clarke and McKay, 2008).
•	 The	existence	of	a	prenuptial	agreement	may	affect	the	likelihood	of	a	divorce,	
although there is disagreement as to whether it increases or decreases the 
likelihood of marital dissolution (Rainer, 2007:338).
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•	 The	 liberalisation	 of	 divorce	 laws	 is	 seen	 by	 some	 as	 making	 divorce	 easier	
(Rainer, 2007).
•	 Educational	attainment:	however,	in	the	UK	there	is	no	evidence	that	level	of	
education has an affect on union dissolution (Aassve et al., 2006:795).
1.5.5 Fertility and single motherhood and welfare systems
Decisions on fertility and single motherhood are complex decisions influenced 
by a wide range of cultural, economic, legal, political, social and religious factors 
(Kearney,	2004:	296;	Maynard	et al., 1998:152-153). However, the nature of the 
interaction between the various factors is still not fully understood.
The view that there is a systematic interplay between economic considerations 
and fertility dates back to Malthus (1798, cited by Clarke and Strauss (1998)). The 
classical theory of population was summarised by Blaug (1978):
‘…the production of children, [is] not a means of spending income on 
‘consumer goods’ to acquire satisfaction, but as a method of investment in 
‘capital goods’ for the sake of a future return.’
(Blaug, (1978:78, cited by Clarke and Strauss, 1998))
The work of Becker is, again, influential in the literature with decisions on single 
parenthood and childbearing seen as being affected by the benefits and costs of 
the options available to women. The underlying economic model assumes that 
marriage will immediately lead to parenthood (Ellwood and Jencks, 2004:14), 
with children regarded as consumption rather than investment goods (Clarke and 
Strauss, 1998). A basic economic model of fertility would therefore predict that 
the opportunity cost of bearing and raising children affects parental decisions 
about starting families and increasing family size. Thus, an increase in family 
income would increase fertility, at least over short periods in which the cost of 
human capital does not change significantly (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 
2007). However, Clarke and Strauss (1998) suggest that:
‘…for individuals in poverty, various public cash and in-kind transfers create 
a series of economic incentives which…make the childbearing decision 
equivalent to the Malthusian analysis that children are income-producing 
assets as well as sources of utility. In the modern welfare state, it is the 
transfer system…that creates income-producing opportunities.’ 
((Clarke and Strauss, 1998:825)
Yet this ‘traditional’ economic model has relatively little to say about non-marital 
births and the ‘decoupling’ of marriage and parenthood (Ellwood and Jencks, 
2004:19). 
There are two broad approaches in the literature on the effects of economic 
factors on non-marital births (Del Bono, 2004:2). The first highlights the role of 
welfare systems in ‘making single motherhood more economically attractive’ 
and is particularly associated with Charles Murray (1984). The second approach 
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focuses on men and women’s economic opportunities, including the availability of 
marriageable men, and male and female unemployment and potential earnings.
The literature suggests that welfare benefits promote both single parenthood 
and non-marital births. So, for instance, benefits and tax credits could be 
expected to generate incentives for single childless women to have children, as 
entitlement may require having a dependent child. AFDC in particular has been 
seen as providing a financial incentive leading to a higher incidence of single 
parent	families	(Moffitt,	2003:332);	although	the	welfare	effect	is	complicated	by	
the programme’s eligibility rules which mean that AFDC ‘…does not discourage 
marriage or cohabitation universally but only if it is with the male who is the 
children’s actual father.’ (Moffitt, 2003:333). However, and as already noted in 
Section 1.4.3, the real value of AFDC declined during the 1970s and 1980s, when 
female headship rates were increasing, so undermining the argument that there is 
a simple connection between welfare benefits and single parenthood. Moreover, 
the impact of benefits on single parenthood is theoretically ambiguous. If marriage 
entry is voluntary and its dissolution a random event then AFDC is effectively a 
form of insurance that ought to encourage individuals to marry, as it reduces 
the risks to the woman relative to what they would have been in the absence 
of the benefit (Moffitt, 1998b:53 and 2003:332-333). In practice this ‘insurance 
role’ is unlikely to have a significant impact because many women become single 
mothers before marriage and the moral hazard problem is potentially large (that 
is, those in receipt of AFDC have an incentive to engage in behaviour that might 
lead to parenthood). 
It is also posited that receipt of welfare benefits will lead women to have larger 
families	than	they	might	otherwise	have	(Presser	and	Salsberg,	1975:227;	Gauthier	
and Hatzius, 1997:295-6). Indeed, that additional benefits for each dependant child 
reduces the direct and indirect costs to families of having children. (An alternative 
view is that benefits may alter the timing of childbearing – encouraging early entry 
to motherhood – but not family size.) It is this economic theory that has been 
used to justify the imposition of family caps (Maynard et al., 1998:150). The cap 
increases the recipients’ net economic cost of childbearing (by an amount equal 
to the benefit increase that previously would have been paid), and, ceteris paribus, 
ought to discourage extra childbearing. However, Maynard et al. (1998:151) argue 
that the effect of family caps on fertility is likely to be small. First, the resulting 
income changes were small both relative to the cost of having children and in 
absolute money terms. In addition, the reductions could be offset by increases 
in	Food	Stamps	and	housing	subsidies;	and	access	to	Medicaid	was	unaffected	
by family caps. Secondly, non-economic factors were likely to be more influential 
on fertility decisions than economic incentives. Moreover, pregnancies can be 
unintentional, and by implication not susceptible to economic factors. 
Other economic explanations focus on economic opportunities, notably male 
unemployment and employment. The notion of a marriage market is influential 
(see Section 1.6.2), and that in poor neighbourhoods (notably inner city areas) 
the increase in single mothers was due to a lack ‘marriageable men’. Willis (1999) 
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argues that unmarried women are more likely to have children if there is an excess 
supply of women and the benefits of marriage are limited by available males having 
low-incomes. On the other hand, if there are marriageable men this can lead to 
increases in the marriage rate and the fertility rate, which in turn increases the 
pool of women at risk of becoming single mothers due to divorce and separation. 
Empirically, however, the marriage market thesis only accounts for a small part of 
the decline in marriage rates amongst African Americans (see previously and Del 
Bono, 2004:3).
Other writers have adopted a broader perspective and examined the affect of local 
labour market factors on cohabitation and childbearing decisions. These studies 
emphasise not only the influence of male employment and unemployment on 
female marriage and fertility rates, but also the opportunity cost to women of 
childbearing. The expectation is that increases in male employment within an area 
will lead to an increase in marriage rates, but a fall in fertility. 
The effect of female wages on single parenthood is theoretically ambiguous. 
Improved economic opportunities for women, via higher incomes, could enable 
them to support their dependant children on their own (an ‘independence effect’). 
However, higher female wages might discourage women from childbearing 
(a ‘substitute effect’), because the perceived ‘opportunity cost’ of a birth is higher – 
women will have to forgo some potential earnings and will have less leisure 
time. It is also possible to argue that a lack of labour market opportunities may 
increase the attractiveness of single motherhood, because in these circumstances 
its perceived ‘opportunity costs’ are reduced. 
In the UK, predicted female wages are negatively associated and male 
unemployment positively associated with non-marital childbearing (Del Bonon, 
2004:11-14). That is, the better the economic prospects for women the lower the 
likelihood of non-marital births. Thus, women with higher levels of education or 
who are in employment have lower rates of childbearing (Aassve et al., 2006:795-
796). Similarly, college educated women in the US are more likely to delay 
childbearing than those with less schooling (Ellwood and Jencks, 2004:28). This 
might be because the former, faced with a satisfying alternative, choose to delay 
having children, or in order to maximise life-long earnings they have to invest in 
their careers early on and this necessitates delaying childbearing. These findings 
for predicted wages suggest that there is an opportunity cost to childbearing. 
Other factors influencing fertility and single parenthood include:
•	 Cultural	and	social	norms:	For	 instance,	 in	 the	US	teenagers	 from	 immigrant	
families that are less well socially integrated into society hold more traditional 
views about non-marital childbearing (Plotnick, 2004:28).
•	 Being	in	a	union:	In	the	UK,	having	children	is	positively	associated	with	being	
in a union (especially for men) (Aassve et al., 2006:796). Moreover, for UK 
single parents having additional children is positively associated with having a 
new partner and being younger (aged under 30 years) (Marsh and Vegeris, 
2004:41-43). 
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•	 Advances	 in	 reproductive	 technologies:	Women	 have	 increased	 control	 over	
their reproductive choices and this, arguably, has led to behavioural changes 
and	an	increased	tolerance	for	cohabitation	(Ellwood	and	Jencks,	2004:25-26;	
Roberts, 2007:2). 
•	 Levels	 of	 self-esteem	 and	 confidence:	 For	 young	 women,	 high	 levels	 of	 
self-esteem are less likely to be associated with non-marital childbearing 
(Plotnick, 2004:9).
•	 Family	background,	including	religious	upbringing	(Plotnick,	2004).
•	 Race	and	ethnicity	(Plotnick,	2004).
•	 In	 the	 UK	 younger	 disabled	 adults	 (aged	 20-34)	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 have	
dependent children than their peers (Clarke and McKay, 2008). However, older 
disabled people (past mid-30s) were less likely to have dependent children.
Some writers, especially in the US, have attributed the increase in single parenthood 
amongst low-income women to their values and attitudes. Indeed, nationally 
representative survey data shows that AFDC benefit recipients compared to other 
women have held statistically significant different familial values and attitudes 
towards marriage and childbearing (p<0.001) (Mauldon et al., 2002:2). However, 
Mauldon et al. (2002:2-3) argue that the differences between the two groups 
of women are small and can be attributed to factors other than welfare receipt. 
When controlling for demographic characteristics the difference for views on 
childbearing disappears. Suggesting:
‘…that the reasons these women became single parents may have more to 
do with their social circumstances and economic conditions than with their 
fundamental preferences.’
(Mauldon et al. (2002:1))
Indeed, most female recipients at risk of further unmarried childbearing aspired to 
marriage (Mauldon et al., 2002:3). 
1.6 Methodological issues
Within the reviewed literature there are three broad methodological strategies:
•	 non-experimental;	
•	 experimental,	and	
•	 quasi-experimental.	
In terms of the volume of evidence there are considerably more published analyses 
using non-experimental methods.
1.6.1 Non-experimental methods
Within the non-experimental literature there is a further distinction between those 
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that seek to establish the magnitude of any welfare effect on family types, but 
do not explore whether actual behavioural changes as a consequence (referred to 
here as scenario modelling);	and	those	that	use	empirical	data	to	investigate	the	
relationship between taxes and transfers and actual behavioural responses. 
Scenario modelling
For the literature reviewed in this study, the scenario modelling approach is 
conducted only for estimating union/marriage bonuses and penalties. (A bonus 
(penalty) occurs when net income (from work and benefits) for a married/
cohabitating couple is greater than (less than) for two single people.) Typically, 
studies adopting this approach find that there is a financial disincentive for single 
parents to marry – but (by definition) do not provide evidence of actual behavioural 
changes. Studies use either (a) ‘stylised’ or prototype families to estimate typical 
union bonuses or penalties, or (b) survey or administrative data to simulate 
outcomes. A weakness of using ‘stylised’ families is that they cannot do ‘justice to 
the wide variation in family circumstances, and does not provide any guide to the 
relative importance of each effect.’ (O’Donoghue and Sutherland, 1999:566). 
Studies adopting this scenario modelling approach tend to impute union bonuses 
and penalties by ‘divorcing’ married couples, rather than ‘marrying’ single people, 
and calculate the difference between what they would receive in benefits/tax 
credits as married couples and as two unmarried individuals. As a consequence the 
studies may be better at estimating the potential marriage bonuses and penalties 
of those who have chosen to marry rather than remain single, as the latter may 
differ from the former in a number of important ways (for instance, in income and 
number of children). 
Whichever approach is adopted, the comparator for estimating the bonus/penalty 
is unobserved, and the calculations are sensitive to the assumptions made about 
living	arrangements	and	dependents	(Eissa	and	Hoynes,	2000:690;	Holtzblatt	and	
Rebelein, 2000:1131). In calculating partnership bonuses and penalties researchers 
can, for instance, assume that benefit take-up is 100 per cent, and ignore 
housing benefits (see, for example, Ellwood (2000b: 1065-1068)). Critically, when 
‘splitting’ married couples, the analysis tends to assume that the employment 
patterns and earnings of the now separated couple are unaffected. Yet people’s 
behaviour, including their labour supply, does often change following a divorce 
–	 the	 assumption	 of	 no	 change	 is	 essentially	 unrealistic	 (Burstein,	 2007:410;	
Ellwood, 2000b:1089 – Anderberg (2007) and Rosenbaum (2000) provide 
examples of where these assumptions are relaxed). For this reason some analysts 
use longitudinal data in order to estimate incentives and disincentives following a 
change in marital status. 
The estimates of marriage bonuses and penalties also tend to ignore the economies 
of scale from running one household rather than two.
Furthermore, the estimates tend to assume that people are aware of the incentive 
structures they face. However, benefit and tax systems can be relatively complex 
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with individuals having to estimate interactions between multiple benefits and tax 
credits. Something which the analysts’ own models can have difficulty achieving. 
According to Ellwood (200b:1073) models often have problems capturing the 
administrative arrangements that interact with benefit and tax systems. For 
instance, the models do not allow for variations across states in, say, sanctions 
regimes or the requirements claimants must meet before they can register for 
benefit under TANF. This omission will bias the estimates obtained. 
In addition, it is unlikely that partners ‘re-optimise each period’, that is, 
re-determine their marital status each year. There are (fixed) costs for entering 
and leaving marriage that will constrain some people’s ability to simply respond to 
financial incentives.
Moreover, the interpretation of the analysis is made more complex if incentives 
and disincentives do affect behaviour. For instance, if survey data are used to 
estimate union bonuses and penalties and the welfare system affected behaviour, 
then a sample of married couples (to be ‘divorced’ in the calculations) would 
over-represent families with large bonuses and under-represent those with large 
penalties (Hoffman and Seidman, 2003:87). 
Empirical studies of demographic responses using non-experimental 
methods
In terms of the second behavioural non-experimental approach that focuses on 
actual behavioural responses to welfare systems, there is a sizable body of mainly 
US research that explores the impact of the benefit and tax system on family 
structure. These studies require that similar family types receive different levels of 
benefit and, in order to see if variations in welfare affect demographic behaviour, 
US researchers are able to take advantage of the variation in levels of benefit (AFDC 
and TANF) between states. Researchers have used the following non-experimental 
approaches to identify the impact of welfare benefits on demographic behaviour 
(Hoynes,	1997a:92-94;	Moffitt,	1998b:57-59;	Moffitt,	2003:336):
•	 Cross-sectional	analyses	of	data	for	a	point	in	time.	Regression	analysis	is	used	
to examine how, say, marriage or fertility varies by differences in the level of 
benefits between states, individual characteristics, and, less often, other state 
characteristics. However, the estimated impact of the welfare system will be 
biased if there are any omitted state factors from the dataset, such as social 
norms or religious characteristics, that are correlated with both family structure 
decisions or (through voter preferences) state welfare policy (Ellwood and Bane, 
1985,	 cited	 in	 Hoynes,	 1997a:91;	 Hoynes,	 1997b:129;	Moffitt,	 1994;	 Ribar,	
2003:1). This is addressed by the next approach.
•	 Analyses	using	pooled	 cross-sectional	 data	or	panel	 data	 for	more	 than	one	
point in time. Using these data with regression analyses, researchers can control 
for unobserved variables. Known as ‘state fixed effect’ models, they can be 
used to capture unobserved factors common to all residents of a state, such as 
State divorce laws or support services. Their advantage is that the analyst does 
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not have to specify exactly which variables are missing, only the structure of 
the omitted variable (Ribar, 2003:19). Most fixed effect models reviewed here 
are for US States, but they can be developed for other geographical areas – 
counties, regions or countries.
 Compared to cross-section designs, the inclusion of area fixed effects can reduce 
the significance and magnitude, even the direction, of any welfare effect on 
family structure (see, for instance, Moffitt, 1994). For example, Lichter et al. 
(1997:126-128) report that a $100 change in welfare payments is associated 
with 0.817 percentage point change in female headship when there are no 
controls for unobserved state level variables (p<0.01). However, the inclusion 
of state fixed effects reduced this impact by more than 50 per cent to 0.392 
percentage points (p<0.01).
 Models with State fixed effects also tend to include year fixed effects. These 
control for average changes in, say, marriage or divorce within a given year that 
are common to all areas (say, States). 
•	 The	use	of	panel	data	enables	the	identification	of	unobserved	individual	effects	
(Hoynes, 1997a:91). To the extent that studies do not control for individual 
effects, but only State effects, they may be biased through inter-State migration 
and sample attrition and entry. The individual effects models capture time-
invariant unobserved variables at the level of the individual.
•	 Time	series	analyses	have	been	used.	However,	a	number	of	US	researchers	(for	
instance, Hoynes, 1997b:125-126) have observed that if financial incentives 
affect family formation then the observed fall in the real value of welfare benefits 
(especially in AFDC since the mid-1960s) should be associated with declines in 
female headship and non-marital births, but instead they have continued to 
increase. Suggesting that factors other than financial incentives are operating 
to influence demographic behaviour. Yet, controlling for all the possible factors 
that change over time is very difficult. 
In summary, the main non-experimental methods used in the US seek to investigate 
whether there is a welfare effect on family structure by using variations in benefits 
between individuals within states, between states and between states over time 
(Hoynes,	1997b:124;	Moffitt,	1998b:57).	 These	non-experimental	methods	are	
discussed further in Appendix A. However, and not wishing to prejudge the review, 
it appears which source of variation and controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
are used affects the reported significance and magnitude of the welfare effect on 
demographic behaviour. 
1.6.2 Experimental methods
There has been some use of social experiments to assess the impact of welfare 
reforms on family structure. Random assignment designs do overcome one of 
the potential problems with non-experimental methods – having to control for 
unobserved variables. Social experiments can also help to establish causation 
between variables (see Stafford, 2002).
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However, social experiments may not be ideal for assessing welfare effects on 
family	structure	(Hoynes,	1997b:133;	Moffitt,	2003:348;	Maynard	et al., 1998:162-
165). This is because the programmes to be tested have a wider impact on the 
community, possibly changing expectations and attitudes and thus the behaviour 
of the control group. This ‘contamination’ of the control group could bias the 
experimental results. (However, this might be overcome if the unit of analysis 
was the community. That is, if there was a random assignment of communities 
to those that received an intervention and those that did not, as opposed to the 
random assignment of individuals within a given community.) 
Moreover, the designs of the demonstration projects tend not to isolate particular 
reforms so that impacts of specific measures on demographic behaviour can 
be identified (Maynard et al., 1998:157-162). Instead packages of reforms are 
evaluated, making it difficult to determine the effects on demographic behaviour 
of particular programme elements. Camasso (2004:453) points out that a 
package of reforms is likely to have a greater impact than each of the components 
separately. Thus experiments ‘…have not been very successful in isolating 
which broad components of reform…influence recipient outcomes’ (Camasso 
(2004:453);	and	see	Moffitt	and	Ver	Ploeg,	2001;	US	General	Accounting	Office,	
2001). The challenge facing policy evaluators, according to Camasso (2004:454), 
is that, unlike some earlier programmes which introduced varying levels in 
phased implementations, more recent programmes have introduced components 
simultaneously to all recipients in the treatment group. According to Camasso, 
this has resulted in ‘black box’ evaluations which are only able to examine the 
impact	of	the	bundle	rather	than	its	component	parts	(Camasso,	2004:454;	and	
see	Greenberg	and	Shroder,	1997;	Wiseman,	1993).	Fien	(1994)	has	identified	four	
strategies	to	evaluate	 ‘reform	bundles’;	as	summarised	by	Camasso	(2004:453)	
these are:
•	 examine	customer	exposure	to	each	provision	separately;
•	 identify	the	unique	goals	of	each	component;
•	 conduct	cross-state	comparison	where	components	differ	between	states;	and
•	 design	multiple	treatment	experiments.	
The particular context of these experiments also means that their findings do not 
necessarily apply to other contexts – for example, that findings from low benefit 
areas apply to high benefit areas. Any findings from evaluations incorporating 
interventions that are meant to affect family structure tend to be site-specific and 
hence cannot be readily generalised to other geographic areas. In addition, even 
if the design was robust, the outcomes reviewed here – marriage, childbearing 
and divorce – could take several years to respond to policy interventions and so 
any experiment would have to be administered for a long period of time (Moffitt, 
1998b:56). 
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1.6.3 Quasi-experimental methods
A	number	of	studies	also	incorporate	difference-in-difference	designs;	in	particular	
UK studies use this approach to explore the impact of WFTC on demographic 
behaviour. These allow for impacts before and after a policy reform to be 
investigated. They involve comparing demographic outcomes for a group affected 
by a policy or programme with one unaffected by the intervention both before 
and after the change. The use of a comparison or control group means that 
unobserved variables that change over time are to some extent controlled for in 
the analysis.
One issue is the selection of an appropriate control group, for instance, single 
women without children are often used as the control for single parents. However, 
women without children may not be a good comparator – their trends in, say, 
union formation may be very different from women with children. Similarly, 
married women may not be a good comparator for single women, due to selection 
effects. Women who marry typically have lower earnings than those that do not 
and this might be because they would be at a relative disadvantage in the labour 
market and so ‘…concentrate more of their efforts towards finding a spouse who 
likes work or has a comparative advantage in the labor market.’ (Rosenbaum, 
2000:9).
Moreover, if the impacts of the welfare system on family structure are both 
positive for some groups of individuals but negative for others, then difference-
in-difference may not capture these effects, because they are ‘averaged out’. In 
addition, if the intervention being assessed is a ‘package’ of different proposals, 
difference-in-difference cannot precisely disentangle the effect of just one policy/
programme. 
1.6.4 Other methodological issues
Tax credits and benefits
In general, the studies reviewed here consider the impact of the benefit system 
or the tax system on family structure. However, the two systems for low-income 
families may interact and as a consequence estimates based on only benefits 
or only tax credits may be biased. Dickert-Conlin (1999:232) (see also Dickert-
Conlin and Houser, 1998) looks at the impact of the US tax and transfer system on 
separation decisions and, following sensitivity analysis, finds that analysts ought 
to consider both as:
‘…earlier work on the effect of taxes or transfers in isolation obtained results 
that were biased towards zero.’
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Longitudinal data
In some instances, non-experimental and experimental studies use longitudinal 
data in the form of repeated cross-sections. However, analyses based on such 
data adopt a ‘stock approach’ through examining states at given points in time 
(Anderberg, 2007:21). An alternative approach is to use panel data, which allows 
a ‘flow approach’ whereby transitions into, say marriage, can be explored. The 
advantage of examining flows is that the stock might not be typical of, for instance, 
married women divorcing, as those becoming divorced are more likely to have 
been married for a shorter period of time than the stock of all married women. 
Lags in response
Several studies seek to examine the association between current welfare provision 
and demographic outcomes. However, there may be a considerable lag between 
changes in transfer and tax programmes and demographic responses, especially 
if family-related decisions are influenced by social norms which might take time 
to evolve. The extent to which the literature takes into account this possible lag is 
limited (Hoynes, 1997b:126).
1.7 Structure of report
The next three chapters review in turn the impact of welfare systems on partnering, 
union dissolution and childbearing and single parenthood. Chapter 5 considers 
the implications of the reviewed literature for the UK and some conclusions are 
drawn in Chapter 6.
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 some of the more ‘technical’ details about individual studies 
are placed in text boxes. Readers focusing on substantive findings can skip over 
these boxes, whilst those seeking more information about the data and analytical 
methods used should read the text boxes. 
As the impacts of the welfare system on family structure are often reported in the 
literature to two decimal places the effects are expressed in subsequent chapters 
as numbers and not, as is customary in this report series for numbers under ten, 
in words.
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2 Partnering
Summary
This chapter considers the evidence on whether, as some commentators argue, 
welfare systems discourage marriage. A union/marriage bonus (penalty) occurs 
when a couple receive more (or less) in benefit/tax payments than they would 
if they were single. For union/marriage bonuses or penalties to exist there 
are two pre-conditions: the unit of assessment is the family (rather than the 
individual) and different marginal tax rates apply at different income levels. 
Trade-offs in policy objectives mean that a benefit and ‘…tax system cannot 
be simultaneously progressive, treat family as unit of taxation and be neutral 
with respect to marriage.’ (Hotz and Scholz, 2003:163). 
United Kingdom
Two United Kingdom (UK) studies were reviewed. One study finds that single 
parents who were Family Credit (FC) recipients in 1991 were more likely to 
have found a partner by 2001 than were non-recipients. However, the second 
study reports that following the introduction of Working Families Tax Credit 
(WFTC), single parents were less likely (by 2.4 percentage points) to form a 
union than single childless women. This impact was more pronounced for 
women with younger children (two to three percentage points). The difference 
in the direction of the impacts might be because WFTC was more generous 
than FC. Effectively, WFTC may have reduced the opportunity cost of being 
a single parent.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
A study of the impact of social security (payroll) taxes for defined-benefit, 
Pay As You Go (PAYG) pension schemes on family formation across the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) finds that 
social security payroll taxes slightly reduce net marriage rates. However, a 
number of simplifying assumptions are made which limit the usefulness of 
this analysis.
Continued
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United States
Compared	to	the	UK,	there	is	a	more	extensive	United	States	(US)	literature;	
although it is focused on single parents. The US literature on the impact 
of welfare systems on union formation presents mixed findings – there are 
studies showing increases, decreases and no significant effects.
A review of earlier research by Moffitt (1998b) shows that some studies 
found	a	marriage	penalty;	a	significant	minority	found	no	effect;	but	all	those	
studies with statistically significant results show that Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) had a negative effect on marriage. His review, 
together with other research, also highlights that impacts in the US vary by 
race and gender.
Studies of US welfare reform (that is, AFDC waivers and Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF)) using non-experimental approaches also report 
mixed findings, whilst a meta analysis of six experimental programmes reveals 
no consistent relationship between welfare programmes and union formation 
(Gennetian and Knox, 2003). 
There is, however, limited evidence from the Minnesota Family Investment 
Program (MFIP) and New Hope projects that in the longer-term welfare 
systems may increase the stability of marriage.
The impact of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on actual marriage decisions 
is small and statistically insignificant – there is no ‘real evidence that EITC 
marriage penalties were reducing marriage.’ (Ellwood, 2000b:1100).
Canada
The Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) (a wage supplementation programme) 
highlights the importance of local context. The programme was implemented 
in two culturally diverse provinces and found that it decreased the probability 
of being ever married or cohabitating in British Columbia by 2.5 percentage 
points	(a	16	per	cent	fall);	but	increased	the	probability	of	being	ever	married	or	
cohabitating in New Brunswick by 4.3 percentage points (a 22 per cent rise).
A second Canadian study on the removal of marriage penalties for surviving 
spouses in the pension system showed that remarriage rates for females aged 
under 65 and for males aged 45 to 59 increased significantly. However, there 
are outstanding queries about the quality of the data used.
Overall
The studies demonstrate that any welfare effect on union formation varies 
by sub-group and they can also be lagged. US and Canadian studies also 
highlight that findings vary by local context. Data problems also undermine 
the robustness of some studies.
Tentatively, this review finds that whilst there are some studies showing an 
effect on marriage/cohabitation, there is in general no strong evidence for 
a large and significant welfare effect on union formation – the evidence is 
inconclusive.
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2.1 Introduction
Do welfare systems encourage or discourage marriage? Some UK commentators, 
for example, Campbell and Roberts (2002), Civitas (2002) and Morgan (2007) 
have – like many US researchers and policy makers – expressed the concern that 
there may be a ‘marriage penalty’ (as opposed to a ‘marriage bonus’) in the benefit 
and tax credit system. So, for instance, did WFTC provide an incentive for single 
mothers not to marry because of the ‘extra’ resources it provided to single parent 
families? 
Ensuring that the welfare system does not, at least, penalise marriage may be a 
policy concern, not simply because policy makers might wish to promote ‘healthy 
marriages’ as an end in itself, but also because some argue that child outcomes 
are better in two-parent families (Roberts, 2007:3). Marriage may also have other 
benefits for partners, such as a lower incidence of health problems (see Arnato, 
2007:952;	 Gassman-Pines	 and	 Yoshikawa,	 2006:11).	 Indeed,	 given	 that	 the	
family income of married women is higher than that for single women, some 
see (stable) marriages as a route out of poverty for low-income single women 
(Morgan, 2007:35). 
This chapter briefly discusses union/marriage bonuses and penalties, then considers 
the published evidence for whether welfare systems affect union formation 
decisions for the UK, see Section 2.2.1, across the OECD, see Section 2.2.2, the 
US, see Section 2.2.3 and Canada, see Section 2.2.4.
2.1.1 Union/marriage bonuses and penalties
Tax and transfer systems can generate union/marriage bonuses and penalties.14 
In the tax system a marriage penalty or bonus arises when a change in marital 
status leads to a change in disposable income (Alm et al.,	1999:194;	Carasso	and	
Steuerle, 2005). A penalty occurs when net income (from work and/or benefits) for 
a couple is less than for two single people living apart. The penalty arises because 
the earnings of one spouse are taxed at a different rate because of marriage 
(Carasso and Steuerle, 2005:168). In general, marriage penalties are higher when 
couples’	earnings	are	similar;	and	lower	when	one	earns	significantly	more	than	
the	other	(Carasso	and	Steuerle,	2005:168;	Hotz	and	Scholz,	2003:163).	As	Alm	
et al. (1999:195) note:
‘When people with similar earnings marry, their combined income pushes 
them into higher tax brackets than they face as singles, and they pay 
correspondingly higher income taxes with marriage. Conversely, the marriage 
of two people with very dissimilar earnings means that the individual with 
higher income moves into a lower marginal tax bracket as a result of the 
marriage, thereby reducing the combined tax burden of the two partners.’
14 The term ‘union/marriage bonus and penalty’ is used in this report rather 
than ‘cohabitation bonus and penalty’.
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The tax system can also generate union/marriage bonuses - when a couple receive 
more in tax payments than they would if they were single. Bonuses tend to occur 
when partners have dissimilar earnings or only one partner is in paid work (Hotz 
and Scholz, 2003:163). The benefit system, like the tax system, generates union/
marriage bonuses and penalties. The complexity of the tax and benefit systems 
mean that individuals can face both marriage bonuses and penalties (Carasso and 
Steuerle, 2005:158). 
In principle, any tax or transfer scheme can generate union/marriage penalties 
and/or bonuses. Two pre-conditions are required: first, the unit of assessment for 
taxes or benefits must be the family (rather than the individual), and secondly, 
different marginal tax rates apply at different income levels. So, as Carasso and 
Steuerle observe:
‘If graduated taxes were accommodated by individual filing or if all income and 
transfers were taxed at a flat rate, there would be no marriage penalties.’
Carasso and Steuerle (2005:157)
That is, the only way to avoid union bonuses and penalties is to have an 
individualised tax and benefit system or a proportional joint tax system (with no 
tax allowances) (Brewer, 2007:218). As a consequence a benefit and ‘… tax system 
cannot be simultaneously progressive, treat family as unit of taxation and be 
neutral with respect to marriage.’	(Hotz	and	Scholz,	2003:163;	see	also	Holtzblatt	
and Rebelein, 2000:1110). By treating families with the same income equally (so 
achieving horizontal equity) and having a progressive tax system it is impossible to 
be	marriage	neutral	(Eissa	and	Hoynes,	2000b:2-4;	Rosenbaum,	2000:3).	
Varying tax rates and the withdrawal of benefit as income rises can combine to 
produce high effective marginal rates of taxation and so union/marriage penalties. 
(The effective marginal rates of taxation is the proportion of the next pound (or 
dollar) of income that is lost due to benefit withdrawal or payment of income tax 
and National (Social) Insurance.) Effective marginal rates of taxation can be higher 
for low- to moderate-income families compared to higher income households. For 
low-income households with one or more earners high effective marginal tax rates 
can be the result of the interaction of a number of tax and benefit programmes. 
High effective marginal tax rates arise when policy makers pursue two policy 
objectives: vertical redistribution of income (giving more tax and benefits to those 
on lower incomes) and containment of benefit programme costs (by restricting 
entitlement to low-income groups). Thus union/marriage penalties in the transfer 
system can arise, not because policy makers wish to penalise marriage, but as a 
consequence of targeting benefits (Alm et al., 1999:198).
Union/marriage penalties and bonuses reside in the UK tax and transfer system. 
Although assessment in the personal income tax system is individually based, tax 
credits (like benefits) are assessed on joint income. Furthermore, whilst contribution 
tests for National Insurance benefits tend to be based on individual income (Adam 
et al., 2002:16), the expansion of means-tested benefits means that there has been 
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an expansion in joint assessment. Union/marriage penalties can arise because a 
single parent already in receipt of Income Support (IS) or a tax credit can experience 
a fall in benefit or tax credits due to the extra income brought to the family by 
any	new	partner.	Union/marriage	penalties	can	be	relatively	large;	in	the	UK	many	
two-parent married couples needed a joint income of £50,000 per annum in 
2004/05 to avoid any marriage penalty (Beighton and Draper, 2007:12). 
In the UK, for out-off-work benefits and tax credits a cohabiting couple will 
generally receive a lower income transfer payment if they declare they are living 
together than if they claim to live separately. This is because (Brewer and Shaw, 
2006:9):
•	 out-of-work	 benefits	 and	 tax	 credits	 are	 assessed	 on	 the	 joint	 income	 of	 a	
couple;	and
•	 entitlement	to	tax	credits	is	based	on	the	joint	income	of	a	family	and	not	the	
number of adults in a family.
The main exceptions to this union/marriage penalty are as follows (Brewer and 
Shaw, 2006:9):
•	 couples	claiming	tax	credits	and	the	secondary	carer	has	no	income	–	here	 it	
would	not	matter	if	the	family	claimed	as	a	couple	or	as	a	single	parent;
•	 couples	with	a	joint	income	of	less	than	£50,000	claiming	tax	credits	and	the	
primary carer has an income high enough to only have entitlement to the family 
element	of	CTC	if	s/he	were	to	claim	tax	credits	as	a	single	parent;
•	 couples	where	the	primary	carer	has	an	income	in	excess	of	£58,000	as	they	
would	have	no	entitlement	to	tax	credits	even	if	they	claimed	as	a	single	parent;	
and
•	 couples	 claiming	 out-of-work	 benefits	 where	 the	 secondary	 carer	 has	 a	 
low-income (less than £31.95 per week) or is in receipt of disability benefits.
FC and WFTC generated union/marriage bonuses and penalties because they were 
only available to families with children, see Section 1.4.2 for further details. The 
typical case for a partnership bonus was when the woman was not working and 
the man worked for a low wage (see first bullet above). This is because under FC 
and WFTC neither the woman nor the man were likely to be eligible for the credit 
if	they	separated;	the	woman	because	she	was	unlikely	to	work	for	16	or	more	
hours per week, and the man because he was unlikely to be the primary carer. 
In couples where the woman already worked full-time (more than 30 hours per 
week) the couple would never receive a tax credit partnership bonus, because the 
presence of the male could never increase their tax credit award. Under FC and 
WFTC a partnership penalty was likely if the woman in a couple was the primary 
carer and worked for 16 hours or more per week (and consequently could receive 
the credit as a single parent) but they received a smaller credit as a couple due to 
the joint income test.
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For WTC/CTC there are similar partnership bonuses and penalties (Anderberg et 
al., 2008:5). In addition, childless couples face bonuses and penalties. Further 
details of partnership bonuses and penalties in UK tax credits and out-of-work 
benefits are provided in Appendix B.
Means-tested benefits, notably IS, mainly generate partnership penalties. For a 
couple where the woman does not work and the man works less than 16 hours 
per week, the IS partnership penalty is equal to what benefit the woman would 
be eligible for if she were single. Prior to the introduction of CTC the size of the 
penalty depended upon the number and ages of the children in the family. Under 
CTC, the child premia in IS were transferred to the new tax credit.
Whether these union bonuses and penalties actually affected marriage and 
cohabitation decisions is discussed in Section 2.2.
2.2 Research evidence on welfare systems and    
 partnering
2.2.1 UK evidence on union formation and the welfare system
There are UK studies that estimate the size and distribution of union bonuses and 
penalties and who is affected, but do not provide evidence of any impacts on 
actual demographic behaviour (see Appendix B for two examples). Unfortunately, 
there is relatively little UK evidence on the effect of welfare systems on actual 
partnering decisions. A key UK study is by Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007), 
who use British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data for 1991 to 2001 to explore 
the impact of the WFTC on the formation of unions (marriage and cohabitation) 
by single mothers.15 
15 The authors also examine the impact of WFTC on employment, use of 
childcare and fertility (see Section 4.2.1).
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Box 2.1 Further details - Francesconi and van der Klaauw   
 (2007)
The BHPS data comprised unmarried, non-cohabiting females aged 16 or 
over, born after 1940 and living in England (Francesconi and van der Klaauw, 
2007:8). The data excluded females who were in school full-time, or were 
long-term sick or disabled. The sample comprised 3,333 women, of whom 
1,507 were lone parents and 1,826 were childless throughout the period. 
They used linear probability models to estimate transitions into partnership 
by single childless women and single parents. A difference-in-difference 
approach is used with outcomes for single mothers compared with those for 
single childless women (the control group) before and after the introduction 
of WFTC. The use of panel data means that whether WFTC led to changes 
in the rate at which single mothers move into partnership can be estimated. 
To account for compositional changes over time, the analysis controls for 
certain socio-demographic variables (woman’s age, number of children by 
age	 band	 (0-4;	 5-10;	 and	 11-18	 years),	 ethnic	 origin,	 highest	 educational	
qualification, tenure, region, and the interactions between woman’s age and 
number of children by age, age and educational qualification, and educational 
qualifications and number of children by age group. The models also include 
fixed	 effects	 (see	 Appendix	 A)	 to	 capture	 non-WFTC	 policy	 changes;	 the	
underlying assumption is that single mothers and single childless women 
responded in the same way to these other policy reforms, enabling the 
analysis to identify the net impact of WFTC. The use of panel data also allows 
the inclusion of individual fixed effects to account for changes in unobserved 
characteristics at the micro level. 
The authors find that WFTC resulted in a ‘substantial’ reduction in the partnership 
rates of single mothers (Francesconi and van der Klaauw, 2007:25-26). Following 
WFTC single parents were on average 2.4 percentage points less likely to form 
a union than single childless women (p<0.05). This represented a 28 per cent 
decrease on the average annual rate of union formation by single mothers 
(8.5 per cent), which they view as a ‘large effect’. Most of this effect was due to 
a reduction in partnership formation by mothers with one pre-school child (aged 
0-4 years), who were 2.8 percentage points less likely to form a union than single 
childless women. However, if the single mothers had an older child there was no 
statistically significant effect. For mothers with two or more children partnership 
rates were also lower for those with pre-school children (2.5 percentage points) 
as well as for those with primary age school children (5-10 years) (1.5 percentage 
points). Therefore, the effect of WFTC on reducing the chances of union formation 
for single parents (compared to single childless women) was more pronounced for 
those with younger children. 
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Further analysis shows that if the comparison group is changed to those single 
childless women with low educational qualifications similar results are obtained 
(to the overall sample). (This comparison is undertaken because single parents 
tend to have low educational qualifications (Francesconi and van der Klaauw, 
2007:8).) In addition, an analysis of women by age (those aged up to 30 and 
those older) revealed similar results – the fall in partnership rates affected all single 
mothers irrespective of their age.
However, these findings contrast with an earlier analysis of a 1991 cohort of lone 
parents (Marsh and Vegeris, 2004). An analysis of what factors were associated 
with a 1991 lone parent being married or cohabitating by 2001 showed that 
those claiming FC for at least 12 months between 1991 and 2001 were more 
likely to find a partner (44 per cent compared to 30 per cent) (Marsh and Vegeris, 
2004:37). That is, FC did not always act as a financial disincentive to forming 
unions notwithstanding that dual-earner families could lose entitlement to the 
benefit. 
‘This is partly due to the fact that some of those who became single-earner 
couples claimed Family Credit as a couple and partly due to the fact that 
people rarely referred to the Family Credit rulebook when deciding who to 
live with. Becoming a couple whose earnings are above the qualifying level 
for Family Credit would be an incentive of itself.’
Marsh and Vegeris (2004:37)
In addition, the length of the duration claiming IS since 1991 was not significantly 
associated with entering a union by 2001.
The difference in the direction of the impact between these two studies might 
be due to WFTC being more generous than FC, see Section 1.4.2. Thus, FC may 
have not been a disincentive to union formation, but the more generous WFTC 
was. Effectively, WFTC may have reduced the opportunity cost of being a single 
parent.
The review found no studies on the impact of WTC on union formation.
2.2.2 Cross-country comparative studies on union formation
Not only may the payment of benefits affect union formation, but the contributions 
levied to finance benefits may also affect behaviour. Ehrlich and Kim (2007) 
investigate the impact of social security (payroll) taxes for defined-benefit, PAYG 
pension schemes on family formation and fertility across the OECD (the findings 
for the latter are discussed in Section 4.2.2). They use two approaches to assess 
this effect: a simulation model and regression analysis. 
The simulation model uses OECD data for 1965 to 1989 and shows that a one 
per cent increase in defined-benefit, PAYG taxes reduces the probability of adult 
marriages by 0.231 per cent.16 However, this simulation model incorporates a 
16 Formally, the social security tax rate used is the old-age, survivor and disability-
insurance proportion of social security benefits as a share of GDP (Ehrlich 
and Kim, 2007).
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number of (simplifying) assumptions that limit its applicability to policy making. 
For example, the authors assume that births only occur within marriage, that 
only social security finances retirement, and that all adults pay the same taxes 
and receive the same defined benefits (and hence only children born to married 
parents pay social security contributions).
The regression analysis uses data for 28 OECD countries for the period 1960 to 
1992, and shows that a one per cent increase in the pension portion of social 
security benefits as a percentage of GDP reduces the net marriage rate for those 
aged 15 and over by 0.369 per cent. Moreover, social security taxes for defined-
benefit, PAYG schemes accounted for 51.5 per cent of the fall in net marriages 
(from 9.97 to 4.86) in OECD countries over this period (Ehrlich and Kim, 2007:18). 
The analysis controls for stage of economic development, other government taxes 
and benefits and for unobserved country-level variables.
Although Ehrlich and Kim (2007) identify a negative effect on union formation 
from social security taxes, their analyses, which are limited by the simplifying 
assumptions made, only find a small sized reduction in net marriages across the 
OECD. 
2.2.3 US evidence on union formation and the welfare system
Compared to the UK there is a more extensive literature in the US on the impact 
of the welfare system on marriage/cohabitation. In part this reflects that some 
supporters of welfare reform in the US saw legislative changes, such as the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Responsibility Act 1996, as partly designed to increase 
the marriage rate (and to reduce the birth rate) of unmarried women. 
As outlined in Appendix D, analysts have demonstrated that tax credits (EITC and 
child tax credit) and a wide range of means-tested transfer programmes (AFDC, 
TANF, food stamps, housing assistance, child care and Medicaid) include marriage 
penalties (and to a lesser extent marriage bonuses) (Carasso and Steuerle, 
2005:158-9). Transfer programmes for low-income families in particular contain 
marriage penalties – benefits received before marriage can be reduced or even 
terminated on marriage. Moreover, under the tax system married and cohabiting 
couples are treated differently, but in the benefit system their treatment can vary – 
depending upon the father’s biological relationship with the child, and how open 
the couple is about their relationship with welfare agencies (Carasso and Steuerle, 
2005:160).
Traditional economic theory would suggest that AFDC should lead to a reduction 
in the marriage rate (see Section 1.5.2), whilst the policy intent behind AFDC 
waivers and TANF was that reform should lead to an increase in the marriage 
rate. Overall, however, the evidence from the US on the impacts of the welfare 
system on partnering is mixed. Some studies find that the tax and transfer systems 
can lead to increases in marriage (see Schoeni and Blank (2000) ahead), others 
report a decrease in marriage (see, for instance, Bitler et al. (2004) and Moffitt et 
al. (1998)) ahead) and others find small or insignificant effects (see, for instance, 
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Ellwood (2000b) ahead). As mentioned in Section 1.6.1, the significance and 
magnitude of estimated effects in non-experimental studies is sensitive to the 
specification of the analytical models – especially controls for unobserved variables 
(state and individual effects), which tend to reduce the size and significance of 
effects. Moreover, a meta-analysis of social experiments conducted by Gennetian 
and Knox (2003) (see ahead) suggests that, in general, welfare reforms had no 
impact on marriage or cohabitation rates. 
This section considers the impact of welfare benefits (AFDC/AFDC-UP, AFDC 
waivers and TANF), tax credits (EITC) and an area initiative, the New Hope project, 
on union formation. For each of these three areas there is a general discussion, 
followed by an outline of the non-experiment and experimental findings as 
appropriate. 
US welfare benefits and union formation
This review benefits from a major review of the early US literature on the impact 
of welfare systems on union formation (and childbearing) by Moffitt (1998b), see 
Appendix C17. He reviews 68 estimates from a variety of studies made available 
between 1970 and May 1996 and found that whilst some found a marriage 
penalty, a significant minority found no effect. However, all of the analyses with 
statistically significant results show that AFDC had a negative effect on marriage 
(Moffitt,	2003:336);	a	finding	that	is	in-line	with	traditional	economic	theory	on	
benefits and family formation.
Work by Moffitt and colleagues also shows that studies of the presumed 
anti-marriage bias of AFDC have been based on the belief that AFDC benefits are 
mainly (even solely) available to single mothers (Moffitt et al., 1998:259). As a 
consequence models estimating the effects of the programme on marriage tend 
to assume that women face a simple choice: being unmarried and on AFDC or 
married and off welfare. In other words, early studies often ignore the possibility 
of cohabitation, or effectively estimate an impact on unions by including it with 
marriage. 
An earlier study by Moffitt (1990) also illustrates the importance of producing 
separate estimates for the impact of AFDC on marriage for men and women by 
race. He finds, using Current Population Survey (CPS) data for 1985, that a more 
generous benefit system significantly reduced the likelihood of black American 
males being married, but had no significance for women or white males. 
Post-1997 studies that show AFDC had a negative effect on marriage include 
Moffitt et al. (1998). They find that a $100 increase in monthly benefit reduced 
the probability of marriage by 2.5 to 4.9 percentage points (the former estimate 
17 Moffitt (1992) also conducted an even earlier review of the literature, 
which concludes that AFDC has some effect on marriage (and non-marital 
childbearing) but not enough to account for the increase in single mothers 
in the US during the 1980s.
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is	 obtained	 using	 PSID	 data	 and	 the	 latter	NLSY	 data;	 see	 Box	 2.2	 for	 further	
details of the study) (p<0.10) (Moffitt et al., 1998:266-72). However, these results 
are for a model that included a limited number of demographic controls. When 
additional controls are included, for instance, for the marriage market and family 
background,	the	percentage	point	estimates	change;	the	PSID	estimate	remains	
negative but is no longer statistically significant and the NLSY estimate is significant 
but reduces slightly in size to 4.5 percentage points. Thus this study provides only 
limited evidence of a negative effect of AFDC on marriage rates.
Relative to single motherhood, Moffitt et al. (1998) do show that the marriage 
rate	was	positively	related	to	age,	education	and	the	presence	of	young	children;	
and was lower for black women compared to non-black women. In addition, 
further analysis controlling for AFDC-UP shows, using the PSID data (but not the 
NLSY data), that this programme did encourage marriage. This contradicts other 
earlier studies that tend to find that the AFDC-UP programme had little or no 
positive effect on marriage rates.
Furthermore, Moffitt et al. (1998:266-72) find only weak evidence that AFDC rules 
provided incentives to cohabit. Specifically, they found that cohabitation rates 
compared to rates of single parenthood were not significantly related to the state 
level of AFDC, but were negatively related to education and were lower for black 
women compared to non-black women. However, a telephone survey of state 
AFDC agencies conducted in 1993 shows that in most states the programme’s 
rules were relatively conducive to cohabitation (Moffitt et al., 1998:264-5). In 
particular, the cohabitation of men unrelated to the children in the family was 
treated leniently – their income was not counted against the grant and contributions 
to the family were often ignored. These rules appear, according to Moffitt et al. to 
give a ‘… significant monetary encouragement to cohabitation while on AFDC …’ 
(1998:266). Indeed, having a lenient policy for in-kind contributions by unrelated 
contributors	was	positively	associated	with	AFDC	recipients’	cohabitating;	albeit	
the evidence of incentive effects is only ‘weak’.
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Box 2.2 Further details - Moffitt et al. (1998)
Moffitt et al. (1998) developed multinomial logit models for partner status 
(cohabiting, married or neither) and for the joint decision of partner status and 
welfare status (on or off welfare, and cohabiting, married or single mother). 
The analysis used two data sets: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). It was, nevertheless, 
a cross-sectional analysis. The PSID data were of all women aged 18-55 with 
children aged under 18 when interviewed in 1987 (1,258), whilst the NLSY 
data were of all women in the 1987 survey, who at that time were aged 22-
29 with children aged under 18 (1,430). 
For each dataset the authors give a ‘small model’ which includes controls for 
demographic variables (age, education, race and number of children) and an 
‘extended model’ that incorporates additional controls for family background, 
the marriage market, religiosity and urban residency.
The extent of the analysis was constrained by the small number of cohabiting 
women in the two samples in receipt of AFDC (43 and 82, respectively). 
The authors also highlight that some of the results obtained are spurious or 
anomalous. 
A more recent study by Blackburn (2000) illustrates how the impact of benefits on 
marriage can vary by race. He examines the association between the generosity 
of benefits and the probability of never-married mothers marrying. Using the 
NLSY for 1979 to 1992 he finds that for the non-black population of unmarried 
single mothers an increase in benefits is associated with a significant fall in the 
probability of marriage – a $100 increase in monthly benefit reduced the probability 
of marriage by 19.5 per cent (Blackburn, 2000:129-131). Moreover, states with 
AFDC-UP had a higher likelihood of marriage. 
However, for black never-married mothers higher benefits were associated with 
increased chances of marriage, and AFDC-UP reduced marriage probabilities. 
That, for instance, a $100 increase in monthly benefit increased the probability 
of marriage by 19.8 per cent was not expected nor anticipated by the underlying 
economic theory. Thus, the study only provides limited support for the hypothesis 
that unmarried women with children will find marriage less desirable when benefits 
available outside of marriage are higher. However, its findings should be treated 
with caution as it does not include controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
The study also found that higher expected earnings were associated with a 
higher probability of marriage, and that never-married mothers who grew up in 
female headed households were less likely to marry (Blackburn, 2000:141). The 
analysis	found	no	evidence	of	a	marriage	market	effect;	in	the	male	labour	market	
opportunities were not significantly associated with the likelihood of marriage.
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Box 2.3 Further details - Blackburn (2000)
Blackburn (2000) estimates proportional hazard models for the duration 
between first birth and marriage. The NLSY covers people aged 14 to 22 in 
1979, and the analysis is based on women who had their first non-marital 
birth between 1978 and 1991. 
It excludes observations where the mother is married within six months of the 
first birth – a procedure adopted by other analysts.
Two welfare benefit variables are used: the sum of AFDC and Food Stamp 
monthly benefits for unmarried women living in each State with no other 
income, and whether or not the State had AFDC-UP. Other hazard rate 
model variables include the time period since the women became never-
married mothers, the woman’s expected earnings (as measured by age, 
years of schooling and a cognitive and applied skills aptitude test), and 
‘marriage market’ variables (such as, percentage of a county’s population in 
manufacturing and the area’s unemployment rate). Three separate analyses 
are conducted for ‘pooled’ data, black people and non-black people. The non-
black never married sample includes a small number of Hispanic women. 
Non-experimental and experimental studies of welfare reform (that is, AFDC 
waivers and TANF) and union formation find mixed evidence of a welfare effect. 
Some programmes appear to increase union formation, but only for sub-groups, 
and other programmes decrease union formation. In terms of non-experimental 
studies Bitler et al. (2004) find that AFDC waivers and TANF reduced marriage 
rates, but Schoeni and Blank (2000) find AFDC waivers increased marriage but 
TANF had no significant effects. For both studies the comparison is made with 
states not implementing ‘major’ AFDC waivers. The waivers covered introducing 
family caps, extending income disregards, amending time limits and expanding 
eligibility for AFDC-UP. These two non-experimental studies are discussed ahead, 
and then findings from experimental studies of welfare reform and marriage are 
outlined.
Bitler et al. (2004) use state level vital statistics on marriage and divorce for 1989 
to 2000 to assess the impact of state waivers and TANF on flows into (and out of) 
marriage.18
18 The findings for divorces are discussed below in Section 3.2.2.
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Box 2.4 Further details - Bitler et al. (2004)
Bitler et al. argue that flow, rather than stock, data are required to assess the 
‘immediate impacts of welfare reform’ (2004:219). The authors regress the 
rate of new marriages (or divorces) with measures of welfare reform, labour 
market characteristics and demographic variables and other controls (including 
state and year fixed effects). The labour market variables cover unemployment 
and earnings and the demographic variables include the proportion of the 
states’ populations that were African American and Hispanic, the proportions 
of the population living in metropolitan areas, the age distribution of women 
and female educational attainment. The analysis gives average estimates for 
the impacts of AFDC waivers and for TANF, and in both cases the comparison 
is AFDC without waivers. 
The disadvantages of using state level vital statistics are: the effects across 
different age, race and educational backgrounds cannot be explored and the 
data are aggregated by the state within which the marriage or divorce occurred 
and not by state of residence. Sensitivity analysis using more detailed data 
suggests that the latter did affect the impact estimates, but the coefficients 
were always negative and sometimes significant.
Bitler et al. (2004:222-223) find that, as with other studies, adding state and year 
fixed effects to the model to control for unobserved variables leads to a large 
reduction in estimated impacts, see Appendix A. For example, for AFDC waivers 
the estimated effect on the rate of new marriages is, with labour market and 
demographic controls, a 15.6 per cent decline relative to the AFDC programme. 
However, adding state and year fixed effects gives a 4.8 per cent decline in new 
marriages (p<0.10). Moreover, welfare reform, in the form of AFDC waivers, which 
might be expected to increase the number of new marriages (given the policy 
objectives) instead, resulted in a decline of nearly five per cent. Similarly, TANF 
led to a reduction of 23.3 per cent in new marriages compared to the AFDC 
programme (p<0.01)19. Although the TANF estimate is relatively large there is little 
variation in the data because it covers a short period of time, and so may not be a 
robust estimate. The authors also show that the maximum amount of benefit paid 
to	a	family	of	four	produced	a	fall	 in	marriage;	however,	when	State	and	fixed	
effects are included in the model this effect became positive, but was statistically 
insignificant (Bitler et al., 2004:223). The authors conclude that: ‘we can say with 
some confidence that welfare reform is not “pro-marriage” on balance.’ (Bitler et 
al., 2004:232).
Schoeni and Blank (2000) use data on all women aged 16-54 years from the CPS 
for 1977 to 1999 to investigate the impacts of AFDC waivers 1992 to 1996 and of 
TANF. The estimates show that the AFDC waivers significantly increased rates of 
marriage by 2.3 percentage points for those with less than 12 years of schooling 
(Schoeni and Blank, 2000:17 and 31) (p<0.10). As the authors anticipated, the 
effects	 for	more	 educated	women	 are	 lower;	 there	 is	 a	 statistically	 significant	
19 Bitler et al. (2004) also specify models that include state specific time trends, 
and these models give similar impact estimates to those reported here.
Partnering
57
reduction in the rate of marriage of 1.4 percentage points for women with 12 years 
of schooling, and the impact for women with more than 12 years of schooling 
is insignificant (0.7 percentage points). So whilst the impact for the Schoeni and 
Blank (2000) study is in the opposite direction to the Bitler et al. (2004) study, it is 
for a sub-group – those with less education – admittedly one likely to be affected 
by welfare reform. However, the CPS is believed to underreport both marriages 
and divorces and this undermines the robustness of studies using the dataset 
(Bitler et al., 2004:219).
Their estimates also show that post-1995 policy changes (TANF) had no significant 
impact on marriage (Schoeni and Blank, 2000:21 and 33). That is, the less educated 
were as likely to get married as the better education following the introduction 
of TANF. 
Box 2.5 Further details - Schoeni and Blank (2000)
The analysis involves collapsing CPS data by calculating the mean marriage 
rate (and single headship rate, see Section 4.2.3, for four age groups and 
three educational attainment groups for each state and year – giving a dataset 
with 14,076 observations (Schoeni and Blank, 2000:9).20 
Schoeni and Blank (2000) are particularly interested in the outcomes for 
women with less than 12 years education (high school dropouts) because 
they were the group most likely to be affected by AFDC and TANF. They did 
not expect women with 13 or more years of schooling to be affected by the 
welfare programmes. (The third educational group was women with 12 years 
of schooling.) 
Different analyses are conducted to obtain the AFDC waiver and TANF 
estimates. For the waiver analysis, regression is used.21 The analysis involves 
comparing outcomes in waiver and non-waiver states, controls for the 
labour market (as the performance of the economy was lower in waiver 
states compared to non-waiver states) and demographic characteristics (age, 
education and race), state fixed effects, year fixed effects and state specific 
time trends (Schoeni and Blank, 2000:13-14). 
To estimate the impact of TANF on marriage rates, Schoeni and Blank (2000:20-
23) adopt a difference-in-difference approach. Differences in marriage 
outcomes for 1995 and 1998 are compared for women with less than 12 
years schooling against women with more than 12 years schooling. Controls, 
year effects and fixed effects similar to those in the regression analysis are 
included in the analysis (the trend data are excluded). 
20 As well as marriage and headship, Schoeni and Blank (2000) estimate a range 
of outcomes, such as welfare participation, percentage working earnings, 
and hours worked.
21 The regression analysis is also used to estimate the effects of TANF, but they 
are regarded as being unreliable because there is a lack of observations and 
state TANF programmes were implemented over a relatively short period of 
time.
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Both the Bitler et al. (2004) and Schoeni and Blank (2000) analyses of the impact 
of TANF on marriage (and divorce) is limited by the relatively short period of time 
over which TANF was implemented nationally. All states had implemented TANF 
between September 1996 and January 1998 – a 16 month period (Bitler et al., 
2004:218). The speed of implementation means that – unlike the AFDC waiver 
data – there is relatively little variation between states. Their findings could be 
biased by random factors that only affected this 16 month period and hence do 
not provide a good guide to longer term impacts. Both sets of authors are more 
confident about their AFDC waiver results. 
Random assignment studies have also been analysed to investigate the impact 
of benefits on partnership decisions. In general, social experiments, like 
non-experimental studies, are inconsistent on whether there is relationship 
between welfare policies and marriage rates for single parents (Gennetian and 
Knox, 2003:1). Overall, experimental programmes have tended not to have an 
effect on marriage, although some have effects for sub-groups. Some of these 
studies are discussed ahead and in Section 2.2.4.
Gennetian and Knox (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of six welfare programmes 
at the 18 months to four years follow-up point and find no consistent relationship 
between these programmes and union formation for either the benefit population 
overall or sub-groups. The studies cover a ten year period, from 1991 to 2001. 
All of the programmes were random assignment experiments and incorporated 
different treatments or were implemented in different areas giving Gennetian and 
Knox (2003:46) 14 sets of results to review.22 Whilst the nature of interventions in 
the programmes varied, across all programmes they included: increased earnings 
disregards, treating two-parent families the same as single parent families, 
mandatory employment services, and time-limited eligibility to welfare benefits. 
A focus of the Gennetian and Knox (2003) review is to explore differences by 
sub-groups of single parents, as they anticipate that the programmes’ effects 
on marriage and cohabitation will vary by sub-group. The sub-groups examined 
were defined by: age of youngest child, number of children, age of single parent, 
priori marital status, race, level of disadvantage (defined in terms of benefit and 
work history and educational attainment), whether has prior work experience and 
length of benefit receipt.
Gennetian and Knox (2003:12) report findings for whether the single parents were 
either married or cohabiting when they were surveyed at the follow-up point of 
each study. As a consequence their reported marriage and cohabitation rates are 
lower than if respondents had been asked whether they had ever been married 
22 This review includes one of the studies discussed below, namely the MFIP. The 
other five programmes were Florida’s Family Transition Program, Vermont’s 
Welfare Restructuring Program, the national Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work 
Strategies, Connecticut’s Jobs First Program, and Los Angeles Jobs First/Gain. 
Gennetian and Knox (2003:6) also selectively include the estimates from 
other programs when appropriate.
Partnering
59
or cohabited. The authors estimate the impacts on marriage and cohabitation for 
sub-groups for each study and then use meta-analysis to estimate average effects 
across the studies overall and for both sub-groups and types of intervention.23 
Their findings are as follows:
•	 For	single	parents	across	all	the	studies	the	welfare	programmes	had	no significant 
effect on marriage or cohabitation (Gennetian and Knox, 2003:14-15). There 
was an insignificant and small fall in the marriage rate of 0.3 percentage points 
to	10.6	per	cent	for	those	in	the	treatment	group;	and	an	insignificant	and	small	
increase of 0.1 percentage points to 10.9 per cent in the cohabitation rate. 
 The analysis also finds a wide variation in rates of marriage and cohabitation 
across individual sites. Gennetian and Knox (2003:15) suggest this variation is 
due to both differences in the length of the follow-up time period of the studies 
and differences in local cultural, economic or political factors.
•	 The	welfare	programmes	had	no significant effect on marriage or cohabitation 
for specific family sub-groups (Gennetian and Knox, 2003:16).24 
•	 By	type	of	policy	intervention	the	only	significant	effect	found	is	the	small	effect	
that improved earnings disregard policies without time limits had on increasing 
marriage amongst young mothers, those not previously married, and those 
most disadvantaged (an increase of 3.2 percentage points) (Gennetian and 
Knox, 2003:21). This finding is consistent with those from wage supplement 
programmes such as the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project described ahead.
The implication is that the positive findings of some other studies are ‘… 
idiosyncratic to the particular programs, populations or sites … rather than part of 
a consistent story of effects on marriage for a broad set of programs.’ (Gennetian 
and Knox, 2003:21). 
The Gennetian and Knox (2003) meta-analysis did not include results for the 
California Work Pays Demonstration Project (CWPDP), which was an AFDC waiver 
project commencing in 1992. Hu (2003) uses this programme to explore short- 
and long-term impacts of AFDC-Basic and AFDC-UP on marriage formation and 
dissolution. It is the explicit modelling of two-parent married families that makes 
this study of particular interest. The treatment group received enhanced work 
incentives in the form of lower maximum benefits, a lower benefit withdrawal 
rate (from 100 per cent to 67 per cent) and an extension of the income disregard 
($30 per month) beyond 12 months (Hu, 2003:947). The dataset comprised 
23 A key assumption underpinning the analysis is that each study’s sample is 
drawn from the same underlying population which has one ‘true’ effect 
size.
24 One statistically significant relationship was found, but within this sub-group 
there was a ten per cent likelihood of finding two significant relationships by 
chance alone. Thus Gennetian and Knox (2003:16) conclude that there was 
no variation in effects by family sub-group.
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longitudinal administrative and survey data. The latter was administered in two 
waves: between October 1993 and September 1994 and between May 1995 and 
May 1996. The analysis is for female respondents only and includes controls for 
demographic characterises. 
Hu (2003:949-951) finds that, compared to the control group, those women in 
the AFDC-UP treatment group had significantly higher rates of marriage and 
cohabitation at wave 2.25 That is, two-parent families receiving the stronger work 
incentives had marriage/cohabitation rates seven percentage points higher than 
the control group. Further analyses suggest that this increase is due to a higher 
proportion being married, rather than due to more cohabitation (Hu, 2003:953-
954). The results also imply that there is a time lag before financial incentives 
affect behaviour – wave 2 was conducted between 29 and 41 months after the 
start of the experiment. 
In addition, for single parents on benefit (AFDC-Basic), the work incentives had 
no statistically significant effect on the proportion married/cohabiting at waves 1 
or 2. However, further analysis shows that single parents in receipt of AFDC-Basic 
and in the treatment group were more likely to cohabit with the children’s father 
by wave 2 compared with the control group (Hu, 2003:954-955). Cohabiting with 
the father meant that the family became eligible for AFDC-UP, but the treatment 
group’s lower maximum benefit meant that the woman faced a lower loss of 
benefit, and hence there was a smaller disincentive to cohabit. 
So Hu (2003) provides some evidence that benefits can promote the stability of 
marriage over approximately three and a half years, albeit for a relatively small 
proportion of the then total AFDC caseload, that is, two-parent families. In the 
analysis Hu (2003:946) ignores the effect of other welfare programmes (notably 
EITC) and as Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999) and Ellwood (2000b) show, this may 
be a serious omission that limits the applicability of the findings. The Gennetian 
and Knox (2003) observations about the importance of local context and the 
idiosyncratic nature of experimental findings potentially apply to the study.
The MFIP was included in the Gennetian and Knox (2003) meta-analysis discussed 
previously. However, it is discussed further here because further analysis is available 
on its longer-term impacts on union formation. Gennetian and Millar (2004) explore 
whether MFIP had an impact on the marriage of single and two-parent families. 
MFIP included an enhanced disregard whereby recipients received a higher basic 
award and were allowed to retain 38 per cent of their earnings (compared to the 
rapid withdrawal of benefit under AFDC) and changed eligibility rules by removing 
the 100 hour per month and work history requirements in AFDC-UP, which had 
served to limit the eligibility of two-parents for AFDC. Thus MFIP should have led 
to an increase in marriage rates.
25 There were no statistically significant findings for wave 1 of the survey. This 
might be because wave 1 was administered only 10 to 21 months after the 
commencement of the experiment, possibly too soon to measure changes 
in marriage/cohabitation and divorce/separation (Hu, 2003:951).
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The authors make use of survey data from a social experiment used to evaluate 
the MFIP. The survey is of a representative sample of programme participants 
who were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups between April 
and October 1994 and the follow-up survey was administered three years after 
they joined the programme. The analysis is regression-adjusted to allow for slight 
differences in the survey data for the treatment and control groups. Separate 
analyses are conducted for single and two-parent families (defined as both married 
and cohabitating couples) by benefit status (that is, whether they where new 
applicants or long-term recipients) in order to reflect differences in MFIP eligibility 
rules. 
Compared to the AFDC control group Gennetian and Millar (2004:285-295) 
estimate that:
•	 For	single	parents	who	were	long-term	recipients	MFIP	increased marriage – after 
three years the proportion married had increased by 4.2 percentage points to 
12.6 per cent (p<0.05). The authors describe this increase as ‘modest’;	however,	
it represents a 50 per cent increase on the control group. (The authors suggest 
that this increase in marriage might be due to an increase in the MFIP mothers’ 
income, which would increase their ‘bargaining power within marriage, thus 
making them more comfortable and willing to marry …’ (2004:296)). 
•	 For	single	parents	who	were	recent	applicants	(that	is,	families	who	had	received	
AFDC for less than 24 months at the time of random assignment or who made 
a new claim on the day of assignment) MFIP had no impact on marriage. 
•	 For	 two-parent	 families	who	were	 already	 in	 receipt	of	AFDC-UP	when	 they	
started on the programme, MFIP significantly increased the proportion in 
marriage and cohabitation over the three years by 19.1 percentage points to 
67.3 per cent. Most of this increase is due to a significant reduction in separations 
(-9.5 percentage points) – the divorce rate for the treatment group was also 
lower (three percentage points), but this fall was not statistically significant. 
Thus for two-parent recipients MFIP increased marriage/cohabitation stability 
by nearly 40 per cent compared to the control group.26 MFIP might have had 
this effect because it reduced the stresses on these families by increasing family 
income which in turn allowed some two-earner families to reduce their working 
hours. 
With respect to two-parent families, Gennetian and Millar (2004:296) conclude:
‘… the MFIP results suggest that providing more generous benefits to low-
income working families can help keep families together – at least in the short 
term – perhaps by reducing the many stresses that these couples face.’
Whether the Minnesota’s impacts last beyond three years is considered in 
Gennetian (2003), who examines the impact of MFIP on the full sample of two-
26 Sample sizes were too small to estimate the impacts of MFIP on marriage/
cohabitation for two-parent who were recent applicants.
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parent families over a seven year follow-up period.27 The outcomes of interest 
are the divorce rate for those that were married at the start of the study, and the 
marriage and any subsequent divorce for those that were cohabitating at the 
beginning of the study. As with the findings for the three year follow-up period, 
the analysis distinguishes between families who had been long-term and recent 
recipients at the time of random assignment. She finds that effects were more 
pronounced for the former group than the latter group.28 
For existing benefit recipients, MFIP (in comparison to the AFDC control group) 
increased overall marital stability by significantly decreasing divorce by 3.5 
percentage points to 10.4 per cent (a 25 per cent reduction) over the seven years 
of the follow-up period (Gennetian, 2003:6-8). Moreover, this effect was more 
pronounced for: black married couples (minus 9.9 percentage points), families 
with children whose youngest child was aged under six years at study entry (minus 
five percentage points), and larger sized families (three or more children) (minus 
5.2 percentage points). In addition, MFIP reduced the divorce rate of those that 
were married when they entered the study (by minus 2.9 percentage points), but 
this fall is not statistically significant. However, for black, non-Hispanic married 
couples at baseline, MFIP did reduce the divorce rate by 20.5 percentage points 
over the seven year follow-up period (a 73 per cent reduction to 7.8 per cent) 
(Gennetian, 2003:14-16). 
For existing recipients who were cohabitating at study entry, MFIP did not encourage 
marriage (Gennetian, 2003:17). However, of those that did subsequently marry 
the couples in MFIP were less likely to get divorced by the end of the follow-up 
period compared to the AFDC control group (minus 5.3 percentage points in the 
divorce rate, or a 66 per cent reduction). Thus MFIP also promoted marital stability 
amongst this group of former cohabitating couples.
For recent two-parent applicants, MFIP had no significant effect on the divorce 
rates over the seven year follow-up period (Gennetian, 2003:21). 
Both the three- and seven-year follow-up studies suggest that newer and existing 
benefit applicants may respond differently to marriage incentives. Implying that 
other studies should explore the distinction between longer term and more recent 
claimants. However, a limitation of the Gennetian (2003) analysis is that it only 
focuses on formal/legal divorces and the data do not capture separations or living 
apart. In addition, whilst Gennetian (2003) shows that benefits might help to 
sustain marriages by decreasing the divorce rate, the quality of these sustained 
marriages is unknown. 
This finding confirms that of Hu (2003), namely, that benefits can promote the 
27 The analysis required the matching of administrative marriage and divorce 
records with MFIP data.
28 Note, effects are for martial status at the time the respondent entered the 
study (whether treatment or control groups).
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stability of two-parent families (see previously). However, the MFIP was included 
in the Gennetian and Knox (2003) meta-analysis and, as Gennetian and Millar 
(2004:277) acknowledge, the finding that earnings disregards could increase 
marriage and marital stability, might not be generalisable from Minnesota to other 
localities. 
Both the Hu (2003) and Gennetian and Millar (2004) studies also only show that 
their treatment groups had less adverse effects on union formation than the old 
AFDC policy (as represented by the control group). They are of limited use in 
increasing our understanding of the overall effect of TANF on current rates of 
union formation and dissolution (Burstein, 2007:413). By definition they also 
provide no evidence of any impacts on non-participants in the experiments. 
In practice, welfare reform may have had a relatively small impact on marriage 
because welfare reform gave women greater financial independence through the 
emphasis on obtaining employment. This argument is supported by Nandi (2008), 
who, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the period 
1979 to 2002, finds that single, non-employed women who at some point in time 
were welfare recipients gain more, in terms of household income, if they obtain 
full-time employment (whilst remaining single) compared to if they enter marriage 
or cohabitation. The estimated income gains from full-time employment were 220 
per cent if they worked full-time compared to 119 per cent from cohabitation, 182 
per cent from marriage and 113 per cent from working part-time (p<0.01) (Nandi, 
2008:20 and 23). As a route out of poverty, therefore, full-time employment is a 
better option than marriage or cohabitation. This arises because female benefit 
recipients’	potential	partners	 tend	to	have	 low	paid	 jobs;	even	though	spouses	
tend to have higher earnings than cohabitors. 
EITC and union formation
The US literature on the impact of EITC on partnering is less extensive than that for 
benefits, but still broader than the UK literature. There are a small number of studies 
that have examined actual behavioural responses, and, in general, the effect of 
EITC on actual marriage decisions is small and statistically insignificant (Hotz and 
Scholz,	2003:184-5;	Hoffman	and	Seidman,	2003:98;	 see	also	Baughman	and	
Dickert-Conlin, 2003).29 
For example, Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2002:35) conclude that, on average, 
EITC did not influence marriage decisions. Their analysis is based on women aged 
between 18 and 50 with children, using panel data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participants for the period 1989 to 1995. (The EITC received is imputed 
as the maximum Federal and State EITC for a woman holding constant her 
demographic and family characteristics. Their model includes controls for individual 
and State characteristics, individual fixed effects and time varying covariates. It 
29 This contrasts with the US general tax system, where the probability of 
marriage does fall as the marriage penalty increases (see Alm et al.,	1999;	
Eissa and Hoynes, 2000). The EITC effects are small possibly because marriage 
related tax liabilities are small relative to total income for most households 
(Dickert-Conlin,	1999:222;	Dickert-Conlin	and	Houser,	2002:30).
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also treats cohabitating couples as unmarried.) However, there were differences 
by whether the women were married or unmarried the first time they entered the 
panel (Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 2002:35-36). For the initially married women, 
EITC encouraged them to remain married (or discouraged divorce) – a $100 
increase in EITC increased the probability of marriage by 0.8 percentage points. 
For unmarried women there was no statistically significant correlation. 
Ellwood (2000b) comes to a similar conclusion, namely, that EITC - and other 
welfare reforms - estimated impacts on marriage are small and ambiguous. 
Ellwood (2000b:1100) concludes that there is no ‘real evidence that EITC marriage 
penalties were reducing marriage.’ 
Box 2.6 Further details - Ellwood (2000b)
Ellwood (2000b:1073) uses a difference-in-difference approach to examine 
changes in outcomes for sub-groups both geographically and over time. This 
is done by treating the rapid expansion in EITC, which did not affect people 
equally, as a natural experiment. Using data from the Current Population 
Survey 1975 to 1999 he takes women aged between 18 and 44 and using 
their personal characteristics (such as age, education and race) predicts a 
1998 wage for them for each year. The women are then allocated to wage/
skill quartiles for each survey year. Ellwood (2000b:1075) then tracks what 
happens to similar quartiles of women over time. If financial incentives vary 
for women in the bottom quartile compared to the top quartile, and he 
argues that they do, then there is a natural experiment allowing within and 
between quartile comparisons for groups of women. The expectation is that 
over time marriage should be more common for women with children in 
the bottom quartile (Ellwood, 2000b:1093-1097). However, the data show 
that the marriage rate for those in the bottom quartile continued to fall over 
the observation period – they had not responded to the incentives created 
by EITC and other welfare reforms. A finding confirmed by a small impact 
estimate on marriage of minus four percentage points when using difference-
in-difference to compare the bottom quartile with the third quartile for 1986 
and 1999. This finding is inconsistent with economic theory, which would 
predict a marriage effect. A similar impact estimate for marriage (minus three 
percentage points) was found for a comparison of women with children 
and women without children in the bottom quartile. However, as Ellwood 
(2000b:1096) points out, his analysis uses women’s ages to predict wages, 
and women in the bottom quartile tend to be younger than those in the other 
quartiles, and if younger women postponed marriage decisions for reasons 
unrelated to EITC this could bias the findings. So Ellwood limits his sample 
to women aged 24 to 44 years. This shows that the proportion of married 
women in the lowest quartile flattens out after the early 1990s, implying that 
the decline in marriage amongst the lowest skill women aged over 24 had 
been slowed. Unfortunately, the differences in the trends with other quartiles 
are ‘too tenuous to draw strong conclusions.’ (Ellwood, 2000b:1096). 
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Eissa and Hoynes (1999 cited in Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 2002:28 and Hoffman 
and Seidman, 2003:97-99) also find that EITC had modest impacts on marriage. 
They calculate the income tax cost of marriage and simulate how EITC affects 
the probability of marriage.30 They find that increasing the tax cost of marriage 
by $1,000 reduces the probability of marriage by 1.3 percentage points. Further 
simulations show that EITC (as operating in 1997) increased the marriage rate by 
one percentage point for families with low-incomes (less than $15,000) and reduced 
the marriage rate for those with incomes over $25,000. Moreover, changes in 
EITC between 1984 and 1997 increased marriage rates by one to five per cent for 
low-income families (that is, with incomes below $25,000), and reduced marriage 
rates by one per cent for families with middle incomes (of between £25,000 and 
$75,000). These are weak incentive and disincentive effects. 
Eissa and Hoynes, (2000b) extend this analysis to look at the trade-off between 
marriage and cohabitation. They impute the presence of cohabitating households 
using data on the relationship to the head of household for other household 
members. Their analysis shows that increasing the tax cost of marriage by $1,000 
significantly reduces the probability of marriage by 0.4 percentage points 
compared to cohabitation. This analysis incorporates Federal taxes and EITC. The 
analysis is used to simulate the effect of EITC (and other tax components) on 
marriage rates. Simulations for the same period (1984 to 1997) show that EITC for 
low-income families ($10,000 to $15,000) increased the likelihood of marriage by 
4.3 percentage points, but decreased it for higher income groups – two to three 
percentage points for middle income groups and less than one percentage point 
for the higher income group ($75,000 and over) (Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b:19 and 
37). These simulations for EITC are described as ‘modest’.
However, other factors, even for a married couple in the phase-out stage, may 
help maintain marriage (Ellwood, 2000b:1070-1072). Whilst a woman in a 
low-income married couple where both partners are working might gain a larger 
EITC by divorcing, the family does enjoy the extra income from EITC and this 
might reduce the level of family stress and increase the probability of the marriage 
surviving. Moreover, EITC also provides a lower work incentive for the second 
earner to work, and they may decide to spend more time with the family because 
in Beckerian terms, see Section 1.5.2, this extra time gives marriage a comparative 
advantage over divorce. Moreover, people may consider longer-term benefits and 
costs of marriage and so not respond to shorter-term gains or losses arising from 
EITC. 
New Hope programme
One other US study, the New Hope programme, deserves mentioning because it is 
in effect an outlier – finding a relatively large positive effect on marriage. 
30 In their analysis they use repeated cross-sectional data from the Current 
Population Survey for 1985 to 1998 for women aged 18 to 47 years, and 
use childless women as controls. The models include controls for individual 
characteristics and state fixed effects.
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New Hope was a US voluntary programme operated in two low-income 
neighbourhoods in Milwaukee, Wisconsin during the mid and late-1990s that 
sought to increase participants’ levels of employment and income. It offered 
participants in full-time employment an anti-poverty package comprising earnings 
supplements, low-cost health insurance, child-care subsidies and community 
service jobs for those unable to find paid work in the private sector (Gassman-
Pines and Yoshikawa, 2006:15). Programme benefits were provided for three 
years. The programme was provided outside of the welfare system and was open 
to both welfare recipients and non-recipients. 
New Hope was evaluated using random assignment. Gassman-Pines and 
Yoshikawa (2006:13) assess whether New Hope increased marriage rates five years 
after random assignment for never married mothers. (Participants were randomly 
assigned in the New Hope programme between August 1994 and December 
1995.) The programme has been shown to increase participants’ employment 
rates and income. Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006) consider whether the 
increased financial stability and feelings of well-being it provided also led to an 
increase in marriage rates. 
Box 2.7 Further details - Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa   
 (2006)
Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006:16) count as being married at year 
five those women whose spouse lived with them and those whose spouses 
lived apart. Their measures of income and employment relate to years one 
and two and the indicators of the woman’s well-being, such as depression, 
parenting stress and material hardship, relate to year two only. There is, 
therefore, a three year gap between the main outcome variable of interest 
and some of the factors Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006) believe may 
have affected marriage rates of never-married women. The logit analysis 
includes some demographic and socio-economic baseline variables to help 
control for confounding variables. These covariates include race, presence of 
two or more children, earnings, whether they had a car, and respondent’s age 
(Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006:18). 
They find that New Hope significantly increased the rates of marriage of never-
married women (Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa, 2006:18). Five years after random 
assignment 20.7 per cent of those in the New Hope action group were married 
compared to 11.8 per cent of those in the control group – an 8.9 percentage 
point increase. This is one of the largest reported increases. Gassman-Pines and 
Yoshikawa (2006:25) suggest that this might be because the follow-up period (five 
years) is longer than for most other studies (see, for instance the Gennetian and 
Knox (2003) meta-analysis discussed previously). They argue that to detect changes 
in demographic behaviour longer follow-up periods are required (Gassman-Pines 
and Yoshikawa, 2006:25). 
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Additional (non-experimental) modelling shows that (Gassman-Pines and 
Yoshikawa (2006:20):
•	 There	was	an	association	between	annual	income	and	marriage	(p<0.10).	Each	
$1,000 increase in annual income raised the likelihood of a woman who was 
never-married at baseline being married by year five by 1.08 times.
•	Women	who	endured	higher	levels	of	material	hardship	at	year	two	were	less	
likely to be married by year five (p<0.05).
However, Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006:26) acknowledge that how 
increases in women’s income might promote marriage is unknown. In addition, 
there was no association between marriage and other measures of financial 
stability and women’s wellbeing. 
Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006:24) seek to establish that the economic 
effects of New Hope (increases in employment and earnings) preceded marriage. 
Analysis shows that New Hope had no significant effect on marriage by year 
two (eight per cent of the action group were married compared to six per cent 
of the controls). Yet New Hope had significantly increased employment amongst 
never-married women by year two. Moreover, over years three to five, when most 
of the marriages occurred, New Hope did not significantly increase employment 
or earnings (albeit income did significantly increase (p<0.10)). Thus according to 
Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006:24) New Hope:
‘… provides evidence that an anti-poverty program that increases 
employment and income among never-married mothers can affect their 
entry into marriage.’
Nonetheless, the majority of women who were never-married at baseline were 
five years later neither married nor cohabitating. Moreover, New Hope had no 
significant impact on unmarried cohabitation (Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa 
(2006:18).
The New Hope study finds a relatively large effect. However, the sample used 
in the Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006) study is relatively small (337). It 
also comprised a group of participants who were likely to be less disadvantaged 
than the population in receipt of welfare benefits in general. The study is also 
of one location, and as outlined in Section 1.6.2 and ahead social experiments 
may not adequately take into account local context, which may affect the results 
obtained. 
2.2.4 Canadian evidence on union formation and the welfare  
 system
This sub-section considers two Canadian studies. The first is of the Canadian SSP, 
which is an important study because (like MFIP) it highlights the importance of local 
context. The second study is unusual because it is focused on pension reforms.
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SSP
Two social experiments in Canada provide differing findings on whether an earnings 
supplement paid to single mothers altered rates of marriage and cohabitation. 
Harknett and Gennetian (2003) explore the effect of SSP on union formation 
(marriage and cohabitation) using experiments in two culturally and geographically 
distinct provinces: British Columbia and New Brunswick. SSP was an earnings 
supplement paid to single parents in receipt of benefits (Income Assistance) when 
they entered full-time employment and was payable for up to three years (see 
Harknett and Gennetian (2003:452-453) for further details). SSP also disregarded 
any income or assets from a spouse or partner, and so eliminated any union/
marriage penalties. The amount paid was also unaffected by whether they married 
or cohabitated with a partner. The experiment was conducted between 1992 and 
1998 and single parents were randomly allocated to a ‘supplement offer’ group 
and a control group. Members of the treatment group only received SSP if they 
obtained full-time work within one year of the experiment commencing. 
Qualitative research reveals that some former single parents attributed their 
subsequent marriage to their move into employment as it allowed them to meet 
their husbands, although, for some, paid work did not lead to an enhanced social life 
due to increased exhaustion and lack of time (Harknett and Gennetian, 2003:458-
459). The financial independence provided by employment also allowed a small 
number of recipients to leave physically and emotionally abusive relationships. 
The analysis of welfare effects is based on surveys of the ‘supplement offer’ group 
and a control group and it excludes male single parents and mothers who were 
married or cohabitating at baseline. Control variables (such as age, educational 
attainment, martial status, age of youngest child and prior earnings) were used in 
the regression analysis to adjust for some slight differences in the composition of 
the sample groups. 
Harknett and Gennetian (2003:463-467) find that over the 36 month follow-up 
period:
•	 SSP	significantly	reduced single mothers’ rate of marriage in British Columbia 
from	month	nine	onwards;
•	 SSP	had	no	effect	on	rates	of	cohabitation	in	British	Columbia;
•	 SPP	 significantly	 increased the rate of marriage amongst single mothers 
between	months	six	and	34	in	New	Brunswick;	and	
•	 SSP	 significantly	 increased cohabitation rates in New Brunswick for a few 
months in the second and third years of the follow-up period.
Overall, compared to the control group, SSP decreased the probability of being 
ever married or cohabitating in British Columbia by 2.5 percentage points (a 16 
per cent fall) but increased the likelihood of being ever married or cohabitating 
in New Brunswick by 4.3 percentage points (a 22 per cent rise). The difference 
in the two impact estimates is statistically significant. SSP had a larger impact 
on marriage compared to cohabitation in both provinces: -2 percentage points 
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compared	to	-0.1	in	British	Columbia;	and	2.4	percentage	points	compared	to	1.6	
in New Brunswick. It follows that the effects of SSP were larger in New Brunswick 
than in British Columbia. 
Harknett and Gennetian (2003:467-474) suggest that the differences by province 
arise from different labour market and local policy contexts. Benefits were less 
generous in New Brunswick and the economy was weaker compared to British 
Columbia and this could have encouraged people to pool their incomes through 
forming unions. They also reason that as the impact of SSP on income and 
employment were similar in both provinces, then these economic mechanisms 
cannot account for the observed difference between provinces. 
Harknett (2006) extends the SSP analysis by using non-experimental methods to 
assess whether the effects on those that took up the offer of SSP differ from those 
that did not. Using statistical matching techniques (propensity score matching) 
she compares the 36 per cent in the action group that actually received SSP with 
a matched sample from the control group. A similar comparison is made between 
the 64 per cent in the ‘supplement offer’ group who did not take up SSP with 
a matched ‘non-takers’ group from the control group. Matching is necessary 
because the ‘takers’ or SSP recipients in the action group are self-selecting and 
systematically differ from ‘non-takers’.31 In general, ‘takers’ are less disadvantaged 
– they have more education, more work experience, face fewer barriers to work, 
and have greater work aspirations – and they are younger (Harknett, 2006:745-
746). These characteristics are also associated with an increased likelihood of 
marriage or cohabitation. 
This further analysis shows that (Harknett, 2006:755-764) in New Brunswick SSP 
recipients, in comparison to ‘non-takers’, were more likely to marry or cohabit over 
the 36 months of the study. Furthermore, those ‘takers’ who were less advantaged 
in the labour market – with more obstacles to work, lower educational attainment 
and limited work experience – were more likely to form unions. 
For British Columbia the results of the analysis are unusual. The expectation is 
that the effects of SSP should be concentrated amongst actual SSP recipients 
rather than non-recipients. Yet the fall in union formation is slightly higher for 
‘non-takers’ (-3.1 per cent) than for ‘takers’ (-2.9 per cent). Harknett (2006:758) 
claims that this means that the British Columbia results ‘lack robustness’. However, 
the difference between the two comparison groups is small, and whether the 
difference is statistically significant is unknown. It is also possible that the British 
Columbia results reflect the effect of unobserved factors and in particular ‘local’ 
contextual variables.
Harknett (2006:763) does show that the fall in union formation in British Columbia 
is focused amongst the more advantaged in the labour market. Suggesting an 
‘independence’	effect;	this	sub-group	were	able	to	forgo	the	income	of	a	potential	
partner. 
31 However, the matched comparison groups may also differ on unobserved 
characteristics.
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Pension reform
A second Canadian study by Baker et al. (2003) looks at the impact of the removal 
of marriage penalties for surviving spouses in the pension system during the 1980s. 
This is a time-series cross-sectional study. Simplification of the Canadian Income 
Security system led to the removal of ‘substantial’ marriage penalties, whereby 
surviving spouses lost their pensions on remarrying (Baker et al., 2003:13-14). 
The analysis uses administrative data for 1975 to 1995 and takes advantage of 
Canada having two separate but similar pension schemes: the Quebec Pension 
Plan and the Canada Pension Plan for people not working in Quebec. Marriage 
penalties were removed from the former in 1984 and from the latter in 1987. The 
analysis estimates remarriage rates for males and females in Quebec (the rest of 
Canada) using the rest of Canada (Quebec) as controls. Other control variables 
cover province and year effects and the ratio of unmarried females to unmarried 
males as a measure of the ‘marriage market’. The analysis examines flows into 
marriage by previous marital status for males and females separately for set age 
groups. The interpretation of the analysis is complicated by rapid increases and 
decreases in the remarriage rates of younger males (aged under 35) in Quebec 
between 1986 and 1989 (Baker et al., 2003:21-22). The authors cannot explain 
these ‘spikes’ in the data and so focus on the results for older males.
Baker et al. (2003) find that the marriage penalties had a ‘large and persistent’ effect 
on the remarriage rates of widows aged 15-59 years and on prime age widowers. 
In general, the removal of the marriage penalty increased remarriage rates of 
females aged under 65 by between 21 and 108 per cent (Baker et al., 2003:22-23 
and 44). Results for females aged over 65 are small and statistically insignificant. 
They estimate that the remarriage rates of widowers aged 45 to 59 increased by 
20 to 52 per cent following the removal of the marriage penalties. The results 
for older males are ambiguous and can be statistically insignificant. Widowers 
also had higher remarriage rates than widows. The impacts of the removal of the 
marriage penalty in the pension scheme was larger in Quebec, which is possibly 
because the size of the penalty was larger in the province than elsewhere. Baker et 
al. (2003:29) suggest that the rise in remarriages after the removal of the penalties 
was mainly by individuals who had already identified a partner and possibly had 
been previously cohabitating.32 It was thought likely that it would take a longer 
period of time for any widows or widowers who decided post-reform to re-enter 
the marriage market to find a suitable partner and remarry.
A separate analysis using survey data suggests that individuals most affected by 
the removal of the penalty were both more educated and wealthier (Baker et al., 
2003:28-31). The latter is possibly because the laws relating to the treatment 
of assets and income in Canada favour marriage over cohabitation. However, 
the sample sizes in this analysis are small and many of the coefficients are not 
statistically significant.
32 The marriage penalties in the survivor pensions only applied to people who 
remarried and not to those who cohabited.
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Baker et al. (2003) do find a positive ‘pension’ effect for women aged under 
65. However, the findings should be treated with some caution as there are 
outstanding queries about the quality of the data.
2.3 Overview
Underpinning the majority of the studies reviewed in this chapter is Becker’s 
economic theory of marriage – that women will decide to marry if the benefits of 
doing so exceed the costs, see Section 1.5.2. Associated debates about whether 
there are local ‘marriage markets’ (in particular a lack of marriageable men) and 
an ‘independence effect’ (whether higher female earnings lead to more or less 
marriage or cohabitation) inform the analysts’ selection of control variables. 
The Beckerian utility maximisation model predicts that marriage penalties in the 
welfare system would lead to decreases in marriage (and increases in divorce). It 
is possible to find selected studies that provide some evidence for this outcome. 
There is US evidence that welfare reform (in the form of AFDC waivers and TANF) 
has been less ‘anti-marriage’ than AFDC (Burstein, 2007:421). However, in the 
non-experimental literature, observed welfare effects are less strong once controls 
for unobserved variables are included in models. Moreover, a major meta-analysis 
of US studies finds no significant overall effect on marriage/cohabitation. 
Evidence for the impact of tax credits on union formation in the UK and US is 
fairly consistent – there is, at most, a modest negative impact on marriage. In the 
UK the introduction of WFTC meant single parents were less likely to marry than 
childless single women.
Several of the studies demonstrate that any impacts vary by sub-group. Differential 
impacts have been found by age of child, benefit duration, marital status (marriage 
vs. cohabitation), race and gender, type of policy intervention, and whether married 
or cohabitating. Welfare effects on union formation can also be lagged, and US 
and Canadian studies highlight that findings vary by local context. Data problems 
also undermine the robustness of some studies.
Overall, there is no set of studies that encompass analyses of an extensive range of 
sub-groups, explores long term effects, has high external validity, and uses robust 
data. Tentatively, this review finds that whilst there are some studies showing 
a negative effect on marriage/cohabitation, there is, in general, no consistent 
evidence for a large and significant welfare effect on union formation.
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3 Union dissolution 
Summary
A relatively small number of studies on welfare systems and union dissolution 
are reviewed. These studies do not always distinguish between marital 
breakdown and cohabitation breakdown.
Only one United Kingdom (UK) study is reviewed, which reveals that the 
introduction of Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) had no overall impact on 
mothers’ decisions to dissolve unions. However, if the male partner had low 
earnings (that is, working less than 16 hours per week) the WFTC increased 
the	divorce/separation	rate	(by	2.4	percentage	points;	an	80	per	cent	increase).	
In addition, for this sub-group, the divorce/separation rate was slightly higher 
where:
•	 the	 woman	 had	 a	 ‘high’	 level	 of	 education	 (‘A’	 Level	 or	 above)	 (2.6	
percentage	points);	or
•	 there	were	young	children	(aged	under	five	years)	in	the	family	(three	to	
four percentage points).
For the US there is weak evidence that those who could gain under the tax 
system could separate, but mixed evidence as to whether benefits had a 
significant impact on divorce/separation rates. 
An Australian study shows that over a 12 month period income support 
recipients were more likely to separate than non-recipients (by 1.8 percentage 
points). However, this study also illustrates the importance of other factors 
that have an affect on union dissolutions (such as, levels of satisfaction and 
whether the couple were cohabitating rather than married). In some cases 
these other factors are more important in terms of the size of the impact they 
have on union dissolution. 
Overall, the small number of studies, the mixed findings, queries about 
the robustness of some of the studies and that they do not distinguish 
between dissolving marriages and cohabitations mean that there is no 
overwhelming evidence that welfare systems have had a major impact on 
union dissolution.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter takes forward the discussion in the previous chapter on partnering by 
considering union dissolution. There are fewer studies on union dissolution than 
on partnership formation and childbearing. In general, the studies consider the 
dissolution of unions, and do not always distinguish between marital breakdown 
and cohabitation breakdown. This is a potential shortcoming as conceivably 
different factors leading to dissolution may be operating in marriages and 
cohabitations. 
The evidence of the impact of welfare systems on union dissolution is considered 
by country: 
•	 the	UK,	see	Section	3.2.1;	
•	 the	US,	see	Section	3.2.2),	and	
•	 Australia,	see	Section	3.2.3).	
3.2 Research evidence on union dissolution
3.2.1 UK evidence on union dissolution and the welfare system
Only one UK study, Francesconi et al. (2007), has been found on welfare systems 
and union dissolution. They explore whether WFTC had any impact on mothers’ 
decisions to divorce/separate.33 
Box 3.1 Further details - Francesconi et al. (2007)
Francesconi et al. (2007) develop a household bargaining model and test 
it using longitudinal data on 3,235 married and cohabitating couples from 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the period 1991 to 2002 
(Francesconi et al., 2007:27). The women in the couples were aged at least 
16 years and born after 1946. Of the families, 1,430 had dependent children. 
The BHPS data for married couples show that divorce rates were slightly 
higher for those couples with children (three per cent) than those without 
children (two per cent) (Francesconi et al., 2007:28 and 48). To focus on the 
population of interest, the data excluded couples where the man worked 
more than 16 hours per week and had high earnings (that is, was in the top 
earnings quartile). Also excluded from the analysis were: couples where one 
partner	was	 long-term	sick	or	disabled,	or	 in	 school	 full-time;	and	couples	
where the man worked more than 16 hours and had a high income (earnings 
in the top quartile of the income distribution). 
33 Their paper refers to ‘married mothers’, but the analysis does not distinguish 
between married women, cohabitating couples or other types of ‘living-in’ 
partnerships in the sample. Thus the results more properly cover partnership 
dissolution. Their study also considers the impact of WFTC on work incentives 
and use of paid child care.
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Box 3.1 continued
They adopt a difference-in-difference approach. The statistical analysis is based 
on regression models that take married mothers with children as the treatment 
group and married women without children as the control group. The models 
include controls for individual characteristics (such as age, education, region 
of residence, and number and ages of children) and individual fixed effects 
(Francesconi et al., 2007:29-30). The models also capture non-WFTC policy 
changes, such as the introduction of the minimum wage. 
The analysis shows that for the sample as a whole there is no evidence of an 
impact on union dissolution (see Section 2.1.2) for married/cohabitating mothers 
following the introduction of WFTC (Francesconi et al., 2007:36). Similarly, the 
reform did not affect the divorce/separation rate of married/cohabiting women 
with partners who were in WFTC eligible employment. 
However, there were significant differences for certain sub-groups. For mothers in 
partnerships with low earning men (that is, where he did not work or worked for 
less than 16 hours per week) the introduction of WFTC led to a 2.4 percentage point 
increase in the divorce/separation rate compared to their childless counterparts 
(p<0.05) – equivalent to nearly an 80 per cent increase in their divorce/separation 
rate:
‘The result implies that for such women, the introduction of WFTC reduced 
the gains from marriage. This is consistent with substantial improvements in 
the employment and financial positions of single mothers as a result of the 
reform …’
Francesconi et al. (2007:36)
Further analyses of this sub-group (married/cohabitating mothers in poor 
households) show that the divorce/separation rate was significantly higher 
(2.6 percentage points) following the reform for women with a ‘high’ level of 
education (that is, with an ‘A’ level or higher qualification) (Francesconi et al., 
2007:38 and 56). Across the sub-group there was no statistically significant 
effect for those with lower educational qualifications. However, controlling for 
number of children shows that for married/cohabitating women with husbands 
with low earnings and young children (that is, children aged four years or under) 
the introduction of WFTC significantly increased the divorce/separation rate 
(by 3 to 4 percentage points) irrespective of whether the mothers had low or 
high educational qualifications. Thus the impact of WFTC on union dissolution 
was higher in families with young children (see Section 1.4.2). Francesconi et 
al. (2007:38) point out that the child credit element of WFTC was generous for 
families with young children. A generous childcare credit implied that there were 
potentially large financial gains for single parents in eligible employment, but no 
gains if they remaining married to a husband working fewer than 16 hours per 
week. 
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Hence:
‘The requirement for both parents to work at least 16 hours per week may 
therefore inadvertently have contributed to a considerable increase in the 
divorce rate for a subset of married women.’
Francesconi et al. (2007:28)
Indeed, there were no statistically significant effects on the divorce/separation 
rate for women married to men working 16 or more hours per week with either 
low or high earnings. Suggesting that the more generous tax credit that these 
sub-groups received left couples unaffected by the reform.
There are some limitations to this analysis, first, (and by definition) the effects 
are only for women with children, secondly, the analysis does not distinguish 
married from cohabiting mothers, yet United States (US) evidence suggests these 
groups may respond differently to welfare incentives, and thirdly, it is not clear 
that childless married women are the best comparator for married parents.
More UK studies are required in order to determine whether Francesconi 
et al’s (2007) findings are replicated and if they also apply to the current welfare 
system.
3.2.2 US evidence on union dissolution and the welfare system
Some commentators claimed that in the US the welfare system can act as a 
disincentive for marriage. A woman with little or no earnings might have been 
entitled to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and later Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) if she separated from the father of her children. 
Moreover, as AFDC-Basic and the associated Food Stamps and Medicaid were not 
available to couples with children, it has been suggested that they encouraged 
divorce and separation and so the formation of single parent families. 
Dickert-Conlin (1999:218) claims to be the first to consider the impact of the 
combined tax and transfer systems on decisions to separate. She argues that the 
effects of the transfer system ((AFDC), Food Stamps and Social Security Insurance) 
and the tax system (including Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)) should be considered 
together because of the way in which they interact for low-income households. In 
principle the benefit system incorporates marriage penalties – most married low-
income couples would receive higher benefits if they separated – whilst the tax 
system offers marriage penalties and bonuses – in general, it rewards marriage for 
low-income single earner couple, but penalises marriage for two-earner couples. 
Using panel data from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participants, 
Dickert-Conlin (1999) examines whether married women aged 18 to 44, who 
were calculated to have a marriage penalty, subsequently separated over a 17 
month follow-up period. The estimates for marriage penalties are derived using 
a simulation model (as used in Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998)) that ‘divorces’ 
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married couples.34 Over the subsequent 17 months 131 couples separated – a 
divorce rate of four per cent. Her analysis shows that those couples more likely to 
gain through separating by receiving a lower (1990) tax liability were more likely 
to separate (Dickert-Conlin, 1999:228-229).35 The estimate for the penalty arising 
from the benefit system, although suggesting that the more a couple would gain 
in benefits if they separated the more likely they were to separate, was statistically 
insignificant. The model predicts that making the tax system marriage neutral 
would increase the chances of couples separating by 3.3 per cent (Dickert-Conlin, 
1999:230). Making the tax system marriage neutral, somewhat surprisingly, 
increases the rate of separation, because the so-called ‘marriage tax penalty’ was, 
in fact, an average subsidy of $498 per annum to married couples. Dickert-Conlin 
(1999:234) concludes that the analysis provides ‘… weak support that taxes [which 
include EITC] affect the decision to separate.’ The model, however, only considers 
the survival of marriages over a short period of time.
Ono (1998:685) using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1968 to 
1985 finds that receipt of AFDC in the previous year had no significant effect on 
couples’ decisions to separate. Where couples in receipt of AFDC did separate this 
was because of the husband’s poor economic position rather than the possibility 
of the wife becoming economically independent via AFDC after marriage. Ono 
(1998:688) concludes:
‘… the results in this study do not support the argument that a wife’s high 
potential for receiving AFDC after marriage encourages marital dissolution.’
These findings resonate with Zimmerman’s earlier study on states’ expenditure 
on public welfare and divorce (Zimmerman, 1991). She found that, controlling 
for other variables, the best predictor of (then) current state divorce rates was 
the states’ prior divorce rates (Zimmerman, 1991:144). Zimmerman (1991:141) 
interprets states with higher per capital expenditure on public welfare programmes 
as being more socially integrated. Such societies are seen as sharing a general 
consensus on rules and norms and supportive of family stability and cohesion. 
Accordingly, Zimmerman (1991:146) concludes that ‘welfare state activity’ does 
not have a destabilising effect on family life.
34 To assess the effect of the tax and transfer systems on separation decisions 
she uses probit regression and controls for individual characteristics (for 
example, age, education and race) and state characteristics (for instance, 
state unemployment rate). Variables are also included to control for the costs 
of separation (for example, number of children in the family and marriage 
duration). The non tax and transfer explanatory variables are lagged to 1990 
as they presumably affected the decision to separate, prior to the actual 
separation. Also, the women in the analysis were in their first marriages and 
had remained married throughout the 1990 calendar year.
35 The coefficient is 0.0041 and is significant at the six per cent level. A $100 
increase in tax liability when married would lead to a 0.04 percentage point 
increase in separations.
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However, these studies do not capture later welfare reforms in the US. The Bitler 
et al. (2004) study already mentioned, in Section 2.3, also considered flows out of 
marriage due to state waivers and TANF. By considering flows the authors exclude 
the stock of long-term marriages that were at a low risk of dissolution. Bitler et 
al. (2004:224-225) find that AFDC waivers reduced the rate of new divorces by 
5.5 per cent (p<0.01) compared to the AFDC programme, whilst TANF reduced 
new divorces by 12.6 per cent (p<0.10).36 In other words, welfare reform, as 
intended by policy makers, did lead to a fall in the number of new divorces. As 
a consequence there may also be fewer remarriages, as most divorcees remarry. 
However, the doubts expressed, in Section 2.2.3, about the robustness of the 
TANF results apply here as well. Moreover, the fall in new divorces in AFDC waiver 
states is what would be expected given the policy intent. Yet the comparison of 
wavier states with non-waiver states gives limited guidance on the welfare effect 
of current programmes.
3.2.3 Australia evidence on union dissolution and the welfare  
 system
There is some evidence from Australia that receipt of welfare benefits (Income 
Support (IS)) imposes a marriage penalty. Bradbury and Norris (2005), using 
administrative and survey data, show that married benefit recipients were more 
likely to separate than non-recipients.37 Using a sample of the administrative 
data for Family Tax Benefit Part A (FTBA), which is a means-tested benefit paid 
to families with dependent children, they find that over a one year period 
(June 2002 compared with June 2001) recipients of the higher rate of FTBA were, 
on average, three to four percentage points more likely to separate than those 
receiving the low rate of benefit (p<0.05) (Bradbury and Norris, 2005:428-431). 
The higher rate of FTBA was paid to couples in receipt of IS or who had low to 
moderate family incomes, whilst the lower rate was paid to those with higher 
incomes. The analysis also shows that women in common law marriages were 
slightly more likely to separate (by 5.29 percentage points (p<0.05)) than those 
with low-incomes. Moreover, having a younger child decreased the likelihood of 
separation, but having an older child slightly increased the chances of separation. 
This analysis, which was restricted to FTBA recipient families with at least one 
child aged under 16, included a limited number of controls for age of recipient, 
relationship type (whether legal or common law marriage) and age and number 
of children. Given findings reported elsewhere in this review, this limited degree 
of control raises doubts about the robustness of these findings.
Bradbury and Norris (2005:431-442) also report more elaborate analyses using 
longitudinal survey data with controls for income, demographic and human capital 
36 These estimates are based on models that include labour market and 
demographic controls as well as state and year fixed effects.
37 The analyses reported here cover both legal marriages and de facto or 
common law marriages.
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variables (for example, relationship type, age at marriage, marriage duration, 
number and age of children and educational attainment) and, what they term, 
potential intervening variables (such as, level of satisfaction with life and the 
relationship, mental health, emotional well-being, saving habits, social functioning 
and ‘vitality’). The data were taken from the first two waves of the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey. Using logistic regression the 
authors examine for mixed-sex legally married and de facto couples of working 
age the variables associated with separation. In particular whether, over a 12 
month period couples who were income support recipients, were more likely to 
have separated than non-IS recipient couples. They find that couples receiving 
IS were, on average, more likely to separate (by 1.8 percentage points (p<0.10)) 
than couples not in receipt of benefit. 
However,	 the	analysis	 reveals	 that	other	 factors	were	 significant;	 indeed,	 some	
had a larger impact upon separation. In particular, those currently in a de facto 
relationship (that is, cohabitating) were 3.4 percentage points more likely to 
separate than those who had never been in such a relationship. Confirming other 
research that cohabiting couples were more likely to end their relationship than 
legally married couples. Couples were more likely to separate where:
•	 they	married	at	a	young	age	(each	additional	year	of	average	age	at	marriage	
reduced	the	likelihood	of	separation	by	0.46	percentage	points);
•	 they	were	dissatisfied	with	their	relationship	(2.4	percentage	points);
•	 the	male	was	anxious	or	depressed	(0.9	percentage	points);	
•	 they	had	a	low	score	for	social	functioning	(0.84	percentage	points);	and
•	 the	couples	had	high	levels	of	vitality	(1.3	percentage	points)	–	that	is,	they	did	
not say they lacked energy or felt tired – a result that is ‘puzzling’. 
This analysis is limited by the short period (one year) over which changes in 
relationships are observed and this complicates the interpretation of the findings. 
For instance, male depression may not be a cause of separation as instability in the 
relationship before the survey interview might have led to their poor mental health. 
The observation period is also too short to test if unemployment is associated 
with dissolution. This is a potentially serious shortcoming because other research 
shows an association between union dissolution and unemployment (see Sections 
1.4.1 and 1.5.4). Moreover, there may be unobserved variables not included in 
the analysis that would account for the association between receipt of IS and 
separation. Indeed, there could be other factors that lead some individuals to have 
low-incomes and to be more likely to separate. 
3.3 Overview
As outlined in Section 1.5.4, the Beckerian model of marriage underpins the studies 
discussed in this chapter. The theory posits that unions dissolve when the benefits 
of becoming single again exceed the costs. The studies tend to include data on 
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female and male earnings because of possible ‘stability’ and ‘independence’ 
effects. The former suggests that higher earnings make a partner more attractive 
and/or reduce levels of conflict within a union and so reduce the likelihood of 
dissolution. The latter, on the contrary, suggests that increased earnings mean 
that an individual is in less need of a partner in order to survive financially and so 
increases the risk of union dissolution.
Across the three countries considered here, the evidence for a welfare effect on 
union dissolution is mixed. To the extent that there is an effect it appears to be 
larger	 for	certain	sub-groups;	 the	UK	and	Australia	studies	suggesting	that	 the	
effect is greater in families with lower earnings. However, the small number of 
studies, the mixed findings, queries about the robustness of some of the studies 
and that the studies tend not to distinguish between dissolving marriages and 
cohabitations mean that there is no overwhelming evidence that welfare systems 
have a major impact on union dissolution.
The Bradbury and Norris (2005) and Zimmerman (1991) studies also serve to 
highlight the factors other than the welfare system that affect people’s decisions 
to dissolve unions (and some of these factors are outlined in Section 1.5.4).
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4 Childbearing and single   
 parents
Summary
In the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) there has been some 
concern expressed about the recent growth in non-marital births and single 
parenthood. One policy response in the US has been the introduction of the 
family cap, which seeks to limit further births by not paying extra benefit when 
women have children above a threshold. Several of the US studies reviewed in 
this chapter examine the impact of the family cap.
Of the three UK studies of Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) reform, 
two	 find	 no	 significant	 impacts	 (Francesconi	 and	 van	 der	 Klaauw	 (2007);	
Francesconi	(2007));	and	the	third	an	increase	in	birth	rate	for	couples	(Brewer	
et al. 2007).
The review found relatively few studies on fertility and moves into single 
parenthood at the European level. González (2005 and 2007) finds a positive 
and significant association between welfare benefits and the incidence of 
single motherhood. However, as González’ (2007) analysis becomes more 
sophisticated the size of the impact of benefits on single motherhood and 
single headship becomes smaller and eventually statistically insignificant.
An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study 
modelling impact of social security (payroll) taxes for defined-benefit, Pay As 
You Go (PAYG) pension schemes on fertility finds that they do reduce fertility. 
However, whilst the PAYG pension scheme may not compensate parents 
other parts of the tax and transfer system may do so. In addition, individuals 
are not simply utility maximisers, hence it is possible that the ‘unintended 
consequences’ of PAYG will be less than their models suggest. 
Continued
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Findings from US literature on the impact of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) on female headship show only small or no effects. Hoynes 
(1997) finds ‘no evidence that AFDC has a significant effect on female 
headship decisions.’ Lichter et al. (1997) find that many of the variables they 
analyse only have a relatively small effect on female headship, and argue that 
cultural changes underpin the observed increase in female headship. More 
recent studies that take into account unobserved heterogeneity at the level 
of the individual find that the welfare effect is not only small but statistically 
insignificant.
Early US studies suggest positive welfare effect on the fertility of unmarried 
women. But effects largely disappear when analysts control for unobserved 
state characteristics. Subsequent studies suggest minimal or no effect of 
welfare on fertility – with exception of family cap policies. The family cap is a 
mixed	picture	–	most	studies	find	little	or	no	effect;	a	small	number	of	studies	
report	either	a	small	positive	effect	(Sabia,	2006;	Horvath-Rose	et al., 2008), 
or counter-intuitively a small negative effect. 
4.1 Introduction
In the UK and the US there has been some concern expressed about the recent 
growth in non-marital births and single parenthood (see Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.3). 
This chapter reviews the literature on whether or not welfare benefit systems have 
an impact on women’s fertility and living arrangements. 
Having	a	child	out-of-wedlock	is	one	route	to	single	parenthood;	the	others	are	
union dissolution and widowhood. All of these routes into single motherhood 
are covered in this chapter (rather than elsewhere in the report). However, many 
of	the	empirical	studies	do	not	distinguish	between	the	routes	followed;	much	
of the US literature is focused on female headship decisions which encompass 
fertility decisions by unmarried women as well as the other two routes to single 
parenthood. The literature can also distinguish between single mothers who live 
on their own with their child(ren) (that is, lone parents or single heads) and a 
wider group of single mothers who co-reside with a family member, such as a 
grandparent. 
This chapter considers three UK studies (Section 4.2.1), three cross-national 
comparisons (Section 4.2.2) and several US studies (Section 4.2.3). With respect 
to childbearing many of the US studies focus on the family cap.
4.2 Research evidence 
Much of the literature on the impact of welfare systems on single parenthood is 
from the US. As outlined in Section 1.6.1 these studies, typically, take advantage 
of state variations in benefits and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). 
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They tend to model the probability of being a single parent/female head or having a 
non-marital birth as a function of one or more of the following sets of variables:
•	 State	 characteristics,	 including	 the	generosity	of	benefits.	 The	analyses	often	
allow for unobserved variables that might affect demographic behaviour (in the 
US literature this is known as state fixed effects). 
•	 Individual	 demographic	 characteristics,	 including	 race,	 age,	 and	 educational	
attainment/number of years of schooling. Some analyses allow for unobserved 
variables at the level of the individual that might affect demographic behaviour 
(known as individual fixed effects).
•	 Economic	characteristics	of	women,	 including	female	wage	 levels	and	 labour	
market attachment. These variables reflect theoretical debates about whether 
there is an ‘independence effect’ whereby higher family income enables women 
to support children on their own or whether the lack of economic opportunities 
reduces the ‘opportunity cost’ of childbearing and so leads to non-marital 
births.
•	 ‘Marriage	market’	characteristics,	including	local	gender	ratios,	male	earnings	
and employment prospects. These variables reflect the notion that the supply of 
marriageable men will affect the marriage behaviour of women. 
In general, the results of the analyses are mixed – some find that the welfare 
system does significantly affect the formation of single parent families and 
non-marital births whilst others find no effect. 
4.2.1 UK evidence on welfare systems and childbearing and   
 single parenthood
Of the three UK studies that focus on the 1999 WFTC reform, two studies find no 
significant impacts and the third finds that the introduction did increase the birth 
rate for couples.
Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) use British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
data for 1991 to 2001 to explore the impact of the WFTC on the fertility decisions 
of single mothers and moves into lone motherhood by single childless women.38 
The analysis reveals no statistically significant effect of WFTC on either the birth 
rate of single mothers or on the transition into lone parenthood by single childless 
women. Although WFTC did reduce the likelihood of an additional child by 
single parents by 0.7 percentage points, which is a relatively large reduction of 
20 per cent over the annual average birth rate (3.7 per cent), it is not statistically 
significant (Francesconi and van der Klaauw, 2007:26-27). Sub-group analysis by 
number and age of child(ren) also shows no significant impact of WFTC on the 
fertility rates of lone parent.
38 The authors also examine the impact of WFTC on employment, use of childcare 
and marriage rates. The analytical method is difference-in-difference. Further 
details of the study are provided in Section 1.6.3.
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Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007:27-28) also investigate whether WFTC, 
which was more generous to single parents than Family Credit (FC), provided 
incentives for single childless women to become unmarried mothers.39 As 
mentioned previously, no significant effect was found. Indeed, WFTC had the 
opposite	effect;	it	reduced	the	likelihood	of	single	childless	women	forming	lone	
parent households by 0.16 percentage points. Although statistically insignificant, 
this is a relatively large effect, a 15 per cent reduction over the average annual 
rate (1.3 per cent) of entry into lone parenthood for single childless women over 
the observation period. 
That WFTC did not lead to a statistically significant increase in fertility suggests 
that the gains from working (and the reduction in childcare costs) outweighed 
the incentive effects to have extra children that arising from the credit being more 
generous than its predecessor, FC.
However, the findings for couples are mixed. The study by Francesconi et al. (2007) 
mentioned in Section 3.2.1 found no statistically significant effect of the impact 
of WFTC on either the birth rate of married mothers or entry into motherhood 
for married women without children (2007:37). Yet Brewer et al. (2007) find that 
the increase in the generosity of payments to families with children (through the 
introduction of WFTC and changes to IS) led to a 1.2 percentage points increase 
in births amongst couples with low levels of education (Brewer et al., 2007:25). 
Equivalent to a ten per cent increase in births or nearly 20,000 additional births. 
The effect of the reform was also stronger for women who had not previously had 
children, and this may reflect that payments increased more for first births than 
for second or subsequent births. The effect was reduced for women for families 
where the youngest child was aged under three or aged eight or over, which may 
reflect preferences about the timing of children.
Brewer et al. (2007:29) argue that because the reforms did not have a significant 
effect on the woman’s age at first birth, then the estimated increase in births 
represents an increase in total births rather than families bringing forward the 
timing of a birth that would have happened anyway.
That WFTC increased the birth rate for couples but not for single parents might be 
because, whilst WFTC increased employment for single parents (and so reduced 
fertility), for women in couples employment impacts were smaller (some women 
even reduced their hours of work) and so any effect on childbearing would be 
larger (Brewer et al. (2007:13-14).
39 The analysis is of entry into single parenthood by single childless women – 
moves into single parenthood by married women are not considered.
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Box 4.1 Further details - Brewer et al. (2007)
Brewer et al. (2007) use a difference-in-difference approach and data for 
women aged 20 to 37 years in couples (either married or cohabitating) from 
the Family Resources Study (FRS) and Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for 1995 
to 2003. The differences compared are changes in fertility for low-income 
couples before and after the WFTC reform. For both before and after the 
reform, couples affected by the reform are compared with couples unaffected 
by the reform. The comparison with couples unaffected by the reform means 
that some control is introduced into the comparison for unobserved factors 
that vary over time. The low-income couples affected by the reform are 
defined as where the male and/or female partner left school at or before the 
compulsory school leaving age, whilst those affected by WFTC are defined 
as where both partners left school at age 18 or above. The analysis includes 
controls for socio-demographic variables (such as age, education, tenure, 
number of children and ethnicity) and male and female hourly wages. 
4.2.2 Cross-national evidence on welfare systems and    
 childbearing and single parenthood 
Much of the analysis using data for the US is comparative in that it can incorporate 
differences between states – that is, regression models with state fixed effects.40 
In this sub-section, however, the focus is on cross national studies.
The review found relatively few studies on fertility and moves into single parenthood 
at the European level. Two studies by González (2005 and 2007) provide an analysis 
of the impact of welfare benefits on the incidence of single motherhood. The 
earlier study uses pooled data for 14 countries from five waves of the Luxembourg 
Income Study for the 1980s and 1990s.41 The data were for all women aged 18 
to	55	years.	Estimates	were	made	for	two	routes	into	single	parenthood;	those	
that were never married, and those who were divorced, separated or widowed. 
However, the analysis did not distinguish between cohabitating and married 
couples. 
A number of the variables in the models represent women’s expectations about 
their wages, hours of work, benefits and husbands earnings. In general, the values 
for these variables are the relevant averages for a given country and period. Thus 
expected benefits are the ‘average received by each household type in a given 
country and period.’ (González, 2005:16). The benefits include family-related 
40 In regression analysis fixed effects are used to take into account omitted 
factors or unobserved heterogeneity that may affect the variables of interest. 
This gives more robust results, but involves assuming that the variables 
are time invariant, and requires variation amongst the observations for a 
variable.
41 The 14 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK and US.
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benefits (like Child Benefit), social assistance benefits (for instance, IS) and in-kind 
benefits (like Food Stamps and childcare subsidies). 
The study finds a positive and significant (p<0.001) association between welfare 
benefits and the incidence of single motherhood. A ten per cent increase in benefits 
paid to single parents (keeping benefits to other households unchanged) would 
increase the incidence of single mothers by five per cent (González, 2005:18). 
Other significant findings were:
•	 Higher	male	earnings	(per	annum)	and	employment	rates	reduced	the	incidence	
of never married mothers but increased the incidence of divorced, separated 
or widowed mothers. The overall effect on single mothers, however, was small 
and insignificant.
•	 Higher	female	wages	(per	hour)	reduced	the	incidence	of	single	mothers	(for	
both never married and divorced, separated or widowed).
However, these findings should be treated with some caution. The Luxembourg 
Income Study is not a panel dataset and so the analysis does not control for 
unobserved variables at the individual level, and as a consequence may 
over-estimate the significance of the impact of welfare benefits on single 
parenthood.	Moreover,	data	were	not	available	for	all	waves	for	all	of	the	countries;	
indeed, data are available for all five waves for only two countries (Luxembourg 
and the US). The analysis also excluded from consideration that unmarried mothers 
might marry and divorced mothers might remarry (González, 2005:9).
The second study (González, 2007) examines the impact of welfare benefits on 
the incident of single motherhood and single headship amongst women across 
14 European countries. Here ‘single motherhood’ is defined as an unmarried 
woman aged 18 to 35 living with a dependent child aged under 18 years and 
not cohabitating with a partner, but they could be co-residing with other relatives 
such as a grandparent. ‘Single headship’ (or lone parenthood) is a sub-set of single 
mothers who live on their own with their dependent child – that is, there is no 
co-residency. Separate analyses were conducted for these two groups. Young 
women were examined because their family formation decisions are more likely 
to be influenced by benefit levels and labour market conditions. 
The analysis uses pooled data from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) for 1994 to 2001. The 14 countries, grouped by social protection system, 
are:42 
•	 Anglo-Saxon	countries:	Ireland	and	UK;
•	 Nordic	countries:	Denmark	and	Finland;
•	 Benelux	countries:	Belgium,	Luxembourg	and	Netherlands;
•	 Central	European	countries:	Austria,	Germany	and	France.
•	 Southern	European	countries:	Italy,	Spain,	Greece	and	Portugal.
42 Of the EU15 countries Sweden is omitted because longitudinal data are not 
available in ECHP. Denmark is the omitted country in the regressions.
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The main measure of benefits used in the analysis is the predicted benefit (for 
social assistance and family allowance schemes) for a single parent with two 
children who works 20 hours per week (González, 2007:398). 
The reported analysis moves from simple descriptive analysis to logit regression, 
which becomes increasing advanced by incorporating country fixed effects and 
country-specific time trends, as well as individual fixed effects. The country fixed 
effects control for unobserved factors at country level (such as, public tolerance of 
single parenthood) that might affect the level of benefit and prevalence of single 
mothers. To allow for unmeasured changes over time that were correlated with 
changes in welfare benefits the analysis includes time trends (that vary by either 
individual counties or by the groups of countries listed previously). 
The analyses also include individual-level controls – age and educational level – 
that seek to measure the respondents’ labour market prospects, attractiveness as 
a partner, and preferences for marriage and children, plus country-level controls 
– male unemployment rate and median adult male wage rate – as indicators 
of labour market conditions (González, 2007:398-399). As the author notes 
(González, 2007:410) more detailed variables on the labour market, education 
and the ‘marriage market’ would be ‘desirable’.
The descriptive analysis, a plot of the proportion of single mothers against predicted 
benefits levels for each country for each year, shows that ‘… countries with higher 
benefit levels also have higher incidence of single mother households.’ (González, 
2007:400). (The correlation coefficient is 0.34.) The logit regression analysis 
allows for changes across countries and over time to be taken into consideration 
(González, 2007:403-407). Having controlled for unmeasured factors that could 
lead to changes in benefits and the incidence of single motherhood at different 
rates in different countries or groups of countries, González (2007:394) finds that 
‘… an increase in yearly benefits to single mothers of €1,000 would increase the 
incidence of these households by about two percent.’43 This single motherhood is 
due to both out-of-wedlock childbearing by never married women and divorce by 
married women with children González (2007:406-408). 
González (2007:405 and 406-407) also finds that less educated women are more 
likely to become single mothers and single heads of households. 
Essentially, as the analysis becomes more sophisticated – that is, takes into account 
more possible unobserved heterogeneity – the size of the impact of benefits on 
single motherhood and single headship becomes smaller and eventually statistically 
insignificant. It is the inclusion of controls for unobserved factors at the level of 
the individual that reveals no statistically significant impact of benefits on the 
incidence of single mothers. Rather than saying that the analyses with significant 
positive findings might be spurious, the author attributes this insignificance to the 
lack of variation in the data, which in turn is due to the further disaggregation of 
the data. 
43 If country and time effects are not taken into account the impact of benefits 
on single mothers is higher. An increase in yearly lone parenthood benefits 
of €1,000 increases the incidence of single mothers by about 18 per cent.
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That benefits have no significant impact on US female headship decisions once 
individual effects are included in models is also a finding of Hoynes (1997a) (see 
ahead for further details). This may mean that the positive effect mentioned 
previously ‘… may be attributable to unobserved, individual-specific heterogeneity.’ 
(González, 2007:409). However, González (2007:409) queries the need to include 
individual fixed effects in the analysis arguing that migration across European 
countries is less than across US States and hence their inclusion is less important. 
In addition she points out that significance levels will fall because of the reduced 
number of cases available for the analysis. 
The significance of the González (2007) study is not simply the reported positive 
effect of benefits on single mothers but that it highlights how data limitations 
give rise to interpretative and analytical challenges. Although the total number of 
observations is 172,437, for the regression analyses with fixed effects there is little 
variation in the benefits variable once other variables are introduced (González, 
2007:410). The analysis does not capture long-term trends in benefits or the 
incidence	of	single	mothers;	indeed,	the	average	number	of	observation	periods	
per respondent is six. 
A third study by Ehrlich and Kim (2007) models the impact of social security (payroll) 
taxes for defined-benefit, PAYG pension schemes on fertility and family formation 
across the OECD (the findings for the latter are discussed in Section 2.2.2). They use 
two approaches to assess this effect: a simulation model and regression analysis. 
The simulation model shows that a one per cent increase in defined-benefit, PAYG 
taxes reduces the family fertility rate (that is the number of children per parent) 
by 0.075 per cent and the total fertility rate by 0.306 per cent.44 Moreover, social 
security taxes for defined-benefit, PAYG schemes accounted for 48.1 per cent 
of the fall in the total fertility rate in OECD countries between 1965 and 1989 
(Ehrlich and Kim, 2007:9). The regression analysis shows that social security taxes 
for pensions reduce total fertility rates for all women aged 15-49 (averaged over 
a five year lead period) by 0.284 per cent and the family fertility rate by 0.119 per 
cent (Ehrlich and Kim, 2007:17).
The authors contend that if a parent has a lower (or zero) rate of fertility this does 
not affect their pension, as the benefits are defined by the system and are the 
same as for parents with many children:
‘Since defined benefits are independent of contributions made by children, 
parents are not compensated individually for raising more or better-educated 
children. As a result, PAYG payroll taxes induce behaviour that is not socially 
optimal: They diminish the incentive of individual workers to bear and 
invest in children, save for retirement, or generally form families altogether, 
because they lower the private rewards from family investments relative to 
alternative individual pursuits.’
Ehrlich and Kim (2007:4)
44 Formally, the social security tax rate used is the old-age, survivor and disability-
insurance proportion of social security benefits as a share of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (Ehrlich and Kim (2007).
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However, whilst the PAYG pension scheme may not compensate parents, other 
parts of the tax and transfer system may do so. In addition, individuals are not 
simply utility maximisers, hence it is possible that the ‘unintended consequences’ 
of PAYG will be less than their models suggest. 
4.2.3 US evidence on welfare systems and childbearing and   
 single parenthood
Out of wedlock childbirth and single parenthood have been perceived to be 
problems by policy makers and others in the US. Indeed, an ‘explicit goal of 
policymakers in drafting welfare reform policies was to reduce incentives for 
non marital childbearing.’ (Horvath-Rose et al., 2008:119-120). Section 101 of 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) see 
Section 1.4.3) states ‘Congress makes the following findings: 
•	 The increase in the number of children receiving public assistance is closely 
related to the increase in births to unmarried women.
•	 The	negative	consequences	of	an	out-of-wedlock	birth	on	the	mother,	the	child,	
the family and society are well known.
•	 Therefore,	in	the	light	of	the	demonstration	of	the	crisis	in	our	Nation,	it	is	the	
sense of the Congress that the prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and 
reduction in out-of-wedlock birth are very important Government interests and 
the policy … is intended to address this crisis.’ 
 Horvath-Rose et al. (2008:120)
PRWORA granted some flexibility to states to decide on the conditions of entitlement 
to welfare benefits (Ryan et al., 2006:106). For example, it allowed states to decide 
how long a new mother could remain out of the workforce following child birth. 
Under the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) programme introduced by the 
Family Support Act in 1988 mothers with young children were usually exempted 
from the requirement to work until the child was three years old. However, under 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) two states did not provide any 
exemption at all so that mothers of newly born babies could be required to work 
immediately whilst in a further six states only women with a child under six months 
was exempted from the requirement to return to work. In the other four, mothers 
were not required to work until their child was two years old. According to Ryan 
et al., (2006:105) the limited availability of affordable childcare in many areas 
makes these obligations ‘quite burdensome’.
The family cap is one of three broad government initiatives under TANF that directly 
target the prevention and reduction of out-of-wedlock pregnancies. The other 
two are the establishment of a 100 million dollar incentive each year for five years 
divided amongst the top five states with the largest decline in the illegitimacy 
ratio of abortion to live births (US congress, 1996 cited by Ryan et al., 2006:104) 
and an Abstinence Education Grant Program (AEGP) (Camasso, 2004:454). The 
family cap, which was also a feature of some AFDC waiver programmes, was 
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specifically designed to curb the number of children women could afford to have 
by reducing benefits for children born while the mother is in receipt of welfare 
benefits (Horvath-Rose et al., 2008:120) thus ending the traditional practice of 
providing families on welfare with additional benefits in respect of a newly born 
child (Kearney, 2004:295). Nineteen states adopted family cap policies prior to 
PRWORA and a further six included family caps as part of their TANF programmes 
(Horvath-Rose et al., 2008:120). Five states have introduced partial family caps 
either by reducing but not eliminating additional benefit for a new born child or 
paying the increase in-kind or to a third party (Kearney, 2004: 39).
There are a number of US based studies that have investigated the impact of 
welfare benefits on single parenthood and fertility. The empirical studies can 
be roughly divided between pre- and post- welfare reform periods (Joyce et al., 
2004:477). Crudely, if there is a welfare effect then analyses of AFDC recipients 
can be expected to show an increase in fertility rates and single parenthood and 
the welfare reform studies (of AFDC waivers and TANF) a fall in non-marital births 
and single parenthood (reflecting policy aspirations like the imposition of the 
family cap).
AFDC and fertility and single parents
Much of the literature on the impacts of means-tested programmes on fertility 
and single parenthood focuses on AFDC. Underpinning the US analyses of AFDC 
is a popular view that the programme encourages childless single women to have 
children (Moffitt, 2003:332). Under AFDC a women having a child outside of 
marriage was eligible for the benefit, but typically was not if married (Moffitt, 
2003:334). Thus, it was believed that AFDC included a financial incentive for 
non-marital childbearing. Furthermore, in some States the amount of benefit was 
related to family size with larger sized families receiving more benefits and this 
might create a further incentive to have children. However, during the 1990s real 
expenditure on AFDC was falling and so does not really explain the increases in 
non-marital childbearing and single parenthood.
Methodological issues
The early US literature on the impact of AFDC on female headship was mainly based 
on state-level data and used non-experimental designs. The findings from these 
analyses are mixed, and analysts like Hoynes (1997b:129) conclude that they ‘find 
no evidence that AFDC has a significant effect on female headship decisions.’ (The 
Hoynes (1997b) analysis is discussed ahead.) Later studies controlling for unobserved 
variables across states do find significant and positive effects on female headship. 
However, the size of the effect is small. Moffitt’s review (1998b) suggests that 
more generous AFDC benefit was associated with higher levels of single parent 
families, but the magnitude and significance of the association was uncertain. For 
the models that control for omitted state variables, Moffitt’s (1998b:74-75) review 
finds significant and insignificant welfare effects. More recent studies that take 
into account unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the individual find that the 
welfare effect is not only small but statistically insignificant. 
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A similar conclusion applies to non-marital births. Much of the work in the welfare 
and fertility literature relies on cross-state generosity of welfare benefits paid to 
families with children. Early cross-sectional work suggests that AFDC had a positive 
effect on the fertility of unmarried women. However, Hoynes (1997a) finds that 
those effects largely disappear when controls for unobservable state characteristics 
are included. And when the study controls for individual effects as well as state 
effects there is no evidence that welfare increases the tendency to form female 
headed households for either black or white women (Kearney, 2004:299). 
Klawitter et al. (2000) use data from the youngest cohorts of women in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to estimate models of the determinants 
of the initial use of AFDC. The authors claim to be one of the few studies to 
address the timing and determinants of initial AFDC participation. Klawitter et al. 
(2000) find little evidence that that financial, or other welfare incentives, affect 
the likelihood or timing of first entry onto welfare. Klawitter et al. (2000) find 
that whilst benefit levels do not appear to affect participation, the presence of a 
programme for medical aid to families who are not in receipt of welfare appears 
to affect the entrance on to AFDC for some groups. The authors suggest that this 
finding ‘suggests that some needy mothers may stay off AFDC if they have access 
to an alternative source of health care assistance.’ (Klawitter et al., 2000:543). 
Also, significant for AFDC participation are parental poverty, family structure, 
educational achievement and race (Klawitter et al., 2000:527). The authors point 
out that school-related factors are prominent amongst the significant variables 
and:
‘… may provide the best path for lower welfare participation rates and 
brighter future economic outcome … policies aimed at keeping young 
women in school might provide alternatives to early childbearing and skills 
that allow older mothers to earn enough to support their families.’ 
Klawitter et al. (2000:544).
Overall, non-experimental methods show that any effects of AFDC on non-marital 
childbearing are insignificant, but if significant, are small. 
Findings that show a welfare effect also find differences by race. For example, 
Lundberg	 and	Plotnick	 (1990;	1995)	find	effects	 of	welfare	on	pregnancy	 and	
abortion for white teenagers but not for black teenagers. They suggest that ‘the 
different racial results may reflect ... important unmeasured racial differences in 
factors that influence fertility and marital behaviours’ (Lundberg and Plotnick, 
1995:177).	However,	Arcs	(1994;	1996)	analysing	data	from	the	NLSY	found	no	
effect of welfare for either black or white women. Duncan and Hoffman (1990) 
rely on cross state comparison using the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) 
and do not find a significant effect of AFDC on births for black teenagers while 
An et al. (1993) also undertake cross state comparisons using PSID data and do 
not find a significant effect on the probability that a woman aged 13 to 18 has a 
non marital birth (discussed by Kearney, 2004: 299). However, as Kearney (2004: 
299) observes, a weakness of these and other studies that rely on cross state 
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comparisons is that the findings are potentially biased by unobserved differences 
between states (see Appendix B). 
Studies of AFDC, fertility and single parents
More recent studies of AFDC’s effect on fertility continue to give mixed results. 
For example, Rosenzweig (1999) and Hoffman and Foster (2000) find that AFDC 
increased non-marital births (at least for sub-groups), whilst Fairlie and London 
(1997) and Acs (1996) reveal no significant welfare effect on childbearing.
Rosenzweig’s (1999) assesses the role of AFDC and marital prospects in the fertility 
and marriage choices of young women in the context of a model incorporating 
heritable characteristics that determine marriageable prospects. The analysis is 
of the fertility and marital experience up to the age of 23 of eight birth cohorts 
of women in the NLSY. In the analysis Rosenzweig (1999) controls for both 
unobserved variables at state level and for cohort effects. Rosenzweig (1999) finds 
a significant and large positive effect of AFDC on non marital childbearing:
‘Higher AFDC benefit levels and lower marital prospects induce young 
women to choose to have a child outside of marriage.’ 
Rosenzweig (1999:S3)
Hoffman and Foster (2000) use data from the PSID to replicate Rosenzweig’s 
(1999) analysis and explore the reasons as to why his findings differ from previous 
research. They are able to reproduce his main findings in a model that includes 
state and cohort fixed effects. Controlling for fertility separately by age shows no 
effect on teen non-marital births, but a large effect on the behaviour of women 
in their early 20s (Kearney, 2004:299).
On the other hand, Fairlie and London (1997) examine the relationship between 
incremental AFDC benefits and fertility using the 1990 panel of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and find a positive, although statistically 
insignificant, association between incremental AFDC benefits and fertility among 
women in receipt of AFDC. However, they also find a similar association for several 
non-recipient comparison groups including married women and single women 
who were not in receipt of AFDC. They conclude that the association found for 
AFDC mothers is spurious (Fairlie and London, 1997:575).
Arcs (1996) also finds no welfare effect. Arcs (1996) examines the relationship 
between AFDC and births to women who already have a child, using data on 
young mothers from the NLSY. Arcs (1996) finds that variations in benefits have no 
statistically significant impacts on the subsequent childbearing decisions of young 
mothers in general or of women who received welfare in particular. Furthermore, 
mothers who received welfare to support their first child are no more likely to have 
additional children on welfare up to the age of 23.
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With respect to single mothers, and as mentioned in Section 1.4.3, increases in 
the proportion of single parents have accompanied falls in the real value of AFDC. 
Moffitt (2000) uses time series analysis to investigate if changes in wage rates can 
account for this increase in female headship. Using Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data from 1968 to 1996 for all men and women aged 18 to 65 with less 
than 12 years of schooling he shows that changes in wage rates do help explain 
the increase in single motherhood. Whilst real wage rates for less educated women 
stagnated over this period, those for less educated men declined sharply. This 
increased the female to male wage ratio, and – according to a Beckerian model 
of marriage – reduced the gains from marriage. This fall in the returns to marriage 
‘outweighed the effects of the decline in welfare benefits.’ (Moffitt, 2000:376). 
It also follows that the decline in marriage is not a consequence of these women 
becoming more financially independent. The results are stronger for white women 
and men, but still ‘suggestive’ for the African-American population.
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, findings can be sensitive to the analytical 
approach adopted. Moffitt (1998b:61-65) shows how relatively small changes in 
the data and approach used can influence the assessment of the welfare effect 
on rates of single parenthood. Using CPS data for 1993 he plots the proportion of 
white single mothers in each state against real monthly AFDC benefits for a family 
of four with no other income, and fits a simple least-squares regression line.45 
This reveals only a very weak positive relationship between the two variables. 
However, when the dependent variable is modified to women aged 20 to 44 
without a high school diploma (a sub-group with high participation rates in AFDC), 
a stronger positive relationship is found. Similar results are found if never-married 
single mothers are correlated with benefit amounts. This positive correlation arises 
because many states with generous benefits had high rates of single motherhood 
(such as, New York, California and Illinois). Using data for other years produces 
similar results. 
To explore whether changes in benefits over time have an impact, data for levels 
of benefit and rates of single motherhood in 1970 are compared with those for 
1993. This helps to explore whether, for instance, the increases in the rates for 
white single mothers were greater in those states that reduced, in real terms, their 
benefits the least. Such a result would confirm the simple cross-sectional benefit 
level analysis. However, for this change comparison the relationship between the 
two variables is ‘weak’, because the increases in the rates of white single mothers 
were fairly even across the states.46 The difference between the two sets of analyses 
might be because other factors that affect benefit levels and the incidence of 
single parenthood are omitted from the analyses. 
45 Single mother rates are calculated as a fraction of all women aged 18 to 
64. Possibly a better measure would have been to use women aged 18 to 
45, and so taking out of the base older women who were less likely to have 
children.
46 Similar findings were found for black women (Moffitt, 1997b:66).
Childbearing and single parents
94
The role that the analytical method adopted can play in these studies is emphasised 
in the study by Hoynes (1997a), who examines whether the welfare system (ADFC 
and Food Stamps) affects the incidence of female headship, and finds that it does 
not.47 Unlike previous studies her analysis includes individual effects as well as state 
effects, year effects and controls for state, women and welfare characteristics.48 
This leads Hoynes (1997a) to conclude that earlier studies over-estimate the effect 
of welfare benefits on family structure:
‘… omitting individual effects can lead to a bias through differences in the 
composition of states over time.’
Hoynes (1997a:111)
By implication, Hoynes’ (1997a) conclusion not only applies to studies of single 
headship but more widely to US studies of marriage and divorce that have excluded 
individual effects. 
Box 4.2 Further details – Hoynes (1997a)
Using a nationally representative longitudinal dataset, the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics for 1968 to 1989, Hoynes (1997a:98-100) develops 
separate linear regressions for white women and black women. The dataset 
comprises women aged 16 to 50 who are married or heads of households – 
the data exclude co-resident single mothers. In the models the controls for 
the woman’s characteristics include age, education and religious affiliation. 
The PSID data are matched with other state data.49 The generosity of the 
benefit system is measured by the total value of benefits from AFDC and 
Food Stamps for a family of four with no other income for each state. A 
second welfare benefit variable is whether or not the state offered AFDC-UP. 
The other state variables included the unemployment rate, average wage in 
manufacturing, per capita income, percentage of the population aged over 
65, percentage of population that are children, party of the State governor, 
and proportion of the State House and Senate that are Republican. 
Like the later study by González (2007) mentioned previously, Hoynes finds that 
as more controls for unobserved heterogeneity are introduced, the size of the 
welfare effect diminishes and eventually becomes insignificant. That is, there is no 
evidence that AFDC and Food Stamps influence women’s decisions on forming 
single person households. 
47 A female head is defined as a woman who is unmarried and has a child – 
the study counts cohabiting females as non-heads of households. An earlier 
version of this paper is included in the Moffitt (1998b) review.
48 Year effects are included to control for any common social trends that might 
influence marriage decisions.
49 Following Becker’s model of marriage, in the model the woman’s earnings 
and those of her potential spouse – which influence the net benefits of 
female headship and are difficult to observe directly – were accounted for 
by the woman’s characteristics and labour market variables.
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More specifically, Hoynes (1997a) reports that:
•	 Using	the	data	as	a	cross-section	(to	take	advantage	of	the	variation	in	state’s	
benefit levels) and not controlling for state or individual effects there is a 
positive and statistically significant welfare effect on female headship. For 
white women, AFDC and Food Stamps had a modest and significant effect on 
headship decisions (Hoynes, 1997a:104). For each $100 increase in the value 
of the benefits, female headship increased by 0.9 percentage points (a ten per 
cent increase). However, living in an AFDC-UP State did reduce the economic 
benefit of being a sole head of household – a $100 increase in the benefit 
was associated with a 0.8 percentage point fall in female headship. For black 
women the welfare effect was larger – a $100 increase in benefits increased the 
likelihood	of	single	headship	by	1.9	percentage	points;	and	in	a	AFDC-UP	state	
it increased by five percentage points (Hoynes, 1997a:108-109). 
•	 Controlling	for	state	effects	makes	the	relationship	for	white	women	close	to	
zero and insignificant, but essentially unchanged for black women. For white 
women this finding is:
‘… consistent with the idea that unmeasured state effects influence white 
headship decisions and welfare benefits. For example, a state may have a 
strong two-family tradition which results in fewer female headed households 
and less support for the AFDC program. Not taking into account state effects 
attributes this difference in preferences to a welfare incentive.’ 
Hoynes (1997a:106)
However, controlling for state effects has ‘little effect’ on the relationship between 
benefits and female headship for black women – a $100 increase in benefits 
increases the probability of female headed households by 1.1 percentage points 
(Hoynes, 1997a:108-109).
•	 Adding	individual	effects	shows	that	there	is	no evidence that benefits increased 
the likelihood of either black or white women forming female headed-households 
(Hoynes, 1997a:106 and 110). In particular omitting individual effects for black 
women leads to an over-estimate of the welfare effect on female headship 
decisions. This might be because on average black women moved to states 
with higher benefits (possible to take advantage of better labour market 
opportunities), whilst white women, on average, did not. 
Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999) using data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation and controlling for fixed effects also find that there is no 
significant correlation between AFDC and female headship.
A different approach on the growth in single parenthood during the 1980s is 
provided by Lichter et al. (1997), who use state and county level data and consider 
the affect of cultural factors as well as welfare benefits and economic opportunities. 
Lichter et al. (1997) use longitudinal county level data from the 1980 and 1990 
decennial censuses to estimate the effect of changes in benefits (a package 
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comprising AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid) on unmarried female headed 
households with children aged under 18. The use of county level data means that 
intra-state differences in labour and marriage markets can be explored. 
Box 4.3  Further details – Lichter et al. (1997)
The analysis by Lichter et al. (1997) includes fixed effects to control for 
unobserved variation at state and county levels. The data is for all US counties 
in the 48 contiguous states. Findings are reported overall and separate 
analyses were conducted for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks and 
Hispanics.
The economic attractiveness of males was measured using the sex ratio, 
male employment rate, male earnings for full-time workers and percentage 
of college educated men in the county. Measures of female economic 
independence included median earnings of women in full-time employment 
and percentage of college educated women in the county. The AFDC 
component of the overall generosity of the benefits package represents the 
maximum benefit level of a family of four with no other income. To capture 
the cultural context of family formation, Lichter et al. (1997:123) use measures 
of urbanisation (because non-metropolitan women tend to marry earlier 
and are less likely to have children outside of marriage) and participation in  
‘pro-family’ religious organisations. Other control variables include age and 
racial/ethnic composition of each county.
Lichter et al. (1997) find that many of the variables they analyse only have a relatively 
small effect on female headship, and argue that cultural changes underpin the 
observed increase in female headship. More specifically, they find that:
•	 There	was	a	small welfare effect. A $100 change in welfare benefits is associated 
with a 0.838 percentage points change in county female headship (Lichter et 
al., 1997:129). This implies that over the 1980s the fall in the value of welfare 
benefits (principally AFDC) decreased female headships by 1.4 per cent. By race/
ethnicity this welfare effect was significant and positive for black Americans but 
statistically insignificant for non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics (Lichter et al., 
1997:132).
•	 There	was	a	small marriage market effect, especially amongst black Americans 
and Hispanics. The gender ratio was negatively associated with female headship 
– a decline of 13 men per 100 women would increase female headship by one 
percentage point (Lichter et al., 1997:129-130). Men’s economic opportunities 
were negatively associated with female headship – a ten per cent change in 
male employment was associated with a 1.1 percentage point change in female 
headship;	and	a	ten	per	cent	change	in	male	earnings	with	a	0.3	percentage	
point change in female headship.
•	 There	was	no support for women’s economic independence being associated 
with female headship as women’s earnings and education were negatively 
associated with female headship (Lichter et al., 1997:130). Thus women with 
higher levels of schooling were potentially more attractive as marital partners.
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•	 Cultural	and	demographic	factors	were	significant	and	affected	female	headship	
(Lichter et al., 1997:130-131). Female headship was positively associated with 
urbanisation, high concentrations of black people and young people and falls 
in local population, and negatively associated with ‘pro-family’ factors (the 
proportions of Hispanics, Catholics and anti-abortion Protestants in a county).
Lichter et al. (1997:131) argue that factors other than changes in welfare benefits 
and changes in the composition of the counties must explain the increase in 
female headship. They highlight cultural changes such as changing societal values 
towards sexuality and unmarried cohabitation, and that society has become more 
individualistic. Overall, Lichter et al. (1997:136) conclude:
‘… welfare was not the primary or even a key factor responsible for the 
[then] recent upswing in female headship. The estimated welfare incentive 
effects implied that even very large cuts in welfare payment levels produce 
only a relatively small drop in the rate of female family headship.’
Two more recent studies report similar findings. Blau et al. (2004) examine the 
effects of welfare on single motherhood and family headship using Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) data and controlling for unobserved variables. They find no 
impact of welfare benefits on single motherhood for either white or black women 
and a positive effect on single headship for black but not for white women (Blau 
et al., 2004:382). 
The authors point out that while fixed effects methods improved on early 
cross-sectional analyses of welfare benefit levels and family formation, fixed 
effects methods may still give biased findings if there are unmeasured changes 
in factors, for example norms, correlated with changes in benefits (Blau et al., 
2004:383). For example, a state where the reduction of stigma of being a single 
parent is reducing may increase the level of welfare benefits at the same time 
as the number of single parents is increasing. Blau et al. (2004:384) argue that 
characterising some states as ‘Liberal’ as fixed effects models do misses changes 
in economic and social climate.
Blau et al. (2004) find positive cross-sectional associations between benefits and 
single motherhood and family headship that are consistent with early reported 
cross-sectional analyses reported previously. However, in line with Moffitt (1994) 
and Hoynes (1997) the authors find that when they add the controls for unobserved 
MSA variables the impact on black women reduces and that for white women 
disappears entirely (Blau et al., 2004: 384). Adding MSA fixed effects removes a 
positive welfare effect on single motherhood for all groups. When the authors go 
further and include MSA time trends into the analysis they show a positive effect 
on female family headship for young black women with some evidence of a larger 
effect on less educated black women. However, there is still no evidence of a 
positive effect on either single motherhood or single headship for white women 
or for single motherhood for black women (Blau et al., 2004:384).
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The authors conclude that these findings suggest that for black women and in 
particular those who are less educated, restricting welfare benefits is likely to 
increase extended family arrangements without reducing the incidence single 
parenthood, which they suggest lends support to ‘one of the most robust results 
obtained in this literature’ reported by Danziger et al. (1982) and Ellwood and 
Bane (1985) that welfare changes mainly impact on the living arrangements of 
single mothers but not the incidence of single motherhood itself (Blau et al., 
2004:384).
Similarly, Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004:189) find little consistent evidence that waivers 
affected female headship of families.
Box 4.4  Further details – Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004)
Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004) use pooled panel data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation for years 1990, 1992, 1993 and 1996 to assess 
the impact of welfare waivers and TANF on women’s decisions to form 
single headship families. The authors claim to be the first observational study 
to use nationally representative, individual level longitudinal data. While 
acknowledging the limitations imposed by the short duration of the available 
panel data the data nevertheless allow the authors to analyse incidence and 
transitions into and out of female headship. They also developed annual, 
county-level information on wages and jobs and marriage market conditions 
as well as event history methods to control for other relevant unobserved 
factors. 
AFDC waivers
There have been several studies of the effect of AFDC waivers in particular the 
impact of family cap policies on women’s fertility decisions. The family cap was 
explicitly designed to reduce additional births to women in receipt of welfare 
by reducing or removing incremental increases in benefit for additional children. 
Effectively, it reduces the amount of benefit paid for an additional child born 
on welfare to zero and so increases the marginal cost of bearing another child 
for a woman on welfare. Thus, other things being equal, a family cap raises the 
price of an additional child and is expected to decrease pregnancy rates and 
increase abortion rates (Kearney, 2004:303). The policy might also be expected 
to encourage a pregnant woman to marry before giving birth if the husband’s 
income	substitutes	for	lost	benefit	income	(Baughman	and	Dickert-Conlin,	2007;	
Sabia, 2006:114). With the exception of the family cap, studies subsequent to 
Moffitt’s review (1998b) suggest a minimal or no effect of welfare policies on 
fertility. There are of course counterexamples.
Family cap
There is a mixed picture with respect to the family cap policy. Whilst most studies 
of the impact of the family cap find that there is either little or no effect and 
some, counter intuitively, that there is a negative effect, a small number of studies 
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report positive effects. However, methodological concerns have been raised with 
each of the studies that find positive effects, either by the authors themselves or 
by critics. Therefore the findings of these studies need to be treated with caution. 
The overall picture is that even the family cap has had little or no effect on fertility, 
although some authors have pointed out that it is likely to have had the effect 
of increasing poverty within families and levels of hardship for children (Kearney, 
2004;	Levin-Epstein,	2003	cited	by	Ryan	et al., 2006).
Examples of studies that find no effect of the family cap on childbearing include 
Joyce, et al. (2004), Dyer and Fairlie (2004), Kearney (2004), and Ryan et al., 
(2006) and these are discussed ahead.
Joyce et al. (2004) analyse the effects of the family cap on birth and abortion rates 
(Joyce et al., 2004:475 and 481). The authors argue that widening the analysis of 
the effects of welfare reform to include abortion as well as birth provides further 
important information on changes in women’s reproductive behaviour associated 
with welfare reform. For example, as discussed ahead, Camasso et al. (2003) and 
Jagaqnnathan and Camasso (2003, cited by Joyce et al., 2004:476) find in an 
experimental analysis of New Jersey’s family cap that a fall in birth rates associated 
with the family cap was accompanied by an increase in abortion rates. Abortion 
rates are of interest because rates of unintended pregnancy and abortion are 
high amongst unmarried women (Joyce et al.,	2004:475;	476).	Henshaw	(1998)	
estimates that 75 per cent of all pregnancies to unmarried women and 75 per 
cent of all pregnancies to teens, are unintended (Henshaw, 2004, cited by Joyce 
et al., 2004:476). Whilst an evaluation of Delaware’s waiver programme, A Better 
Chance, found that 82 per cent of women in receipt of welfare that had a baby 
during the trial said that the pregnancy was unintended (Fein, 1999 cited by 
Joyce et al., 2004:504). Joyce et al. (2004) suggest that the high prevalence of 
unintended pregnancies amongst women in lower socioeconomic statuses leads 
to the expectation that a substantial decline in births associated with the family cap 
should also be associated with an increase in abortion (Joyce et al., 2004:475).
Box 4.5  Further details – Joyce et al. (2004)
The authors claim that their analysis is distinct in that, whilst most previous 
analyses of the effect of welfare reform on fertility examined only births, 
theirs is the only econometric study that analyses both birth and abortion 
rates amongst women who are at risk of receiving public assistance (Joyce 
et al., 2004:476). The study uses records from 24 states and a difference-in-
difference design. The study uses a within – state design to compare unmarried 
adult women who have 12 or less years of schooling with no previous live 
births with similar women who have one or more births. The authors suggest 
that while both groups of women have a high likelihood of being affected 
by welfare reform only the latter group should be affected by the family cap 
(Joyce et al., 2004:477). 
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Box 4.5 Continued
The authors explain the need for a within-state comparison by reference to 
the limitations of multi-state studies of the family cap where controls for 
other aspects of welfare reform are included in the regressions or the study 
period	is	limited	to	pre-TANF	years	(Dyer	and	Fairlie,	2004;	Hovarth,	Rose	and	
Peters, 2001). A potential limitation of these studies, the authors suggest, 
is that it is difficult to characterise and measure the differences in complex 
multi-dimensional welfare reform programmes that have been adopted by 
different states and which are enforced to varying degrees (Moffitt, 2003 
cited by Joyce et al., 2004:477). 
Joyce et al. (2004) report that in states with family caps birth rates fell and abortion 
rates rose more amongst high risk women with at least one previous live birth 
compared to similar childless women, a finding which they suggest is consistent 
with the expected effect of the family cap. However, this parity-specific pattern 
of births and abortions also occurred in states that implemented welfare reforms 
without a family cap. Thus, the effects of welfare reform may have differed between 
mothers and childless women, but there is little evidence of an independent 
effect of the family cap (Joyce et al., 2004:475). Joyce et al. (2004:504) conclude 
that ‘there has been no major reproductive responses to the family cap’.
Dyer and Fairlie (2004) compare changes in fertility across family cap and 
non-family cap states and find no consistent evidence of an association between 
the family cap and the probability of an additional birth while in receipt of 
welfare.
Box 4.6  Further details – Dyer and Fairlie (2004)
Dyer and Fairlie (2004) use a national sample of mothers who ever received 
welfare drawn from CPS micro data between 1989 to 1999 to examine the 
impact of AFDC waiver family cap policies on the birth rate of single less 
educated women with 12 or less years of schooling and at least one child. 
The study uses the first five states that were granted AFDC waivers to implement 
family caps as ‘natural experiments’. They employ several techniques to 
increase the credibility of the experiment, specifically multiple comparison 
groups, controls of differential time trends, and difference-in-difference-in-
differences estimators.
They develop the analysis by using married women with children and with 12 or 
less years of schooling as a within-State comparison group. Again they find no 
consistent association between the family cap and non marital fertility. However, 
in a separate analysis of New Jersey’s family cap policy the authors report a two 
percentage point decline in the fertility rate (relative to a mean of six per cent) 
associated with the family cap, although this decline is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels. 
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The authors conclude that:
‘… our general lack of evidence of a negative effect of the family cap and 
other waivers on fertility do not support the hypotheses that family cap 
policies reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock birth.’
Dyer and Fairlie (2004: 441)
The authors suggest that effects of family cap policies may be limited for a number 
of reasons: because increments in benefit levels are much lower than the estimated 
costs of bringing up a child, many welfare spells are short, the importance of 
non-monetary factors, the unintended nature of some pregnancies and the partial 
offsetting of lost benefits by Food Stamps and Medicaid (Dyer and Fairlie, 2004).
Kearney (2004) also uses the variation across states in the timing of the 
implementation of the family cap to identify whether the denial of an increase in 
benefits for children leads to a reduction in births. 
Box 4.7  Further details - Kearney (2004)
Kearney (2004) claims to improve on previous cross-State studies in a number 
of ways through using Vital Statistics Natality Data compiled by the National 
Centre for Health Statistics (NCHS) which include all births in the US from 1989 
to 1998. Kearney (2004) limits the sample to births to women age 15 to 34. 
She exploits the cross-state variation in the timing of policy implementation 
to compare the change in birth rates for a state that implements a family 
cap to those that do not while controlling for level differences in birth rates 
across states and years as well as differences in linear birth trends across 
states (Kearney, 2004:296). This allows the analysis to control for the effects 
of time and state fixed effects and observe whether results extend across race 
and age groups (Kearney, 2004:300).
However, Kearney points out that her analysis contains only limited  
post-family cap data as most states that introduced a cap did so in 1995-6 
and at the time of her study vital statistics for births was only available until 
1998. Kearney points out that it is possible that the effects of the family cap 
may take longer to show so further research is needed to investigate longer 
term effects (Kearney, 2004:318).
Kearney finds no evidence that family cap policies led to a reduction in births to 
women aged 15 – 34. She also finds no evidence of large declines in higher order 
births amongst groups with relatively high welfare participation rates. Kearney 
(2004) suggests that family cap policies are at best ineffective and at worst 
misguided as fewer state resources are being provided per child.
Contrary to expectations Kearney found counter-intuitive evidence that welfare 
reform had a small positive association with increased fertility about one year 
after the family cap was introduced for unmarried women with low education. This 
finding was also supported by Joyce et al.	(2004;	cited	in	Ryan	et al., 2006:107).
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Further evidence that welfare receipt has minimal effect on fertility is provided 
by Ryan et al. (2006). Using discrete time event history analyses of data drawn 
from the PSID, they examine the association between the risk of a non marital 
subsequent birth and State level welfare waiver policies implemented under AFDC. 
The authors point out that while many studies have treated welfare policies as a 
group, their aim is to assess the effect of each state policy – family cap, time 
limits, work exemptions, job sanctions, earnings disregards, work requirements - 
separately in order to determine which, if any, were effective in reducing subsequent 
non marital childbirth as ‘… grouping all waivers together may obscure the true 
influence of specific policies.’ (Ryan et al., 2006:104).
Box 4.8  Further details – Ryan et al. (2006)
Ryan et al. (2006) conduct discrete time event history analyses of data drawn 
from the PSID. PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of US 
residents and their families (Ryan, 2006:109). The authors point out that PSID 
is the only data set that can provide the necessary longitudinal information 
on public assistance receipt, childbearing behaviours, relationship transitions, 
and individual characteristics. Ryan et al. (2006) combined the Marriage 
History and the Childbirth and Adoption History files with the main Family 
and Individual files to build complete marriage and childbearing histories for 
each female respondent (Ryan et al., 2006:109). The data also provide state 
of residence annually allowing the authors to include state-level economic 
variables in the analysis (Ryan et al., 2006:109).
The authors argue that a key strength of their research is the use of national 
level data on fertility behaviours of those who could be expected to be most 
affected by the changes – unmarried mothers who have received welfare 
benefits. They argue that conceptually this is an improvement over those 
studies that use only aggregate state data or single state specific data or 
those that use national data but do not identify the same high risk population 
(Ryan et al., 2006:109). The only time invariant variable the authors used was 
race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic whites vs. Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks) 
(Ryan et al., 2006:110). 
The research finds that:
‘… although reducing the number of non-martial births is a key goal of 
welfare reform, state established welfare waiver policies do not operate 
as intended – they did not have any influence on women’s childbearing 
behaviours in the sample, net of women’s individual characteristics and state 
economic environments. Even the family cap policy, which was designed for 
the sole purpose of reducing additional births, had no significant association 
with non marital subsequent childbearing.’
Ryan et al. (2006:103)
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Instead, Ryan et al. (2006:114) found counter-intuitive effects – the family cap 
was marginally associated with greater odds of a non marital subsequent birth. 
The authors tested multiple model specifications to see if the counter-intuitive 
findings were robust and found that in all models this effect persisted (Ryan et al., 
2006:119). The authors report that these findings are similar to other national level 
studies that found counter-intuitive effects of family cap policies for at least some 
populations (see discussion of Joyce et al. (2003) and Kearney (2004) previously), 
but do not match state-level analysis by Horvath-Rose and Peters (2001) (see 
ahead) that showed a negative association between family cap and non-marital 
births at the state level (Ryan et al., 2006:119). However, they are consistent with 
Blank’s (2002, cited by Ryan et al., 2006:120) conclusion that most studies find 
either minimal effects or none at all and with Levin–Epstein’s assertion that ‘the 
available research offers no compelling evidence that (family cap policies) have 
achieved the objective of reducing fertility.’ (Levin-Epstein, 2003:1 cited by Ryan 
et al., 2006:120). Ryan et al. (2006:120) argue that their research suggests:
‘… that personal characteristics, not public policies, are stronger determinants 
of women’s childbearing decisions. Unmarried mothers who were younger, 
or who were black or Hispanic, were more likely to have subsequent births 
than were older, non-Hispanic white unmarried women.’
In addition, women living with cohabiting partners were more likely than never 
married non-cohabiting partners to have a second or higher order birth (Ryan et 
al., 2006:120).
The research also suggests parity toward two children (Ryan et al., 2006:120). 
Women who had one child were more likely to have had a non-marital subsequent 
birth than women with two children, whilst those with three or more children were 
less likely to have another child. This, the authors suggest, reflects US society’s two 
child norm: 
‘Given the tendency of many women to want at least two children, there 
may be very little hope that legislation aimed at limiting fertility can have a 
measurable impact for women with fewer than two children.’
Ryan et al. (2006, 120)
The authors conclude that: 
‘Overall, this paper contributes to an expanding body of research that shows 
minimal effect of welfare waivers on fertility.’
Ryan et al. (2006)
Indeed:
‘The family cap may instead increase family hardship by limiting the amount 
of money families receive as their family size grows and ultimately adversely 
affect the well-being of children. In response some states have reversed their 
decisions to implement family cap policies and are eliminating them.’ 
Levin-Epstein (2003, cited by Ryan et al., 2006:121)
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However, other studies such as Camasso (2004), Camasso et al.	 (1998;	2003),	
Hovath-Rose and Peters (2001), Sabia (2006), and Horvath-Rose, Peters and Sabia 
(2008) all find statistically significant associations between the family cap and 
fertility;	whilst	Lopoo	and	DeLeire	(2006)	find	statistically	significant	effects	of	the	
minor parent provisions on 15 to 17 year olds. These studies are outlined ahead.
As part of AFDC waiver agreement with the Federal Government New Jersey 
undertook an experimental evaluation of the family cap component of the 
New Jersey Family Development Program. Implemented in 1992, the Family 
Development Program was the first to impose a cap on benefits for women who 
had a child while on welfare. Camasso’s (2004) evaluation of New Jersey uses 
the sequential phasing of specific reform components by county as a natural 
experiment to isolate the relative effects of a family cap policy and enhanced 
JOBS programme on the fertility of 2,100 women on welfare who were randomly 
assigned to treatment and control groups. Data were collected from 1992 to 1997 
(Camasso et al., 2004). 
Box 4.9  Further details – Camasso (2004)
Camasso (2004) uses the experimental design and the phased introduction 
of components at county level to create a multiple treatment to unbundle the 
effect of the family cap from that of the enhanced JOBS programme which 
he hypothesised also affected the fertility of recipients. 
However, several concerns have been raised about Camasso’s analytical 
approach. For example, Kearney (2004) questions whether the results of the 
New Jersey experiments apply to other contexts and suggests that there is 
evidence that the experimental design was contaminated (Kearney, 2004). 
Kearney (2004) cites Loury (2000) who claims that many members of the 
treatment	and	control	groups	did	not	know	which	policy	applied	to	them;	
more than one-quarter of case workers in the New Jersey experiment admitted 
that they used their discretion when allocating participants to the treatment 
and control groups. In addition, the response rates to the surveys were low 
and that respondents were not representative of the larger AFDC caseload 
(Loury, 2000, cited by Kearney, 2004:301).
Camasso (2004) found that the family cap significantly lowered births and 
increased abortions and use of contraception for short-term welfare recipients. 
However, he found that the family cap did not have any effect on longer term 
recipients;	although	the	enhanced	JOBS	programme	reduced	fertility,	independent	
of the family cap, amongst longer term welfare recipients (Camasso, 2004:462).
Camasso (2004) suggests that his finding of differential impact of the family cap on 
new and ongoing welfare recipients may be expected from general demographic 
theory. More recent recipients tended to enter the programmes with more 
education and fewer children than ongoing recipients, which after controlling for 
age are indicative of lower fertility (Mellor, 1998, cited by Camasso, 2004). 
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However, there are doubts about Camasso’s methodology. Ryan et al. (2006) 
cite Fein et al. (2002), Loury (2000) and Rossi’s (2001) concerns about numerous 
aspects of the study’s approach, including the sample size, representativeness and 
attrition, the process of random assignment, short follow-up periods and that 
similar services and information were being provided to the treatment and control 
groups, all of which they suggest cast doubt on the study’s conclusions, see Box 
4.9.
Three studies by combinations of Horvath-Rose, Peters and Sabia, who use 
aggregate vital statistics birth data, find that the family cap has an effect on 
non-marital births. Horvath-Rose and Peters (2000) analyse the effect of the 
family cap on state level non-marital birth ratios (defined as the proportion of 
non-marital births to total births that occur to unmarried women) between 1984 
and 1996. The study concludes that the family cap decreases non-marital fertility 
for all race and age groups. They find that the family cap is associated with a nine 
per cent decline in non-marital birth ratios among teens and a 12 per cent decline 
among adults in models that control for both unobserved state and year variables. 
However, the study’s methodology has been questioned, see Box 4.10. 
Box 4.10  Further details – Horvath-Rose and Peters (2000)
In their analysis Horvath-Rose and Peters (2000) control for state and year 
fixed effects, high school completion rate by adults aged 18-24, proportion of 
state population living in urban areas, proportion of State population that are 
fundamentalist adherents and indicator variables for waivers for minor parent 
provision, time limits, work requirements, AFDC-UP, child support, expanded 
time disregard, asset limit, school attendance and performance requirement, 
and parental consent requirement for an abortion, and requirement for sex 
education in schools.
However, Joyce et al. (2004) point out that 20 of the 23 states that 
implemented the family cap did so in 1995 or later. Thus Horvath-Rose and 
Peters had few post cap observations in their sample (Joyce et al., 2004:478). 
Kearney (2004) also questions the study’s methodology. She suggests that 
the analysis confounds the marriage and fertility responses to the family cap, 
fails to account for the changes in the reporting of marital status in vital 
statistics data that occurred during the study period and presents implausible 
findings, specifically that there are such large effects for the entire population 
of women aged 20-49 most of whom are unlikely to ever receive welfare 
(Kearney, 2004:301-302). Joyce et al. (2004:478) also point out that some 
of the other results of the study are counter-intuitive which they suggest 
‘raises questions about the robustness of the specification.’ For example, 
Joyce et al. (2004:478) find it strange that the minor parent provisions (see 
discussion ahead) are associated with a large increase in the non-marital birth 
ratios amongst adults while AFDC-UP programmes are associated with lower  
non-marital birth ratios amongst teenagers but not adults. 
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Sabia (2006) uses aggregate data from 1984 to 1998 to estimate the association 
between family cap policies and non-marital birth, pregnancy and abortion 
rates. Sabia finds ‘robust evidence’ even after controlling for a wide set of policy 
variables, socio-economic characteristics and time-invariant State level unobserved 
heterogeneity that the family cap is associated with a reduction in non-marital 
birth rates particularly amongst one sub group - black women (Sabia, 2006:112-
113). 
Sabia (2006:112-113) also finds that the reduction in non-marital birth rates 
particularly amongst black women were driven by a reduction in non-marital 
pregnancies rather than an increase in abortion or marriage rates. Sabia (2006:129) 
concludes that his finding suggest that ‘black unmarried women are responding 
to the family cap by having less sex or increasing the level of contraceptive care 
taken during intercourse.’ This finding is not consistent with Camasso et al. (1998) 
and Jagaqnnathan and Camasso (2003). Both analyses suggest that pregnancies 
and births amongst women who were in receipt of welfare declined after the 
family cap was introduced and abortions increased (Kearney, 2004:). However, 
Sabia (2006:128) points out that Camasso et al. (1998) only looked at the family 
cap in New Jersey, while other methodological concerns about Camasso’s findings 
have been discussed in Box 4.9, previously.
Sabia (2006) finds that the reduction in the non-marital birth rate of black women 
associated with the family cap is driven by a 2.7 per cent decline in the non-marital 
pregnancy rate amongst black women ‘… which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that that higher direct economic costs and higher indirect stigma costs induce 
unmarried black women to curb their childbearing by avoiding pregnancy.’ (Sabia, 
2006:129). The author suggests that there is evidence that stigmatising illegitimacy 
may effect black women more than white women due to white people holding 
racial stereotypes judging unmarried black women more harshly, particularly with 
regard to welfare receipt. He cites studies which show that media coverage of 
welfare use a disproportionate share of blacks in reports on poverty whilst white 
people who ‘harbour racial resentment’ respond less generously to welfare policies 
targeted at supporting black people. As noted above these findings differ from 
the studies reviewed by Moffitt (1998) which found that welfare had a greater 
effect on white women. Baughman and Dickert–Conlin suggest that one of the 
consistent findings of these studies - that welfare seems to have a larger effect on 
fertility for white women than black women has ‘never been explained well in the 
literature’ (Baughman and Dickert–Conlin, 2007: no page numbers).
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Sabia caveats his findings with reference to unobserved state specific time varying 
characteristics associated with the implementation of the family cap and the 
reduction in non-marital childbearing that are not caused by the policy. Under 
these circumstances ‘the observed impact may be upwardly biased.’ (Sabia, 
2006:128). This concern is particularly acute because of the use of aggregate 
data in the analysis: 
‘If time-varying, unobserved, state-specific anti-illegitimacy sentiment is 
correlated with the implementation of the family cap, then the policy impact 
... may, in part, reflect spurious correlation. Similarly, if there are unobserved 
policy changes that are correlated with the implementation of the family 
cap, then the observed policy impacts may be overstated.’
Sabia (2006:128)
Horvath-Rose, Peters and Sabia (2008) also use aggregate state level panel data 
from 1984 to 1999 to examine the extent to which state welfare reforms had 
lowered age and race-specific non-marital fertility. The authors also look at other 
policy	initiatives:	time	limits;	AFDC-UP	(welfare	eligibility	for	two	parent	families);	
sanctions	 for	 non-compliance	with	 child	 support;	 expanded	 income	 disregards	
and	asset	 limits;	 the	minor	parent	provision	 that	 requires	minor	parents	 to	 live	
with	 their	 own	parents	 or	 guardians;	 and	 school	 attendance	 and	performance	
requirements. The last two are only included in the teen analysis (Horvath-Rose et 
al., 2008:129).
Box 4.11  Further details – Horvath-Rose et al. (2008)
The analysis is by age and race. Age is broken down into teen women (15-19) 
and post-teen women (20-49), whilst race is broken down into two groups: 
white women (including white Hispanic) and black women (including black 
Hispanic women) (Horvath-Rose et al., 2008:127).
The authors claim to improve on previous research by correcting the models 
for bias in the panel data (Horvath-Rose et al., 2008:120-121). The models 
include controls for unobserved variables. 
The authors use two measures of non-marital fertility: the non-marital birth 
ratio, defined as the proportion of non-marital births to total births that 
occur to unmarried women, and the non-marital birth rate, defined as the 
proportion of all women in the population with a non-marital birth (Horvath-
Rose et al., 2008:124). However, the authors point to the weakness of using 
the nonmarital birth ratio as a dependent variable because an increase in 
marital births with no change in nonmarital births would result in a decrease 
in the nonmarital birth ratio. It is also important to note that changes in the 
non-marital birth rate could be caused by marriage as well as birth decisions 
(Horvath-Rose et al., 2008:123).
The authors also point out the limitations of using aggregate data to estimate 
the impact of family cap on non-marital births as those data include women 
who are not in receipt of welfare.
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With the exception of the family cap, Horvath-Rose et al. (2008:131) do not 
find that any of the policies examined have significant effects on non-marital 
childbearing. The authors do find evidence that the family cap is associated with 
a decline in non-marital birth ratios for both age and race groups. The family cap 
is associated with a decline in non marital birth ratio of 5.3 per cent for white 
teens and 1.6 per cent for black teens. For the post teen groups the family cap is 
associated with a decline of 3.9 per cent for white women and 6.9 per cent for 
black women. For their second measure of non-marital births – birth rates – the 
family cap is associated with a decline of non-marital birth rates among black 
post-teens. The family cap is also associated with a reduction in non-marital birth 
rates for black teens and white post-teens but these findings are insignificant 
(Horvath-Rose et al., 2008:130). 
The authors suggest that one explanation for the stronger results for non-marital 
birth ratios than for birth rates could be that the family cap may be positively 
associated with marital births which if true would suggest that the family cap may 
encourage unmarried women to marry prior to the birth of the child. 
However, the authors suggest that the size of the association between the family 
cap and marital birth rates – 1.3 per cent for white post-teens to 15.8 per cent 
for black teens (Horvath-Rose et al., 2008:132) – suggests that this explanation 
is incomplete and that there are unobserved characteristics associated with both 
higher non-marital birth rates and the implementation of the family cap (Horvath-
Rose et al., 2008:131).
Nonetheless, the magnitude of the effect of the family cap is small, and the authors 
suggest that:
‘… changes in variables such as social stigma, expectations and unmeasured 
aspects of socioeconomic variables appear to play a larger role than changes 
in welfare policy.’ 
Horvath-Rose et al. (2008:134)
Social experiments
Maynard et al. (1998:153-155) review eight social experiments seeking to reduce 
the fertility of teenage parents on benefits or at risk of claiming benefits. The projects 
were: Job Corps, Job Start, New Chance, Project Redirection, Ohio Learnfare, 
Teenage Parent Welfare Demonstration, Teenage Parent Health Care program 
and the Elmira Nurse Home Visiting program. The results of the evaluations were 
mixed and show that the impacts of programmes on abortion rates can mitigate 
against any effects on pregnancy rates. Only two projects, Teen Parent Health Care 
and Elmira Nurse Home Visiting, which were both health-focused and targeted 
on first-time teen parents, significantly reduced the repeat pregnancy rates by 57 
per cent and 43 per cent, respectively.50 Another two, Job Start (an employment 
and training program) and New Chance (an education and training program), had 
50 Expressed as a per cent of the average for the comparison/control group.
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significant increases in repeat pregnancy rates of 13 per cent and eight per cent, 
respectively. Maynard et al. (1998:155) suggest that possible explanations for this 
are:
•	 The	programmes	provided	opportunities	for	the	women	to	meet	men.
•	 The	 programmes	 promoted	 the	 women’s	 self-esteem	 and	 ability	 to	 live	
independently but did not alter their contraceptive practices.
For the New Chance programme there was also a significant increase in the 
abortion rate (34 per cent) which offset the increase in pregnancies so that the 
overall increase in the birth rate (eight per cent) was statistically insignificant. 
For Project Redirection and Teenage Parent Welfare Demonstration projects, falls in 
the abortion rate amongst participants were sufficient for the birth rates to increase 
significantly (by 20 per cent and seven per cent, respectively), notwithstanding 
that the increases in the repeat pregnancy rate were insignificant. 
Maynard et al. (1998:156) notes that the US literature suggests that AFDC single 
mothers show little interest in marrying the fathers of their children, or even of 
pursing child support. The former could occur because the men were ‘… not 
reliable sources of economic and emotional support; welfare can at least be relied 
upon for economic support.’ (Maynard et al. (1998:156). The latter may reflect 
the absence of any financial gain from doing so.
Welfare reform, single mothers and living arrangements 
There is also a US literature on welfare reform and single mothers and living 
arrangements. The regression analysis by Schoeni and Blank (2000), which utilised 
data on all women aged 16-54 years from the CPS for 1977 to 1999 to investigate 
the impacts of AFDC waivers 1992 to 1996 and of TANF, and described in Section 
2.2.3 shows that the AFDC waivers significantly decreased rates female headship 
by 1.7 percentage points for those with less than 12 years of schooling (Schoeni 
and Blank, 2000:17 and 31).51 The AFDC waivers had no statistically significant 
impacts on female headship for women with more years of education. The authors 
claim this finding is what would be expected, that is, women with less education 
(high school dropouts) were more likely to be affected by welfare programmes.
However, their difference-in-difference model to estimate the impact of TANF 
on female headship rates (see Section 2.2.3), shows that for women with less 
education female headship rates fell compared to those with more schooling. For 
women with less than 12 years schooling compared to women with more than 12 
years education female headship rates fell by two percentage points following the 
introduction of TANF (Schoeni and Blank, 2000:23 and 33). Similarly, or women 
with less than 12 years schooling compared to women with 12 years education 
female headship rates fell by 2.1 percentage points. (Both findings are statistically 
significant at the ten per cent level.) 
51 These findings are statistically significant at the ten per cent level.
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There are a few studies that consider the impact of welfare reform on children’s 
living arrangements. AFDC waivers and TANF can be expected to ‘… decrease the 
probability that a child lives with an unmarried parent and increase the probability 
that a child lives with a married parent.’ (Bitler et al., 2006:5). However, a possible 
outcome of welfare reform is that children leave the parental home and live with 
others if, say, reform leads to a reduction in household income and (financial) 
stress.
Bitler et al. (2006) utilise CPS data for 1989 to 2000 and consider whether the 
introduction of AFDC waivers in states lead to children to live with an unmarried 
parent, with a married parent or with neither parent. Separate analyses were 
conduced for black, Hispanic and white children (aged under 16). The authors 
find that state waivers were associated with (Bitler et al., 2006:13-20):
•	 A	fall	in	the	likelihood	that	children	will	live	with	an	unmarried	parent.	
 This effect is concentrated amongst Black (-15 per cent) and Hispanic children 
(-14 per cent) and is insignificant for white children. 
•	 An	increase	in	the	likelihood	that	they	will	live	with	a	married	parent.	
 This effect is concentrated amongst Hispanic children (20 per cent). The evidence 
for white children is mixed and the effect is not statistically significant for black 
children. 
•	 An	increase	in	the	likelihood	that	they	live	with	neither	parent.	
 This is especially true for black children (a 13 per cent impact) who are likely to 
live with a grandparent. There is a smaller impact for white children (seven per 
cent) and no statistically significant impact for Hispanic children.
The analysis controls for demographic variables (such as child’s age), other state 
public assistance policies (for instance, the generosity of the State’s Medicaid 
programme), labour market variables (such as unemployment and employment 
rates) and unobserved state and year effects (Bitler et al., 2006:10). 
Similar results were found in an earlier study by Acs and Nelson (2004), who used 
data from the National Survey of America’s Families for 1997 and 1999 to explore 
the impact of welfare reform policies on living arrangements. Although using a 
different approach (difference-in-difference-in-differences) and hence difference 
controls and comparisons, they report that:
•	 States	with	 a	 tough	 sanctions	 policy	 (that	 is,	 they	 removed	 the	 entire	 TANF	
benefit for non-compliance with work requirements) were less likely to have 
low-income single parent families (Acs and Nelson, 2004:281-282). However, 
such sanction policies did not reduce the proportion of children living with 
single parents. Nor did they have any clear relationship with two-parent family 
living arrangements or with the probability that the child lives apart from both 
parents.
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•	 Family	caps	tended	to	be	associated	with	a	decline	in	single	parenting	amongst	
families and children (Acs and Nelson, 2004:282-284). Indeed, family caps 
were associated with an increase in two-parent (married) families and children 
living in two-parent families. However, they were not associated with a higher 
probability that a child lived with neither parent.
•	 Restrictions	on	the	receipt	of	welfare	by	two-parent	families	had	no	significant	
association with living arrangements (Acs and Nelson, 2004:285-286). 
(The restrictions considered were whether the state imposed a work history 
requirement of a 100-hour test on two-parent families.)
As Acs and Nelson (2004:287) observe their analysis: 
‘… provide[s] some evidence that welfare policies and practices have 
contributed to the decline in single parenting and may, in fact, promote 
dual parenting and marriage.’
However, this analysis only considers one policy at a time, it ignores the ‘nuances’ 
of policy and how they interact. As Acs and Nelson (2004:287) point out, the 
findings for family cap policies, for instance, are likely to be a proxy marker for 
a set of related state policies and practices that together promote two-parent 
families and discourage single parent families. 
Minor parent provision and childbearing
Lopoo and DeLeire (2006) examine the minor parent provision that requires teenage 
mothers younger than 18 to live with a parent or legal guardian and enrol in high 
school in order to receive welfare benefits. They use state level natality data from 
the NCHS to compare the trend in fertility rates for young women aged 15 to 17 
to the trend for a control group of 18 year olds. Their estimates suggest that the 
annual percentage decline in fertility rates following implementation of the minor 
parent provisions was 0.7 percentage points larger for young teens than for teens 
aged 18, a difference of over 22 per cent. (Lopoo and DeLeire, 2006:275).
EITC and childbearing and single mothers
US researchers have considered whether EITC affects the fertility decisions of 
households – as the maximum credit available is higher for families with (two or 
more) children than those with none.52 
52 Since 1991 the maximum credit for families with two or more children has 
been higher than that for families with one child. A smaller credit to childless 
recipients was introduced in 1994. These changes to EITC may be seen as 
creating fertility incentives. (This fertility incentive is available to both married 
and unmarried women since eligibility for ETIC, like WTC, is not dependent 
upon marital status.)
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There is some evidence that the effect of EITC on actual fertility decisions is small. 
Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003:249-250) found that higher welfare benefits 
for unmarried mothers were correlated with higher first born birth rates (for children 
born between 1990 and 1999). They also found that the fertility incentive effect 
of EITC on first births for non-white recipients was larger than for white recipients 
(especially for married women).53 The authors suggest that the greater effect for 
non white married women may be because EITC was a more important source 
of income for non-white women. Or if non-white women have fewer marriage 
options, financial incentives for additional children may matter more (Grogger and 
Bronars, 2001, cited by Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 2003:250).
In a second study Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2007) use birth certificate data 
for the years 1990 to 1999 and exploit the variation in state EITC programmes 
to test whether changing incentives in the EITC affect fertility rates – specifically 
whether expansion in credit influence birth rate among targeted families. 
Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2007: no page numbers) conclude that while 
economic theory would predict a positive fertility effect of the programme for 
many eligible women, their results indicate that expanding the credit produced 
only extremely small reductions in higher order fertility this time among white 
women.
The impact of EITC on female headship decisions, whilst controlling for AFDC, 
is considered by Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999).54 They find that the impact 
of EITC on female headship decisions is ‘ambiguous’. Their analysis was based 
on data for women aged 18 to 50 from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation for the period 1989 to 1995 and included controls for individual and 
State characteristics and incorporates individual and year effects.55 Like Hoynes 
(1997a), their analysis is suggestive of a link between the degree of control used 
and the magnitude and significance of the impact of EITC on female headship 
decisions. When the data are pooled and individual fixed effects are not included 
AFDC has a positive and EITC a negative effect on female headship, and in both 
cases the impacts are statistically significant. But when individual fixed effects are 
included in the models the coefficients become insignificant.
53 This contrasts with the literature on welfare, where larger effects are found 
for white families (Moffitt (1998) cited in Baughman and Dickert-Conlin 
(2003:250)).
54 Note, in this analysis a female head is an unmarried women with children, 
that arises from out-of-wedlock births or divorce.
55 They use the maximum monthly combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefit 
for a family of three and the maximum combined annual Federal and state 
EITC for a family with two children as the independent variables of interest 
in the regression analysis (a linear probability model). The EITC amount is 
also lagged by one year because it is refunded in the following tax year.
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Nonetheless, Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999:22) maintain that EITC might only 
have an effect on female headship decisions for women who are likely to be 
eligible for the credit (as opposed to all unmarried women). As eligibility for EITC 
is likely to be related to income and the female headship decision they predict 
eligibility using wage regressions that control for individual and state variable 
such as age, education and female unemployment rate and assume she works 
for 2,000 hours. By interacting this variable with the maximum EITC entitlement 
variable they have a measure of the additional effect of EITC on women who were 
probably entitled to the credit. Using this measure (and controlling for individual 
effects) they find that for white women an increase in EITC of $100 increased the 
probability of female headship by 0.1 per cent (or 0.02 percentage points), whilst 
for black women it decreased the likelihood of female headship by 1.4 per cent (or 
0.6 percentage points) (Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1999:22 and 29). Although 
the latter result is not ‘robust’, possible reasons for the different results for while 
and	black	women	are:	that	they	face	different	labour	market	opportunities;	the	
earnings of the spouses of black women were sufficiently low that even if the 
women had a desire to work their likely combined income did not make them 
ineligible	for	EITC;	and	that	the	impact	of	EITC	might	vary	by	the	route	into	female	
headship because non-martial childbearing varies by race (Dickert-Conlin and 
Houser, 1999:29 and 35). 
Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1999:23-26) also conduct this analysis for a 
sub-sample of women with lower levels of educational achievement (that is, with 
less than high school education) because they are more likely to be in receipt of 
AFDC. The result for the predicted EITC eligible variable is statistically insignificant 
for both white and black women. In addition, in the analysis all unmarried women 
are counted as female heads if they have children and as non-heads if they are 
childless – thus it does not distinguish between cohabitating and non-cohabitating 
women. Nonetheless, an analysis for single heads gives similar results to when data 
for all unmarried women are used (Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 1999:32-33).
4.3 Overview
As noted in Section 1.5.5, Malthus was the first to propose the view that there 
is a systematic interplay between economic considerations and fertility (1798, 
cited by Clarke and Strauss (1998)). The work of Becker is, once again, influential 
in the more recent literature which views decisions on single parenthood and 
childbearing as being affected by the benefits and costs of the options available 
to women. Within this framework two broad approaches can be identified 
(Del Bono, 2004:2). The first highlights the role of welfare systems in ‘making 
single motherhood more economically attractive’ and is particularly associated 
with Charles Murray (1984). The second approach focuses on men and women’s 
economic opportunities, including the availability of marriageable men, and male 
and female unemployment and potential earnings.
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Some commentators are concerned that welfare systems encourage non-marital 
births and single parenthood. Some early US studies would lend support to such 
a view - all of the significant studies in the Moffitt (1998b) review show that 
AFDC had a positive effect on single motherhood and fertility. However, overall 
results are mixed. Often where there is a welfare effect, it is not for the population 
as a whole, but for a sub-group. For instance, Schoeni and Blank (2000) find 
small but significant and positive effects on female headship for those with less 
than 12 years of schooling. Moreover, non-experimental designs that control for 
unobserved variables at the level of the individual find that the welfare effect is 
not only small but statistically insignificant.
Evidence of the impact of family caps is weak (Moffitt, 2003:350). Family caps 
tend to be part of a wider package of reforms and it is difficult to isolate the 
effect of the family cap from other policies. Moreover, no social experiments have 
varied the presence of a family cap holding other design features of the project 
constant.
That people’s demographic behaviour is influenced by factors other than financial 
incentives in the welfare system is illustrated by those US studies that show that 
the family cap far from reducing non-marital births – as policy makers intended – 
was associated with increases in births.
Overall, the mixed nature of the findings suggests that there is no consistent and 
robust evidence that financial incentives in welfare systems affect childbearing 
and single parenthood decisions.
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5 Implications for the UK   
 welfare system
Summary
Identifying the policy implications of the literature reviewed is not 
straightforward, because there is ambiguity in the underlying theory about 
the direction of any welfare effect, the ‘mixed’ nature of the empirical findings 
and the key role of other factors important in influencing demographic 
behaviour.
Most of the reviewed research is international, and the application of the 
findings to the United Kingdom (UK) is limited by differences in policy and 
national/local context. Impact estimates cannot be simply applied to the UK. 
Much of the literature is concerned with the possible effects of marriage 
penalties within the welfare system. However, a case for marriage penalties 
can be made. The argument for marriage penalties includes that couples 
benefit from the presence of household economies of scale, higher incomes, 
and from the time that a second adult can devote to a family. For society there 
may also be a trade-off between pursuing neutrality in the welfare system 
and achieving greater equity. Nonetheless, the literature includes discussions 
of the policy options for eliminating marriage penalties in the benefit and tax 
credit systems. The options are:
•	 Change	 the	 unit	 of	 assessment	 from	 the	 family/household	 to	 the	
individual.
•	 Introduce	a	transferable	allowance	for	couples.
•	 Target	families	with	children	by,	for	instance,	increasing	the	basic	credit	in	
Working Tax Credit (WTC) for couples with children.
Continued
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The United States (US)-style family cap policy conflicts with fundamental 
principles of UK social policy including policies to reduce child poverty. 
However, options in the literature that may be more applicable to the UK 
include:
•	 Short-term:
– Improve sex education in schools. 
– Improve contraceptive take up.
– Improve access to early abortion.
•	 Longer	term:
– Increase employment opportunities for client groups (females and 
males).
– Increase opportunities for further education for client groups (females 
and males).
None of the literature considered the cost-effectiveness of using the welfare 
system as opposed to other policies to affect family structure. The literature 
on other family policy instruments, such as family counselling, has not been 
reviewed, but it may be more cost-effective. Using the welfare system to 
‘nudge’ family structure is also potentially in tension with other policy goals, 
such as tackling poverty, which are more effectively addressed by the benefit 
and tax credit systems.
5.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the possible implications of the reviewed research for the 
UK. In comparison to the US it does not appear that UK policy makers have actively 
sought	to	use	the	tax	and	transfer	systems	to	influence	demographic	behaviour;	
even though it is acknowledged that policy can affect demography (Dixon and 
Margo, 2006:45). Welfare policies have generally sought to achieve goals other 
than demographic ones. So to the extent that the UK tax and transfer system has 
to date affected family structure, any impact would appear to be unintended. 
Identifying the implications of the review for the UK is not straightforward, because 
there is ambiguity in the underlying theory about the direction of any welfare 
effect, other factors have a significant influence on demographic behaviour and 
the ‘mixed’ nature of the empirical findings, see Section 5.2. That there is more 
non-UK based research than UK research also raises the issue of the extent to 
which findings can be transferred to the UK especially from the US, see Section 
5.3. Nonetheless, implications for the UK for making the welfare system marriage 
neutral, see Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, and for minimising non-marital births, see 
Section 5.4.3, are addressed ahead. 
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5.2 Theoretical and empirical ambiguity
Explicitly or implicitly public policies incorporate substantive ‘theories’ or models 
about how the factors that policy makers can influence affect the outcomes 
desired. Some of the policy and public debate about the impact of welfare 
systems on family structure appears to imply that how benefits and tax credits 
affect behaviour is conceptually or theoretically unambiguous: that in principle 
the direction of the effect can be predicted. Thus, welfare systems are seen as 
leading to less marriage, and more cohabitation, non-marital births and single 
parents. However, the literature shows that the direction of the effect is, in theory, 
ambiguous. It may, for instance, lead to more or less marriage, see Section 1.5. 
Moreover, the underlying theory provides little guidance as to whether the size of 
the impact of the welfare system on family structure is small or large. In addition, 
whether the effect is direct (receipt of benefit causes, say, single motherhood) or 
there is a selection effect (some women possess characteristics that mean that 
they are likely to be both benefit recipients and single mothers) can be unclear 
(see Bradbury, 2006). Moreover, observed impacts may be less than theory would 
predict because the traditional Beckerian model attempts to explain whether 
someone will marry rather than when they will marry (Ellwood and Jencks, 
2004:18-19). Specifically, the model does not predict the age at which people will 
marry and hence cannot explain why people are delaying the age of first marriage. 
Nor does it help to explain non-marital childbearing. 
The conceptual model in Figure 1.1 depicts the impact of the welfare system 
as being moderated and mediated by other factors. How the welfare system 
is seen as affecting demographic behaviour is important because it influences 
policy options. For instance, if receipt of Income Support (IS) had a direct effect 
on childbearing then increasing benefit rates would lead to more births and 
single mothers. However, if the effect is indirect or other factors lead to both 
benefit receipt and single motherhood then not increasing benefit rates could 
undermine the women’s well-being as well as having no significant effect on 
future childbearing. 
The review suggests the exact determinants of family structure are unclear, 
making it difficult for researchers to inform policy makers about how to approach 
the design of welfare and family policy. The empirical research suggests that, 
in general, the impact that welfare systems have on family structure is modest, 
mixed (i.e. it can be both positive and negative) and other factors are influential. 
Implying that simply changing the welfare system with the intention of nudging 
family structures in a certain direction is unlikely to have any major impact. So, for 
instance, Geronimus (1997) argues that the assumptions upon which US policy 
are based, while ‘well-known’ are nevertheless either erroneous or presented with 
greater certainty than the evidence warrants. She suggests that the nature and 
scope of the welfare reform debate in the US resulting in Personal Responsibility 
and Work Reconciliation Act 1996 (PRWORA) reflected a view that poverty is the 
result of poor people’s values and behaviours, and that this is justification for 
policy makers to intervene explicitly in the childbearing decisions of people on 
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welfare. However, Geronimus argues that the policy ‘prism’ through which single 
parenthood is viewed:
‘… may ill reflect the traditions or, more importantly, the environmental 
contingencies and life expectancy faced by members of poor families who 
hope to provide for children’s well-being.’ 
Geronimus (1997:406)
Geronimus points out that:
‘… the health of poor African American women deteriorates in measurable 
ways as early as the mid-20s, perhaps the consequence of long-term severe 
socioeconomic disadvantages.’ 
Geronimus (1997:415)
and that this necessitates early childbearing to give poor African American mothers 
a greater chance of supporting their children into early adulthood. Thus: 
‘… welfare policy makers … fail to distinguish between the function of 
providing stability, care, and economic support to children that is most often 
provided by married couples in the United States from the form of marriage 
itself.’ 
Geronimus (1997:418)
Geronimus (1997:406) concludes that if ‘apparent consensus siphons energy and 
resources away from searching debate about the nature of poverty, it presents a 
definite social danger’.
5.3 Policy transfer
Much of the literature reviewed in this report is taken from the US, and this raises 
the question of the extent to which US findings can be transferred to the UK 
(see Midgley et al., 2008). When assessing the applicability of findings for other 
countries to the UK it is crucial to locate those findings within their policy and 
local/national context. Arguably, important policy and other contextual differences 
mean that the US findings in particular cannot simply be transferred to the UK. 
There are critical policy differences (such as, more generous benefits for women 
in the UK compared to the US) which mean that the context within which people 
take demographic decisions is very different. There is no UK equivalent of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/ Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) and Food Stamps, nor of the pro-marriage policy ambitions underpinning 
the former. Even policies that might appear similar, such as Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) and WFTC/WTC, contain vital differences. For instance, EITC has 
‘phase-in’	and	‘phase-out’	stages;	so	that	as	recipients’	income	increases	so	the	
amount of credit payable increases (phase-in) until a maximum is reached and it 
then reduces (phase-out). WFTC and WTC have no ‘phase-in’	stages;	rather	they	
incorporate a minimum working requirement of 16 hours per week. Consequently, 
neither the magnitude nor the statistical (in)significance of the effects observed in 
the US should be simply applied to the UK.
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A	further	difficulty	 is	 that	 the	US	findings	are	mixed;	 there	 is	no	unambiguous	
lesson to learn. Indeed, the study by Harknett and Gennetian (2003) implies that 
caution is required when considering the policy transfer of research findings on 
the impact of welfare systems on family structure. They found that the direction of 
the effect of an earnings supplement on demographic behaviour differed between 
two sites within one country (Canada) (c.f. Section 2.2.4). The scope for the direct 
transfer of these findings to the UK is, therefore, limited. The context within which 
these studies take place is critical. Implying that policy makers should primarily 
draw upon UK research and not simply apply estimates from elsewhere in order to 
gauge the likely effects of the welfare system on demographic behaviour.
Non-UK studies may, however, help to inform UK policy makers about the likely 
direction of people’s response to financial incentives and provide lessons on how 
policy-related research on this topic should be conducted, see Section 6.2. In many, 
but not all cases, the direction of any welfare effect on family structure is in the 
expected direction – even if the impact is statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, a 
general lesson from the US research is that actual behavioural responses to welfare 
system financial incentives are smaller than might be predicted. Demographic 
decisions are influenced by a range of complex interacting factors and people do 
not appear to simply react to financial incentives. 
5.4 Welfare policy and the family
Much of the UK policy literature on welfare systems and the family is focused on 
the existence and impact of marriage penalties. There is also some concern about 
non-marital births. Accordingly, this chapter now focuses on marriage disincentives 
in, and policy options for, the welfare system (see Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2) and 
then policy options for reducing (non-marital) births.
5.4.1 Is there a case for marriage penalties?
This sub-section is focused on the case for and against marriage penalties and the 
next sub-section considers the options for eliminating penalties. It is recognised 
that there are broader moral and political issues beyond the scope of this review, 
namely, what is the purpose of marriage in today’s society and whether government 
should promote marriage or other family forms. Moreover, this review has not 
explored the evidence on, for instance, the social benefits and costs of marriage 
as opposed to cohabitation. 
Even in the US, where in recent years the state has adopted pro-two-parent family 
policies, few states have a made a concerted effort to influence family structure 
through the welfare system. In part this may reflect a reluctance to use the system 
to influence what for many may be seen as a private matter, and if pursued may 
further stigmatise single parenthood (Fein et al., 2002:1). It may also be (tacit) 
recognition that other policy instruments might be more cost-effective at steering 
demographic behaviour than the benefit and tax credit systems. None of the 
reviewed studies included a cost-benefit analysis making it impossible to know the 
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social costs and benefits of attempting to influence family structures through the 
welfare system. This review has also not looked at the literature on the impacts or 
cost-effectiveness of some other possible polices, such as family counselling.
One criticism of the welfare system is that it is not marriage neutral – indeed, that 
it imposes a penalty on marriage. The broad case for abolishing marriage penalties 
is that marriage is a ‘merit good’ and so should be promoted – that is, people may 
not be aware of the benefits from marriage to themselves and their children. There 
may also be benefits that accrue to society from marriage, which might otherwise 
incur extra costs, say, if cohabitation rates were higher. In addition, the existence 
of penalties may encourage fraud in the benefit and tax system as some couples 
may	seek	to	avoid	financial	penalties	(Brewer,	2007:225;	Morgan,	2007:74-79).	
The removal of penalties would eliminate this potential fraud.
Even evidence that the welfare system may, at most, only have modest impacts on 
marriage rates has not deterred some from calling for the elimination of marriage 
penalties. Policy can have considerable symbolic significance. Some argue for the 
abolition of marriage penalties because they ‘sent the wrong messages’ about 
the importance of marriage (Fein et al., 2002:1). For instance, Morgan (2007:124) 
states:
‘By rewarding some behaviours and penalising others, tax and welfare 
systems affect the preference and behaviour of individuals not just through 
hard cash calculations but by (unavoidably) embodying and promoting 
certain values and assumptions.’
Invariably those making this point are pro-marriage. However, such symbolic 
policies risk (re-)stigmatising other family forms. They undermine the acceptance 
of, and being neutral towards, individual choices about family structure. 
In addition, there may be a rationale for not requiring the welfare system to be 
marriage neutral. One rationale for marriage penalties in the welfare system is the 
presence of economies of scale within households – fewer resources are required 
to maintain a standard of living for a second adult in a household than for the 
first (Eissa and Hoynes, 2000b:4). Married couples benefit from sharing resources 
– for example, the cost of accommodation for two people living together is less 
than twice the cost of accommodation for a single person (Brewer, 2007:218). 
That this occurs is acknowledged more widely in social security through the use of 
equivalisation scales. However, any such economies of scale accrue from any group 
of people living together and imply that these other living arrangements, such as 
cohabitation, should be treated like marriage. That is, the economies of scale 
argument cannot just be used to justify penalties solely for married couples. 
It could also be argued that it is more difficult for a single mother to gain paid 
work than for a partner in a couple. The former is likely to want part-time work, 
which in turn is likely to be lower paid and the marriage penalty could be viewed 
as compensating for this. That is, couples tend to be better-off than single mothers 
so they are better able to cope with lower tax credits and benefits. There is, then, 
an element of equity in having marriage penalties in the tax and transfer system.
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Moreover, a two adult household in comparison to a single person household 
benefits from the time that the second person can devote to the household and 
this has a monetary value. For instance, one partner in a two-parent family can 
undertake childcare, and whilst this is unpaid work, it has an implied monetary 
value in that unlike the single parent situation childcare need not be purchased. 
Higher benefits for lone parents therefore to some extent compensate for the need 
to buy in services that a two-parent family can obtain through specialisation. 
In addition, eradicating marriage penalties might be expensive and not 
cost-effective;	 especially	 as	 they	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 a	 major	 impact	 on	
behaviour. Whether the removal of marriage penalties would be cost-effective 
is unknown as there appears to be no published research in this area. However, 
the conceptual model outlined in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.1) posited that the 
welfare system could affect family structure through employment and family 
income. Policies that generate sustainable employment for (unskilled) men 
possibly have more of an effect on marriage decisions (Burstein, 2007:419) than 
would the removal of marriage penalties. Moreover, improving women’s earnings 
and educational attainment/employment prospects may increase the stability of 
marriages (Burstein, 2007:419). 
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, achieving marriage neutrality is problematic if 
Government’s want to target financial support on low-income couples with children 
and the unit of assessment for benefits and tax credits is the household rather 
than the individual (see also Brewer, 2007:217-220). Moffitt et al. (1998:272) 
highlight that where policy treats married and unmarried families or children in 
non-cohabiting and cohabiting families differently there is a trade-off between 
neutrality and equity. Neutrality requires that, say, people’s decisions about 
cohabiting should not be encouraged or discouraged by public policy. However, 
equity considerations might lead governments to compensate children in single 
parent families more than those in cohabiting couples, because the latter may 
have additional income or lower household expenses per person (see discussion 
previously). But if benefit payments are lower for children in cohabiting families 
compared to non-cohabiting families this undermines the neutrality principle.
5.4.2 Reducing marriage penalties
The literature does, however, contain some proposals for reducing marriage 
penalties that can be used individually or in combination:
•	 Change	the	unit	of	assessment	from	the	‘family’	to	the	individual.
 Marriage penalties arise in part from having the ‘family’ (or benefit unit) as 
the unit of assessment in the welfare system.56 Penalties could be tackled by 
introducing individual (rather than household) based benefits and tax credits 
(Carasso and Steuerle, 2005:170-1). There would then be no financial incentive 
for single motherhood – the single mother and the mother in a couple would 
56 Individualising benefits is also a policy option touched on by David Freud in 
his review of welfare to work (Freud, 2007:103-104).
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receive the same amount of benefit/tax credit. This would imply, for example, 
changing the unit of assessment for WTC from the household to the individual. 
Thus, adults in two earner households would have separate claims for WTC. 
A variant of this is that total family income is allocated for tax purposes to 
dependants, and each ‘slice’ would be taxed as the income of that individual 
(Morgan, 2007:149). 
 However, this would undermine vertical equity considerations and the targeting 
of support on those with a low-income, as two mothers with the same nominal 
income might receive the same amount of credit but one lives with a partner 
on a high income and the other does not (see Adam et al.,	2002:15-16;	Brewer,	
2007:218;	Moffitt,	2003:333).	Whereas	the	UK	has:
‘… a tax and benefit system that redistributes income to couples who have a 
low combined income, rather than to individuals who have a low individual 
income.’
Brewer (2007:218)
 Individualisation might also reduce tax revenues, and increase administrative 
and compliance costs (Alm et al., 1999:203). The change in the assessment unit 
might also make the system even more complex to users. 
 In addition, individualising tax and benefits may be inappropriate if adults in 
the same household share their resources to some extent and benefit from 
economies of scale. The choice of unit assessment also has important implications 
for the financial autonomy of individuals in partnerships. Whether the unit for 
assessment for taxes and benefits for couples should be their joint or individual 
incomes will partly depend upon views about whether families do, or ought to, 
share resources. 
•	 Transferable	allowance.
 Tax penalties could be tackled by introducing a transferable tax allowance 
for	 couples	 (Beighton	 and	 Draper,	 2007:14-18);	 a	 variant	 of	 this	 would	 be	
to restrict the measure to only married couples rather than those cohabiting 
(Brewer, 2007:217). Individuals in couples would be allowed to transfer the 
unused part of their personal allowance to their partner (Brewer, 2007:228-
230).	 This	 proposal	would	benefit	one-earner	 families	with	 children;	 indeed,	
it would reduce the incentive for one-earner couples to become two-earner 
households. To contain costs to the Treasury, the ability to transfer allowances 
might be limited to families with children aged under a certain age (say, six) and/
or the transferred allowance to the basic rate of taxation.
•	 Target	families	with	children.
 Specific UK proposals include enhancing the tax credits for couple families to 
reduce the ‘couple penalty’ and/or introducing a tax allowance for married 
couples (Beighton and Draper, 2007:14-18). 
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 One tax credit option is to increase WTC for couples with children, which could 
be achieved by increasing the basic credit for couples with children (Brewer, 
2007:226-227) or to create a second credit for an adult within CTC or to 
introduce an income disregard for couples living together (Draper, 2005). Single 
parents would be unaffected by this proposal. It removes the penalty single 
parents face when they cohabit and would assist in combating child poverty. 
It would help one-earner families, but might discourage them from increasing 
their income by working more hours or moving to a job with a higher hourly 
rate.
 As the proposal increases the credit paid to couples with children compared to 
couples without children, it might affect the childbearing decisions of the latter 
(but see Chapter 4). 
 An alternative is to increase WTC for two-earner couples only, for instance, by 
introducing an extra credit for two-earner families (Brewer, 2007:227-228). It 
would have similar impacts on the couple penalty as the previous proposal, 
but would also reduce the incentives for some couples not to increase their 
income. 
 A more radical option is to establish a universal benefit or tax credit system for 
families with children, so that they receive support regardless of marital status 
(Carasso and Steuerle, 2005:170-1). This could be seen as a variation on a ‘Basic 
Income’ scheme, although some argue that the cost of this option would be too 
high (Morgan, 2007:148-149).
It is possible that there is a feedback mechanism with family structure affecting 
labour supply decisions. Changes to the tax and transfer systems to make them 
more marriage/couple ‘friendly’ might affect work incentives (Brewer, 2007:219). 
In particular, the work incentives for the first earner in a couple can differ from 
those for a second earner (see also Buffeteau and Échevin, 2008:2-3). Thus, 
changes to marriage penalties to make the welfare system marriage neutral might 
have adverse effects on work incentives.
If union/marriage penalties are retained in the UK welfare system, then arguably 
the Government’s should communicate more clearly the reasons for the differences 
in benefits for married and single households (Burstein, 2007:419).
5.4.3 Policy options for reducing (non-marital) childbearing
The US-style family cap policy conflicts with fundamental principles of UK social 
policy including policies to reduce child poverty. However, there are options in the 
literature that may be more applicable to the UK. These include:
Short-term
•	 Improve	sex	education	in	schools.	
•	 Improve	contraceptive	take	up.
•	 Improve	access	to	early	abortion.
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Longer term
•	 Increase	employment	opportunities	for	client	groups	(females	and	males).
•	 Increase	 opportunities	 for	 further	 education	 for	 client	 groups	 (females	 and	
males).
However, Geronimus (1997:406) questions the merit of placing the reduction of 
teenage childbearing as an important goal of welfare reform: 
‘… welfare reformers focus narrowly on teenage childbearing and leave 
unexamined other important causes of persistent poverty. There is no doubt 
that teenage childbearing is associated with many social and public health 
problems. And high rates of teenage childbearing in socioeconomically 
disadvantaged communities likely result from the severe limits placed on 
the options available to the young for pursuing important goals. But none 
of these observations leads necessarily to the conclusion that reducing 
teenage childbearing itself, in the absence of other social changes, is either 
an attainable goal or one that would result in other social improvements. In 
targeting teen childbearing as a major activity for welfare reform, the basic 
question of cause and effect is consistently glossed over by policy makers 
and advocates.’
Geronimus (1997:409)
The question Geronimus argues policy makers need to address is: 
‘Would social problems be alleviated if the same women who become teen 
mothers postponed childbearing to older ages?’
Geronimus (1997:409)
The social force that determines labour market successes, according to Geronimus 
(1997), is inequality. In predominantly African American poor urban populations, 
which Geronimus (1997) suggests are some of the very populations where 
early childbearing gives rise to ‘most concern in the general population’ – the 
probability of premature death appears to be so high that teenagers who live in 
these areas cannot be confident that they will survive in to middle age. Geronimus 
(1997) cites figures showing that, for example, more than one-third of Harlem or 
Chicago south side women die by the age of 65 while less than three-quarters of 
Harlem or Chicago south side men survive to age 45 compared to 95 per cent of 
white males. In Harlem and Chicago south side, 15 year old men have less chance 
of surviving to the age of 45 than a typical white 15 year old American male has 
of living to be age 65. Geronimus (1997:423) suggests that premature death 
from chronic diseases, rather than the more widely publicised incidences of gang 
violence, are the primary reasons.
Geronimus (1997:426) suggests that if responsible parenthood includes maximising 
the chance that a parent will survive to see and help her child grow up, then 
insecurity about one’s own longevity would be a serious consideration when 
deciding whether to defer parenthood.
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The perspective that teenage childbearing represents trade-offs made in order 
to maximise children’s well-being in hard circumstances may also explain why 
early childbearing has continued in extremely disadvantaged communities, 
despite increased access to contraception and abortion and in the face of public 
disapproval. It would also suggest that it may continue to exist in the face of 
welfare reform (Geronimus, 1997:426).
5.4.4 Welfare systems and modern living arrangements
This review touches on complex issues that transcend the public and private 
realms. In policy terms, a welfare system that was not neutral towards different 
living arrangements would have to trade-off this stance against vertical and/or 
horizontal equity. The benefit and tax credit system is probably more effectively 
and efficiently directed at dealing with issues of equity than it is at steering 
demographic choices. This is not to deny that the welfare system can have a 
modest effect on family structure, but that demographic behaviour is possibly 
better guided by other policy instruments. So whilst there is some evidence that 
many single parents aspire to marriage, the introduction of marriage friendly 
welfare policies may be less relevant – even less cost-effective - than policies that 
seek to help welfare recipients fulfil their pro-marriage desires. 
More pragmatically, nowadays there is a wide range of family types (see Williams, 
2005). If the wider context for social policy is a long-term decline in the rate of 
marriage, then (irrespective of whether policy makers believe that the trend can 
be influenced by the tax and benefit system) the case for using martial status in 
determining tax liability and benefit receipt is questionable. Arguably, the tax and 
benefit system needs to accommodate changes in family structure, with – if desired 
– other policy instruments steering demographic behaviour. Welfare systems are 
probably more suited to addressing other policy goals, such as tackling poverty 
and increasing the employment rate. 
This does not mean that demographic behaviour should be ignored by welfare 
system policy makers. On the contrary, Carasso and Steuerle (2005:159) suggest 
that because policies are implemented piecemeal, there is ‘… little coordination 
or thought to how they affect married couples.’ The implication is that the policy 
making process should be more holistic in considering the impacts of initiatives on 
family structure (see also Dixon and Margo, 2006:42-43). 
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5.5 Overview
The implications of the review are, of necessity, limited because how welfare 
systems affect demographic behaviour is not fully understood. In attempting to 
gauge the impact of welfare systems on family structure international evidence is 
of limited value because of key policy and local/national differences with the UK. 
Nonetheless, the literature does include policy options for removing marriage 
penalties and reducing births. However, the case for using the welfare system to 
influence demographic decisions is unproven as it may not be cost-effective, as well 
as being at the expense of other policy goals, such as tackling work disincentives 
in order to combat poverty and social exclusion.
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6 Conclusions
Summary
The impact of the welfare system on family structure is contested – and the 
empirical evidence provides mixed findings. Identifying any impact is also 
complicated by the analytical methods used. 
There are implications arising from the review for future United Kingdom (UK) 
research and how any further research is carried out. There is a gap in the UK 
evidence base. There is a need for research that is more up-to-date in terms 
of policies covered, that has the potential to provide estimates of longer-term 
impacts and allows extensive sub-group analyses.
Researching the effects of the welfare system on family structure is difficult 
because establishing the causal mechanisms is problematic. Studies are 
complicated by the influence of other (unobserved) factors and the need for 
extensive sub-group analyses due to differential impacts of welfare systems 
on family structure.
The review finds mixed evidence that financial incentives in welfare systems 
affect family structure. Whilst there are studies finding significant impacts, 
these tend to be small and are countered by studies finding no relationship 
or the opposite effect. Overall, there is no consistent and robust evidence to 
support claims that the welfare system has a significant impact upon family 
structure.
6.1 Introduction
There are public and policy concerns about the impact of welfare systems on 
family structure. Even though welfare systems provide support to elderly and 
disabled people, the focus of this concern and of the research reviewed here is on 
the demographic behaviour of the non-disabled, working age population with a 
low-income (Hoynes, 1997b:101). There is in particular a sizeable body of United 
States (US) literature exploring the impact of Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) on family structure, notably on single motherhood arising from 
non-marital births.
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This review shows that the impact of welfare systems on family structure is 
contested. Moffitt (1998b:67-68) conducted a major review of the US literature 
and shows that during the 1970s the research suggests that the welfare system 
had no effect on marriage and childbearing. However, during the 1980s and 1990s 
there was a consensus that it did have an effect (a negative effect on marriage 
and	a	positive	effect	on	fertility);	albeit	the	magnitude	of	that	effect	was	uncertain	
with some claiming it was small and others that it was sizeable (Moffitt, 1998a:1 
and 1998b:50). Moffitt’s review also shows differences by race. A further theme 
emerging in his review is that in part these results seem to reflect the analytical 
method used, and the more the analyst controlled for unobserved heterogeneity 
the more likely the welfare effect was to be weaker, even insignificant (Moffitt, 
1998b:71). Moffitt’s 1998 review of non-experimental studies (see Appendix C) 
concluded that:
‘A neutral reading of the evidence still leads to the conclusion that welfare 
has incentive effects on marriage and fertility, but uncertainty introduced 
by the disparities in the research findings weakens the strength of that 
conclusion.’
Moffitt (1998b:75)
However, in a later review Moffitt modifies his position slightly - notwithstanding 
uncertainty in the literature and a number of studies reporting insignificant results, 
he concludes welfare ‘is likely to have some effect on family structure’. (Moffitt, 
2003:336). However, studies that incorporate controls for unobserved individual-
level variables (for instance, Hoynes (1997a) and González (2007)) find no welfare 
effect and together with other studies, such as the meta-analysis by Gennetian 
and Knox (2003), suggest that even Moffitt’s tentative conclusion overstates the 
impact.57 On balance, this review concludes that there is no strong evidence of a 
persistent	and	large	impact	by	welfare	systems	on	family	structure;	albeit	individual	
studies can be identified where a significant and large effect is found.
Although some contend that welfare systems impact upon family structure, across 
countries there is no consistent empirical evidence that demographic behaviour is 
influenced by benefit and tax credit systems. When significant effects are found 
they tend to be relatively small or modest. Bitler et al. (2004:214) commenting on 
the US literature observe:
‘Overall, the estimated effects of welfare are relatively small in magnitude 
and cannot explain the secular decline in U.S. marriage rates and rise in 
divorce rates since the 1960s, during which average real welfare benefits 
declined …’
This comment by Bitler et al. (2004) appears to be anomalous with the traditional 
economic orthodoxy which would imply larger effects. This might be for 
methodological	reasons,	as	the	review	shows	it	is	a	difficult	area	to	analyse;	for	
theoretical reasons, there are ambiguities with the theory (see Sections 1.5 and 
57 An earlier version of the Hoynes’ (1997a) paper is included in the Moffitt 
review (1988b).
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5.2);	 for	 policy	 reasons,	maybe	 the	 incentives	 are	 not	 large	 enough	 to	 have	 a	
significant	effect;	or	for	behavioural	reasons,	financial	 incentives	may	have	little	
influence on individuals’ demographic decisions. 
It could be argued that the modest impacts on demographic behaviour reported 
in earlier chapters are because the incentives within the welfare system were not 
large enough. After all, in practise, the policies’ financial incentives have been 
primarily designed to enhance recipients’ employment prospects and earnings, 
not to affect family structures. However, it is difficult to identify the size of the 
incentive that would be required to affect demographic behaviour given the 
ambiguous nature and small size of the effects reported. 
Moreover, the studies ignore the quality of family life. There is no attempt to 
capture the quality of a familial relationship (marriage or cohabitation) or a child’s 
early years. Even if financial incentives were large enough to influence demographic 
behaviour there is no certainty that, for society as a whole, the quality of family 
life would be improved.
Much of the literature assumes that financial incentives affect people’s choices. 
So, for instance, the theory underlying the family cap is that financial incentives 
and penalties are important determinants of behaviour and can be included in 
welfare arrangements to influence and control (poor) women’s decisions to have 
children (Kearney, 2004:296). However, people may not respond in the way in 
which	theories	predict;	people	may	not	engage	in	rational	behaviour	in	order	to	
maximise their utility (Lewis, 2007:8). Evidence on the impact of work incentives 
on employment decisions can be used to support the case that the welfare system 
impacts upon family structure. However, decisions on demographic behaviour are 
arguably more complex and far-reaching than those about whether to increase 
hours of work or to accept a job offer. When asked, people do not necessarily 
identify financial matters as influencing decisions on family structure. For instance, 
the most common (unprompted) reason cited by clients of the Child Support 
Agency (CSA) for their relationship breakdown was that their partner had been 
seeing someone else (Wikeley et al.,	2001:38);	and	none	claimed	it	would	make	
them better-off financially (Henshaw, 2006:21). 
The review findings also need to be considered against a background in which 
families are more fluid and dynamic. As non-traditional family forms become 
more common they are less stigmatised, and in such a milieu people may be less 
responsive in their demographic behaviour to financial incentives.
6.2 Research implications
The review has a number of implications for future research on welfare systems 
and demographic behaviour. These are discussed in this section.
Conclusions
130
6.2.1 Further research
The review shows that there is a need for further research on welfare systems 
and family structures. There are studies of the impact of the UK welfare system 
on family structure, but compared to the US the number of analyses is small. 
The varied nature of the US evidence suggests that more UK-based analyses are 
required to test the reliability of existing findings. Moreover, the UK evidence does 
not	relate	to	the	current	welfare	system;	there	is	little	on	the	impact	of	Working	
Tax Credit (WTC). There remains a lack of evidence on the effect of recent welfare-
to-work programmes on family formation and childbearing (Mauldon et al., 
2002). Thus there is a need for further up-to-date UK studies that, over time, 
could provide evidence on longer-term impacts of the tax and transfer systems 
on family structure. Moreover, sample sizes for UK studies need to be sufficiently 
large to allow for detailed sub-group analyses as impacts are known to vary by 
sub-group (see ahead).
The reviewed (US) studies have tended to focus on the generosity of the welfare 
system – the level of benefits, rather than other aspects of the system, such as 
disregards and other support services (Moffitt, 1998b:57). However, these features 
might be of interest to policy makers because they might affect people’s behaviour. 
Further work on these ‘components’ of the welfare system, and not just benefit 
amounts, might be useful. 
6.2.2 Undertaking research on welfare systems and family   
 structure
The studies reviewed also demonstrate that the analysis of the effect of tax and 
transfer systems on family structure is problematic. This is because (Carasso and 
Steuerle, 2005:161):
•	 It	is	difficult	to	establish	empirically	a	causal	link	between	financial	incentives	in	
the welfare system and demographic behaviour. Critically, even if, say, a couple 
calculate a possible marriage penalty (or bonus) before they marry this offers 
only limited evidence that it actually affected their decision to marry (or not). 
Conversely, even if people do not rationally calculate the financial implications 
of marrying they may still effectively be responding to incentives because they 
observe that unmarried couples have a higher standard of living (Carasso and 
Steuerle, 2005:161).
•	 Variables	or	factors	other	than	financial	incentives	affect	behaviour.
 Specifically, an individual’s social and cultural context may be a more influential 
determinant of behaviour than the welfare system. For example,
‘Empirically identifying the effects of policy on demographic outcomes is 
particularly challenging: The decision to marry or cohabit is influenced by 
a set of difficult-to-observe factors, including social and community norms 
and personal tastes and preferences.’
Harknett and Gennetian (2003:451)
Conclusions
131
 In the words of Gennetian and Knox (2003:9):
‘Other factors such as community norms, culture or the local social policy 
context, including the dominant religion of the community and the stigma 
or acceptability of being a single parent, may also shape the influence of any 
change in women’s economic circumstances on marital behaviour. If these 
important influences vary systematically for different identifiable subgroups 
of families, they may cause different effects on marriage for different 
identifiable subgroups … However, because we do not fully understand how 
local context, economic opportunity structures, cultural norms and other 
factors affect marital decisions, these influences may lead to variations in 
impacts across families, sites, or studies that are difficult to explain.’
 Inconsistent findings from social experiments in the US suggest that context is 
important – variations in findings can be attributed to the influence of political, 
social, cultural and economic factors operating at each site. The implication is 
that benefits and tax credits may have less of an impact on family structures 
than basic economic theory would suggest. Or, if individuals do respond to 
economic incentives the effect is influenced by local ‘contextual’ factors.
•	 There	are	complex	interactions	between	a	number	of	tax	and	welfare	programmes	
that affect the financial impacts on households. Yet some analyses focus on one 
aspect rather than the combined effects of the tax and transfer systems. For 
instance, studies on the effects of union bonuses and penalties on marriage 
rates tend to ignore the effect of tax incentives on childbearing, yet these may 
also encourage marriage (see Rosenbaum, 2000).
•	Much	of	the	analysis	reported	here	is	focused	on	women’s	behaviour,	but	this	
may only provide a part of the explanation (Ellwood and Jencks, 2004:11). 
Research that explored the responses of both men and women might provide 
useful insights. The US literature in particular has focused on female headship 
rather than other forms of living arrangements that may involve single parents, 
such as cohabitation, ‘sub-families’, and single mothers doubling up within a 
household (typically a mother and daughter sharing a house) (Winkler, 1993).
•	 A	related	point	 is	 that	not	all	studies	carry	out	extensive	sub-group	analyses.	
Welfare systems might be expected to have differential impacts on demographic 
behaviour (Moffitt, 1998b:54). Whilst the overall effects may be small or 
insignificant, several studies do show that impacts vary by sub-group. The 
study by Moffitt et al. (1998) strongly suggests that where welfare systems 
treat cohabiting couples differently from married couples (for instance, different 
eligibility rules for stepfathers and cohabiting males unrelated to the children) 
then researchers need to distinguish between married and cohabiting couples. 
Harknett and Gennetian (2003:458) also argue that studies should distinguish 
between marriage and cohabitation, because the reasons for entry to, and the 
duration of, cohabitation may differ from that for marriage. Indeed, the effects 
of the welfare system on single people may be different from those on married 
couples (Bitler et al., 2004:232). For instance, the impact of welfare systems 
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on the fertility decisions of single parents are likely to differ from those on 
couples (Brewer et al., 2007:31). Gennetian and Knox (2003:9) go further and 
suggest that findings for populations mask important differences between sub-
groups and variations in impacts by, for example, duration of claim (recent vs. 
longer-term recipients), age of mother, age and number of children, prior marital 
status and ethic origin should be explored. For example, it might be expected 
that, for those already in receipt of benefits, changes to the system could affect 
second and subsequent fertility decisions whereas this is less likely for those 
flowing onto benefits. In addition, analyses of childbearing tend to focus on the 
birth of the first child rather than on subsequent births. Yet a full understanding 
of the effect of financial incentives on family structure needs to include birth 
order and parents’ decisions about having further children (see Brewer et al., 
2007:32). Similarly, welfare systems might have more of an impact on re-
marriage decisions than on divorce/separation decisions which may be more 
influenced by other factors. 
•	 A	possible	 reason	 for	 the	 absence	of	 large	 effects	 in	 the	 reviewed	 literature	
could be that there is a considerable lag between a benefit/tax initiative and 
it affecting demographic behaviour. In general, the studies do not measure 
longer-term	effects;	and	longer	observation	periods	may	be	required	especially	
for studies of the impacts of welfare systems on fertility (Fein et al., 2002:6). 
Gassman-Pines and Yoshikawa (2006:25) who find a significant and large 
impact (8.9 percentage points) for the New Hope project on the marriage of 
never-married women at year five argue that, to detect changes in demographic 
behaviour, longer follow-up periods are required. However, welfare and fiscal 
policies change over time making it difficult to establish any longer-term impact 
on family structure (Carasso and Steuerle, 2005:161).
•	 The	US	research	in	particular	shows	the	importance	of	controlling	for	economic	
variables (for example, local wage rates) in the analyses (Harknett and Gennetian, 
2003:456). 
The review has highlighted that findings can vary by analytical method. As Moffitt 
(1998b:50-51) observes this is problematic because:
‘Whether the differences in study findings are the result of inherent differences 
in different datasets or differences in the way the data are analyzed for 
example, in estimating techniques, definitions of variables, characteristics 
of the individuals examined, other influences controlled for, and so on is 
difficult to determine because most authors do not systematically attempt to 
determine why their findings differ from those of other studies.’
Nonetheless, the lesson for the UK is that adequate controls for unobserved variables 
need to be included in non-experimental and quasi-experimental studies.
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In addition, the data requirements for studies are demanding. To investigate if 
welfare systems affect actual behaviour, longitudinal (panel) data are required. 
Data with sufficient in-group variation are required to control for unobserved 
variables, and to allow for changes over time, trend data are also required. Repeat 
cross-sectional data may be used, but will not allow fixed effects at the individual 
level to be included in the analysis. 
6.3 Final thoughts
In conclusion, this review finds mixed evidence that financial incentives in welfare 
systems substantially affect family structure. Whilst there are studies recording 
significant impacts, these tend to be small and are countered by studies finding 
no relationship or a negative effect. Overall, there is no strong evidence to 
support claims that the welfare system is responsible for the breakdown of the 
traditional family. This is not to say that individual studies could not be highlighted 
to demonstrate the contrary position, but that the balance of evidence is that 
welfare systems have only a small impact on family structure. In particular the 
magnitude of the impact is not as large as might be predicted by ‘traditional’ 
economic theory. This is not to deny the existence of financial incentives, such 
as marriage bonuses and penalties in the welfare system, but that, on balance, 
other factors appear to be more important in affecting demographic behaviour. 
There are two caveats to this conclusion, first, it is based on a reading of selected 
literature;	this	was	not	a	systematic	review	nor	did	it	involve	a	meta-analysis,	and	
secondly, the observation that other factors may be more crucial is in part based 
on findings from non-UK countries. The implication of, for instance, making tax 
and transfer policies more ‘pro-marriage’ is that any changes would be largely 
symbolic and the actual effect on behaviour would be small. Any changes would 
essentially be a ‘statement of values’ (Burstein, 2007:419). 
Policies that appear to have a bigger impact on demographic behaviour than the 
welfare system include family planning and counselling services. (However, this 
review has not examined the literature on the effectiveness of these policies.) This 
does not mean that welfare-to-work programmes have no role to play, as promoting 
participants’ employment and income, especially those of less skilled males, can 
help provide a secure financial setting that makes marriage and childbearing more 
feasible for low-income households (see Del Bono, 2004:17). 
There are policy trade-offs in the objectives for the tax and benefit systems (Brewer, 
2007;	O’Donoghue	 and	 Sutherland,	 1999).	 Being	 ‘neutral’	 towards	 the	 family	
implies trade-offs with, for example, maintaining progressivity, treating families 
with similar total incomes the same, introducing complexity into the tax and 
benefit systems, and so on. Changing the benefit and tax system to, say, remove 
marriage penalties, could also have implications for work incentives for financially 
dependent partners and for targeting financial support to low-income families 
with children (see Brewer, 2007 and O’Donoghue and Sutherland, 1999). Thus, 
using welfare systems to promote specific demographic behaviours may involve 
trade-offs with other policy objectives.
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Another key conclusion, however, is the paucity of ‘hard evidence’ for the UK on 
how financial incentives affect demographic norms, attitudes and behaviour. As 
the impact of the welfare system on family structure is likely to remain a topic of 
policy and public debate, welfare-related research and evaluations should, as a 
matter of routine, incorporate detailed demographic variables for analysis.
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Appendix A 
Non-experimental methods of 
analysis
The main non-experimental methodologies used to identify the impact of welfare 
systems	on	demographic	behaviour	are	as	follows	(Hoynes,	1997a:92-94;	Moffitt,	
1998b:57-59;	Moffitt,	2003:336):
•	 Regression	analyses	are	used	 to	exploit	 cross-sectional	data	on	differences	 in	
benefits between states to measure the welfare effect (see Moffitt, 1994 and 
1998a;	 Schultz,	 1994).	 These	 analyses	 model	 the	 outcome	 variable	 (usually	
marriage or fertility) as a function of individual characteristics, the level of State 
welfare	benefits	and,	less	often,	other	state	characteristics	(Hoynes,	1997a:92;	
Moffitt, 1998b:58). However, the estimated impact of the welfare system 
will be biased if there are any omitted state factors, such as social norms or 
religious characteristics, that are correlated with both family structure decisions 
or (through voter preferences) state welfare policies (Ellwood and Bane, 1985, 
cited	 in	Hoynes,	 1997a:91;	Hoynes,	 1997b:129;	Kearney	 2004:299;	Moffitt,	
1994;	 Ribar,	 2003:1).	 Indeed,	 social	 norms	 and	 cultural	 factors	 are	 likely	 to	
affect demographic behaviour and possibly welfare policy. Hoynes (1997a:93) 
notes:
‘… if the population in a given state believes strongly in the two-parent 
family, the state may not have much support for an Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) progam and, hence, it may offer low benefits. 
…. In general, if the unmeasured effects are positively (negatively) correlated 
with welfare benefits then the estimated welfare effect will overestimate 
(underestimate) the true effect.’
 Yet these socio-cultural factors are often unrecorded in analysts’ datasets, and 
so cannot be simply added to the statistical models (see also Ribar, 2003:12-
14). The inclusion of indirect measures might reduce bias, but some bias will 
remain. 
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 A possible further weakness of this approach is that the analyses do not provide 
information on the timing of demographic transition (Morgan, 2007:96). 
 On the other hand, if demographic behaviour takes a long time to respond to 
the welfare system it is possible that this ‘comparison-of-levels’ approach (unlike 
the approached to be discussed ahead) measures this longer term response 
(Moffitt, 1998b:59). 
•	 Panel	data	or	repeated	cross-sectional	data	can	be	pooled	to	model	variations	
in benefits over time using regression analysis (Moffitt, 1994 and 1998b:58). 
These are often called ‘fixed effects’ models and they capture unobserved factors 
common to all residents of a country, region or state, such as state divorce laws 
or support services and characteristics of potential spouses. The welfare effect 
in a state fixed effect model is captured by within state variation (or changes) 
in benefits over time, which is compared with changes in, say, marriage and 
fertility. The advantage of this approach is that the analyst does not have to 
specify exactly which variables are missing, only the structure of the omitted 
variable (Ribar, 2003:19). Moffitt (1998b:58) provides an example:
‘… the low AFDC benefit levels and high marriage rates in most southern 
states may not be a reflection of a true welfare effect but may instead reflect 
the fact that the South is socially a relatively conservative region where 
social and cultural norms encourage marriage, as well as being a relatively 
conservative region politically where elected representatives do not legislate 
generous welfare benefits. … [A] positive correlation between benefit levels 
and marriage (for example) would arise because there is a third variable 
social, cultural, and political norms that leads to them both, not because 
benefits affect marriage.’
 It is important that the omitted variables are time-invariant and that within the 
data there are variations over time in the observed indicators. The method does 
not deal with omitted variables that are time varying – thus it is assumed that 
the omitted variables, for instance, social norms have not changed over time. So 
state fixed effects control for unobserved variables that vary across states (but 
not over time). 
 If demographic behaviours do not respond fairly quickly to changes in benefits 
and tax credits then datasets covering a relatively long period of time are required 
to capture changes. If such data are not available then this approach may only 
capture short-term responses to changes in benefits and tax credits (Moffitt, 
1998b:59). However, if data are available for long periods of time, it might not 
be justifiable to assume that state effects are fixed throughout the observation 
period.
 Compared to cross-section designs the inclusion of fixed effects, which provide 
increased control for unobserved variable, can reduce the significance and 
magnitude, even the direction, of any impact of welfare systems on family 
structure (see, for instance, Moffitt, 1994). 
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 Models with state fixed effects also tend to include year fixed effects. These 
effects control for average changes in, say, marriage or divorce within a given 
year that are common to all areas (say, states). 
•	 There	may	also	be	 individual	effects	that	are	unobserved	and	correlated	with	
welfare policy, especially if the data have to cover a relatively long period of time. 
In a pooled cross-sectional model these individual effects may be correlated 
with the generosity of the state’s welfare system and arise through inter-state 
migration and changes in the composition of the sample. The use of panel 
data enables the identification of welfare, state and individual effects (Hoynes, 
1997a:91). Analysing individual effects requires a panel dataset in order to 
control for changes in the composition of the sample over time. To the extent 
that studies do not control for individual effects, but only state effects then they 
may be biased through inter-state migration and sample attrition and entry. The 
individual effects capture time-invariant unobserved variables at the level of the 
individual.
•	Within	 state	 studies	using	 a	determinant	of	 benefits	 that	does	not	 correlate	
with family structure. These studies require recipients to be offered different 
levels of benefit or involve comparisons between those eligible and not eligible 
for welfare benefits. The problem in practice is that differences in benefit levels 
are usually associated with a demographic characteristic so finding suitable 
explanatory variables is difficult.
•	 There	have	been	a	small	number	of	time-series	studies	that	attempt	to	explore	
the contribution of the welfare system to observed falling rates of marriage and 
increasing rates of nonmarital childbearing (Moffitt, 1998b:55-56). A number 
of US researchers (for instance, Hoynes, 1997b:125-126) have observed that if 
financial incentives affect family formation then the observed fall in the real value 
of welfare benefits (especially AFDC since the mid-1960s) should be associated 
with declines in female headship and non-marital births, but instead they have 
continued to increase. Suggesting that factors other than financial incentives 
are operating to influence demographic behaviour. However, controlling for all 
the possible factors that change over time is very difficult. Even though the 
fixed effects analyses mentioned previously require longitudinal (at least, repeat 
cross-section) data, analysts have tended not to conduct time-series analyses. 
Indeed, they typically include dummy variables for years in regressions in order 
to eliminate the influence of time trends (that is, to control for year effects). 
In summary, the main non-experimental methods used (primarily in the US) seek 
to investigate whether there is a welfare effect on family structure by using 
variations in benefits between individuals within states, between states and 
between	 states	 over	 time	 (Hoynes,	 1997b:124;	 Moffitt,	 1998b:57).	 However,	
the source of variation and the controls for unobserved heterogeneity that are 
used affect the reported significance and magnitude of the welfare effect on 
demographical behaviour. In addition, using variation arising from state and over 
time differences only provide information on the marginal effects of the welfare 
system on family formation. They do provide estimates of how the very existence 
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of tax and transfer programmes affect demographic behaviour. Thus these studies 
‘… are limited in their ability to make predictions about eliminating programs.’ 
(Hoynes, 1997b:124). This is important since policy makers might wish to know 
the consequences of cancelling a programme. However, such information may be 
gained from experimental research designs. 
However, for studies of childbearing there are further analytical issues. Geronimus 
(1997) argues that studies employing standard multivariate techniques to control 
for specified, measurable background characteristics are likely to overestimate the 
negative consequences of teen childbearing. She suggests more accurate findings 
can be derived from comparing sisters, which in effect controls for factors such as 
general access to resources during childhood, cultural environment, neighbourhood 
and school system but not personal antecedents of early childhood and is likely 
to produce estimates of effects of teenage childbearing on subsequent economic 
success that are still upwardly biased but which highlight the extent to which 
unobserved factors associated with family background account for poor economic 
fortunes of teen mothers. (Geronimus, 1997:411). 
Geronimus (1997) suggests that a better approach than using sisters is to 
compare outcomes for teenage mothers and teenagers who get pregnant but 
miscarry which, she suggests, effectively randomly allocates motherhood to teens. 
Geronimus (1997) argues that for key economic outcomes bearing directly on the 
question of long-term economic self-sufficiency, findings from studies using these 
methods challenge the assumptions upon which policy is based. These studies 
reduce effects estimated by more traditional methods by at least 50 per cent and 
in some cases find no independent effect of teenage childbearing on important 
economic outcomes. Geronimus and Korenman (1992, cited by Geronimus, 
1997:412) reported no relationship between teen childbearing and high school 
graduation or subsequent family income in their analysis of sister pairs in the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women. Using more recent data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Corcoran and Kunz (1997, cited by Geronimus, 
1997:412) found teen mothers to be no more likely to be welfare recipients after 
the age of 25 than their sisters who became mothers at older ages (Geronimus, 
1997:412).
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Appendix B 
UK studies modelling the 
amount and distribution of 
union bonuses and penalties 
The focus of this review is to explore the actual impact of welfare systems on 
family structure. Some analysts model the size and distribution of union bonuses 
and penalties but not whether they subsequently affect behaviour. This appendix 
outlines two such United Kingdom (UK) studies by Anderberg et al. (2008) and 
Draper (2008). They provide some information on who is likely to be affected 
as well as estimates of the size of any bonus or penalty. However, their findings 
should be considered in light of the criticisms made of this approach in Section 
1.6.1.
Anderberg et al. (2008) use Family Resource Survey data 1995-2004 to simulate 
partnership or union bonuses and penalties by comparing what couples aged 
20-60 would receive in welfare transfers when living together and apart.58 The 
welfare payments included in the analysis are Family Credit (FC), Income Support 
(IS), tax credits, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit (HB/CTB). The tax credits 
considered are WFTC and WTC/CTC.59 
In general, Anderberg et al. (2008:3) report that:
•	 Reforms	to	IS	(the	increases	to	the	then	child	premia	in	1999	and	their	transfer	to	
CTC from 2003) meant that the union penalty in IS increased (from an average 
of £67.90 per week in 1996 to £78.80 in 2001) and then diminished (to an 
average of £44 per week in 2004) (Anderberg et al., 2008:6 and 11).
58 This study appears to be a development of earlier research by Anderberg 
(2007).
59 The Children’s Tax Credit is included in WFTC.
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•	 Tax	 credits	generate	partnership	bonuses	 for	 some	couples	and	penalties	 for	
others. 
•	 The	majority	of	couples	were	affected	by	partnership	bonuses	or	penalties.	An	
analysis of three selected years (1996, 2001 and 2004) to represent the Family 
Credit (FC), WFTC and WTC/CTC regimes respectively shows that in general 
around 90 per cent of couples faced a partnership penalty (Anderberg et al., 
2008:9-11).60 Less than one in ten had a partnership bonus.61 Furthermore, 
under the WTC/CTC/benefit system more couples faced a partnership penalty 
compared with the WFTC/benefit system (an increase of six percentage points). 
This increase was driven by a dramatic increase in the proportion of couples 
facing a tax credit partnership penalty – an increase from 28 per cent in 2001 to 
64 per cent in 2004. (In contrast, the proportion of couples facing a partnership 
penalty due to Income Support fell slightly from 28 per cent in 2001 to 26 per 
cent in 2004.) Similarly, under the WTC/CTC regime fewer couples faced an 
overall tax credit/benefit partnership bonus (a decrease of 5 percentage points). 
‘Hence the system in 2004 is, on average, less partnership friendly than the 
system in 2001.’ (Anderberg et al., 2008:9). This change is mainly due to policy 
reform (see ahead). 
•	 Often	the	amount	of	the	bonus	or	penalty	is	large.	The	analysis	shows	that	across	
all three selected years 20 per cent of couples had an overall partnership penalty 
of £60 or more per week (Anderberg et al., 2008:9). Moreover, the replacement 
of FC with the more generous WFTC meant than the average size of credit/
benefit partnership bonuses grew – from £7.80 per week to £16.90 per week 
(Anderberg et al., 2008:11). In addition, under the WTC/CTC/benefit system the 
average partnership penalty was larger than under the WFTC/benefit system - 
£46.60 per week compared to £38.10 per week – whilst average partnership 
bonuses were smaller - £13.90 per week under the WTC/CTC/benefit system 
compared to £16.90 per week for the WFTC/benefit. This reduction in overall 
partnership bonuses was largely due to the transfer of IS child premia to CTC. 
For the typical case (man working at least part-time and the woman not in paid 
work), under WFTC the partnership bonus was the entire amount of the couple’s 
tax credit. However, under WTC/CTC if the couple were to separate, the man 
(without care of the children) could be eligible for WTC and the woman would 
receive CTC. Deducting this potential payment from the combined WTC/CTC 
they would obtain as a couple gives the smaller (net) partnership bonuses. 
60	 By	year,	the	proportions	for	partnership	penalties	were:	1996,	87	per	cent;	
2001,	86	per	cent;	and	2004,	93	per	cent	(Anderberg	et al., 2008:11).
61 By year the proportions for couples who faced a bonus were: 1996, eight 
per	 cent;	 2001,	 ten	 per	 cent;	 and	2004,	 five	 per	 cent	 (Anderberg	et al., 
2008:11).
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•	 A	sub-group	analysis	of	the	WFTC/benefit	system	reveals	that	average	weekly	
bonuses and penalties tended to be larger for:
–	 couples	with	children	compared	to	childless	couples;
– women who are economically inactive compared to those working part-time 
or full-time (although the proportion facing a penalty is lower for those not in 
employment	(71	per	cent	compared	to	93	per	cent);
– couples with females aged 30-50 years as younger and older women were 
less	likely	to	have	dependant	children;
– couples with fewer educational qualifications because they were more likely 
to be economically inactive (Anderberg et al., 2008:12-15).
In addition, analysis of the 1999 WFTC/IS reforms and of the introduction of WTC/
CTC shows that the distribution of bonuses and penalties changed over time, 
partly due to these reforms and partly due to demographic changes (such as 
changes in the composition of the population). This analysis entails simulating 
what would have happened had the policy not changed (the counterfactual). 
Changes in partnership bonuses and penalties in this counterfactual will reflect 
compositional changes in the population, whilst actual changes not found in the 
counterfactual scenario will reflect the policy reforms (Anderberg et al., 2008:15). 
In terms of the policy reforms (Anderberg et al., 2008:16-17):
•	 The	introduction	WFTC	and	increases	in	the	child	premia	in	IS	improved	partnership	
bonuses. The reforms increased both the proportion of couples facing a bonus 
and the average amount of the bonus (and decreased the proportion facing a 
penalty, but had no affect on the amount of the average penalty). The increase 
in the average amount of the bonus was due to the greater generosity of WFTC 
compared to FC.
•	 The	WTC/CTC	reform,	however,	was	less	favourable	towards	partnership.	The	
reform decreased both the proportion of couples facing a bonus and the amount 
of the average bonus (and increased both the proportion facing a penalty and 
the size of the penalty). The decrease in the size of the average bonus reflects 
the smaller bonus some couples received from the couple/lone parent element 
of the new tax credit. 
In	both	cases,	these	changes	were	due	to	tax	credit	reform;	the	IS	reforms	did	not	
influence the proportion of couples facing a partnership bonus or penalty.
In terms of demographic changes, an increase in the labour force participation rate 
of women has led to a small increase in the proportion of couples facing partnership 
penalties and a small reduction in the proportion facing bonuses (Anderberg et 
al., 2008:17-19). A consequence of increasing female economic activity is that the 
proportion of couples confronting a penalty due to IS has decreased. However, the 
concomitant change is that there is an increase in the proportion of couples with 
a tax credit penalty.
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The modelling by Anderberg et al. (2008) is based on a number of assumptions, 
including that the supposed union dissolutions do not affect the supply of labour 
(that is, individual earnings), that benefit take-up is 100 per cent, and that the 
woman would remain the primary carer after union dissolution. The analysis 
excluded any couple with adults who were long-term sick or disabled, retired, 
unemployed or self-employed. The modelling also excludes any maintenance 
payments. (Yet Draper (2008) suggests that maintenance payments reduce 
partnership penalties, so this is a significant omission.) The finding outlined above 
must be interpreted in light of these assumptions.
A smaller scale and less comprehensive study by Draper (2008) takes 98 families 
and estimates the difference in disposable incomes after housing costs for couples 
if they live together and apart. Separate estimates before and after maintenance 
payments are also made. However, these are stylised families – unlike the 
Anderberg et al. (2008) analysis they are not actual families (Draper, 2008:8). 
Moreover, the selected families are not a nationally representative sample of familial 
types, although Draper (2008:8) claims that they represent ‘a fair cross-section of 
families’ on average and below average incomes. However, the nature of the 
sample used does limit the generalisability and validity of the study.62 Nonetheless, 
the estimates can be used to identify types of couples that might be affected 
by partnership penalties and bonuses. The estimates show that the partnership 
penalty is lower after housing costs are taken into account and if maintenance 
payments are made. The disincentives are higher for couples living in the private 
rented sector, one-earner couples, two-earner couples with high joint incomes 
but modest incomes individually, and couples on IS. There are few penalties (even 
bonuses) for couples living in owner occupation with a mortgage and two-earner 
couples with ‘low’ incomes.
Notwithstanding that some couples face sizable bonuses and penalties, the 
Anderberg et al. (2008) and Draper (2008) analyses do not tell us if the existence 
of	a	penalty	(or	bonus)	is	sufficient	to	alter	behaviour;	whether	couples	facing,	say,	
a penalty were more likely to separate than other couples is unknown. Such an 
analysis would require the use of panel or pooled cross-sectional data.
62 For this reason no figures are quoted from this study.
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Appendix C 
Summary of Moffitt’s  
(1998b) review of US  
non-experimental studies
There are a number of reviews of the literature on the impact of welfare systems 
on family structure and the most often cited is Moffitt (1998b), who reviewed 68 
estimates of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC’s) effect on marriage, 
single motherhood, female headship, fertility and abortion over the period up to 
1996. A summary of his review findings is given in Table C.1. Moffitt (1998b:67-
68) shows that during the 1970s the research suggests that the welfare system 
had no effect on marriage and childbearing. However, during the 1980s and 1990s 
there was a consensus that it did have an effect (a negative effect on marriage 
and	a	positive	effect	on	fertility);	albeit	the	magnitude	of	that	effect	was	uncertain	
with some claiming is was small and others that it was sizeable (Moffitt, 1998a:1 
and 1998b:50):
‘A neutral reading of the evidence still leads to the conclusion that welfare 
has incentive effects on marriage and fertility, but uncertainty introduced 
by the disparities in the research findings weakens the strength of that 
conclusion.’
Moffitt (1998b:75)
Subsequently, Moffitt modifies his position slightly - notwithstanding uncertainty in 
the literature and a number of studies reporting insignificant results, he concludes 
welfare ‘is likely to have some effect on family structure’. (Moffitt, 2003:336). 
However, this is based on giving equal weighting to the studies regardless of 
the extent to which they sought to control for unobserved variables (Moffitt, 
1998b:70). Yet there are more estimates for studies that did not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity than for those that did and, by race, the two approaches 
suggest different welfare impacts. That is, there is a link between the analytical 
approach used (or source of benefit variation) and whether a welfare effect is 
found by race. 
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For the estimates not including controls for unobserved heterogeneity slightly more 
studies reported significant effects (18) than insignificant effects (15) (Moffitt, 
1998b:68-69). However, the studies imply a larger effect for white women (with 
nine significant and only two insignificant estimates) than for non-white and black 
women (with six significant and seven insignificant estimates). In comparison, for 
the smaller number of studies including controls for unobserved variables (that is, 
fixed effects) the estimated effect on white women is weaker (four significant and 
four insignificant estimates). However, the results for non-white and black women 
are stronger (with five significant and only one insignificant estimates). 
So:
‘Overall, although there is a very slight excess of significant estimates over 
insignificant ones across all races, it is quite small. However, the patterns 
differ by race and source of benefit variation …. The difference in how 
benefit variation affects family structure between the two races is a result of 
a different sorting of single mothers by state for the two races, with white 
single mothers tending to be concentrated in high-benefit states but black 
single mothers tending to be concentrated in low benefit states.’
Moffitt (2003:336)
Moffitt (1998b:71) highlights that the studies control for different State level 
variables. Whether labour market, demographic and/or political characteristics 
are controlled for varies, as does which specific variables are used. For example, 
labour market variables include rate of unemployment, median or average wages, 
and percentage employed in specific sectors. His review suggests:
‘… the more variables that are controlled for in an analysis, the weaker is 
the estimated effect of welfare – although there is no logical reason why this 
need be so …’
Moffitt (1998b:71)
Nonetheless, in substantive terms, all of the significant studies in the Moffitt 
(1998b) review show that AFDC had a positive effect on single motherhood/
fertility and a negative effect on marriage. 
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Appendix D 
US studies modelling the 
amount and distribution of 
union bonuses and penalties
This review considers the impact of the welfare system on demographic behaviour. 
However, some United States (US) analysts model the size and distribution of union 
bonuses and penalties but not whether they subsequently affect behaviour. This 
appendix outlines selected US studies estimating marriage bonuses and penalties 
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC).
D.1 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Acs and Maag (2005) use data for cohabitating couples with children from the 
2001 National Survey of America’s Families and a tax-transfer simulation model 
to estimate the union penalties and bonuses arising from TANF, given known tax 
changes for 2003 and 2008.63 They hypothetically ‘divorce’ couples (see Section 
1.6.1) to calculate union bonuses and penalties. They find that most low-income 
cohabiting couple with children (86 per cent) do not receive TANF and by definition 
receive no penalty or bonus due to TANF (Acs and Maag, 2005:6). Nonetheless, 
TANF interacts with the tax system to alter the potential marriage bonuses and 
penalties that cohabitating couples with children face. For the 9.6 per cent of 
low-income cohabiting couples that faced an average tax penalty of $1,004 in 
2003, marriage would result in an average loss of $1,800 in TANF benefits giving 
an overall loss of $2,804. Under the 2008 tax changes the potential loss in TANF 
benefits was unchanged but increases in the tax penalty increased the combined 
tax and TANF loss to $3,311. For the 65.2 per cent of low-income cohabiting 
couples that faced an average tax bonus of $2,939 in 2003, the potential loss 
63 TANF is outlined in Section 1.4.3.
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in TANF benefits was $2,096 leaving them with a small overall bonus of $843. 
However, planned tax changes for 2008 would increase the tax bonus (the loss 
of TANF benefits is the same) giving an overall tax-transfer bonus of $1,294. Thus 
Acs and Maag (2005:6) conclude that:
‘For low-income families, the potential loss of cash welfare benefits under 
TANF may be a greater financial barrier to marriage than any bonus or penalty 
resulting from federal taxes.’
However, their analysis only applies to cohabitating couples with children and 
ignores other family forms, and the TANF modelling makes a number of simplifying 
assumptions and does not capture fully the variation in states’ eligibility rules for 
TANF. Moreover, Acs and Maag (2005) simulate marriage bonuses and penalties, 
and as mentioned elsewhere in this report, such studies do not explore whether 
the identified financial incentives and disincentives affect actual behaviour.
D.2 Earned Income Tax Credit
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, there are marriage bonuses and penalties 
associated with EITC. It can provide both marriage bonuses and penalties relative 
to cohabitation or living independently. This is because it has both phase-in and 
phase-out (or withdrawal) stages. For a working parent EITC increases as income 
rises (phase-in stage), there is then an income range where the amount of credit 
does not change (a ‘plateau’ where the maximum credit is payable), and, finally, 
as income rises further the amount of credit received falls (phase-out stage) until 
it diminishes altogether. So if a single parent marries and the couple’s joint income 
take them above this phase-out threshold they face a marriage penalty (Carasso 
and Steuerle, 2005:163), and they face high marginal rates of taxation (Ellwood, 
2000a:194). However, if a low earner marries a non-earner with a child they may 
receive a marriage bonus if they file jointly, as their combined income entitles them 
to a larger credit than if they claimed as two unmarried individuals (Holtzblatt and 
Rebelein, 2000:1108).64 Similarly, a two-earner couple with children and a modest 
joint income could be ineligible for EITC if married, but receive it they do not marry. 
Cohabiting couples can also receive union penalties and bonuses. In general, EITC 
provides a marriage subsidy to single-earner families and a marriage penalty to 
two-earner	households	(Dickert-Conlin	and	Houser,	2002:27;	Eissa	and	Hoynes,	
2000:687). Given the gendered nature of employment this will tend to penalise 
marriage for women who work and subsidise those women who do not.
In recent years the Federal Government has sought to reduce the marriage 
penalties in EITC and the wider tax system. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Act 2001 created a separate married-couple schedule for EITC, which was phased 
in between 2002 and 2007 (Hoffman and Seidman, 2003:84 and 95). This Act 
extends the ‘plateau’ of maximum EITC for married couples so that the phase-out 
stage commences at a higher income.
64 In the US married couples can for income tax purposes file either jointly or 
separately. Most couples file jointly because this reduces their income tax 
liability (Holtzblatt and Rebelein, 2000:1110).
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In practice, US families’ overall marriage bonus and penalty is affected by the 
interaction between the tax and transfer systems. So that, for instance, the penalty 
arising from the loss of TANF can in certain circumstances be offset by a marriage 
bonus from EITC. 
In theory, there is an incentive to marry during the (generous) phase-in of the tax 
credit and to dissolve partnerships during the phase-out of EITC because it only 
counts	 the	 income	of	married	partners	 (Blundell	and	Walker,	2001:31;	Carasso	
and Steuerle, 2005:168).65 As Scholz observes:
‘In general, positive incentives to marry are provided to low- or zero-earning 
taxpayers with children; and positive incentives for separation (or negative 
incentives for marriage) are provided to couples with children when each 
has modest earned income.’
Scholz (1994:9)
Ellwood (2000a) makes the same point but adds that phasing-out of EITC is 
accompanied by the loss of Food Stamps and the phasing in of federal taxes (see 
also Carasso and Steuerle, 2005:168). As a consequence recipients have high 
effective marginal rates of taxation. 
Some writers, such as Acs and Maag (2005), Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998) 
and Holtzblatt and Rebelein (2000) use survey or administrative data and 
micro-simulation models to estimate the size of the dis/incentives in EITC for 
partnering. These studies tend to ‘divorce’ the married couples (see Section 1.6.1) 
when calculating marriage bonuses and penalties. Dickert-Conlin and Houser 
(1998) utilise hypothetical families to derive their estimates (see also Eissa and 
Hoynes,	 2000:687;	 Hoffman	 and	 Seidman,	 2003:84-86),	whilst	 Holtzblatt	 and	
Rebelein (2000) focus on different family arrangements. The simulations by Dickert-
Conlin and Houser (1998) suggest that marriage tax penalties are relatively large 
and that those facing the highest marriage bonuses in the tax system (in part 
due to EITC) also had the largest marriage penalties in the welfare system. Acs 
and Maag (2005:3-6) (see also Section D.1) find that for cohabitating couples tax 
changes introduced by President Bush and coming into effect in 2003 and 2008 
have made the welfare system more ‘marriage-friendly’ – the proportion facing 
penalties if they were to marry has decreased. The proportion of low-income 
cohabitating families with children receiving a bonus in 2003 was 63 per cent and 
this is estimated to rise to 75 per cent in 2008. Moreover, the size of the average 
tax bonus and penalty was expected to increase by 2008. For low-income families 
the main source of marriage penalties was EITC. Penalties increase in size because 
cohabitating couples in 2008 became eligible for fewer and lower non-EITC tax 
credits and so will be less able to offset their tax liabilities.
65 EITC also provides incentives for cohabitation. EITC is briefly described in 
Section 1.4.3.
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An interesting approach is used by Ellwood (2000b) which allows fertility and 
earnings to vary after marriage (rather than assuming that they are unchanged). 
Ellwood (2000b:1089-1090) uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1983 
to 1991 to observe the reported income of individuals before and after marriage. 
He calculates their income for the last year prior to marriage and for the first 
year afterwards, and then estimates whether they would have been ‘winners or 
losers’ had the provisions for the rapid expansion of EITC in 1996 applied before 
and after marriage. Thus, he captures any changes in labour market status or 
childbearing following marriage, and avoids any impact that the expanded 1996 
EITC regime could have had on marriage decisions. 
Ellwood (2000b) estimates that there would have been more marriages where 
the amount of the 1996 EITC (had it been in effect) would have been lower 
(16 per cent, with an average loss of $1,500) than higher (11 per cent, with an 
average gain of $1,400). The majority of marriages (72 per cent) would experience 
no change in EITC. The main reason for the higher proportion of ‘losers’ is that 
there was a relatively high proportion of marriages where before marriage both 
partners worked and had a child, and in most of these cases the estimated EITC 
was lower post-marriage. The estimate of the proportion of winners is likely to be 
an underestimate as many couples were likely to have children after the first year 
which could increase their EITC. However, his sample, which is of new marriages, 
may not be representative of the wider ‘stock’ of marriages. 
As mentioned in Section 1.6.1, studies that estimate EITC net benefits are sensitive 
to the assumptions made, especially about labour market status and living 
arrangements. For instance, studies that ‘divorce’ married couples and assume 
that the children remain with the women are likely to find that fewer families face 
marriage penalties than those where it is assumed that, where there are two or 
more children, they will be divided between the ‘separated’ parents.
The studies considered here show that EITC generates both marriage bonuses and 
penalties, and in some cases they are relatively large. The estimates do not say if 
the bonuses and penalties actually influenced behaviour. 
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